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Abstract
This thesis examines the operation of urban labour and housing markets. I bring new insights
to old questions about migration, unemployment and homeownership.
The first essay studies the impact of immigration on the wages of native-born workers. In
standard competitive models, the e ect comes entirely through changes in marginal products
of di erent labour types. But, I argue that firms with monopsonistic power can exploit the
lower reservation wages of recent migrants by cutting wages for natives and migrants alike. I
present evidence from cross-city variation in local skill distributions, wages, and employment
rates.
The second essay looks at why higher skilled workers are more likely to migrate long
distances within a country. It is commonly argued that they face comparatively low migration
costs. But, US survey evidence on reported reasons for moving suggests this explanation is at
best incomplete. I argue that high skilled workers are relatively mobile, more fundamentally,
because of larger potential gains from a successful job match.
The third essay documents descriptive facts on regional unemployment di erentials. In
the UK, unemployment has remained persistently high in less productive cities since the
1980s. But, there is no such relationship in the US: local populations adjust quickly to
meet local demand. I speculate that relatively generous out-of-work benefits in the UK may
allow unemployed workers to remain in poor-performing cities, while low local housing costs
discourage them from searching elsewhere.
The final (co-authored) essay focuses on the determinants of homeownership. It is com-
monly argued that households bring forward their home purchase because of uncertainty over
future house price fluctuations. But, using a life cycle model, we argue that households are
more likely to respond to price risk by increasing their liquid savings. We present supporting
evidence from cross-city variation in ownership rates and loan-to-value ratios.
3
Contents
Contents 4
List of Figures 6
List of Tables 8
1 Introduction 10
2 “Cheap Labour”: Immigration and Wages Revisited 14
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Empirical application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.5 Empirical results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3 Skilled Mobility and the Job Surplus 52
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Migration patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.4 Equilibrium results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5 Response to local shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.6 Evidence on the productivity process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.7 Market tightness and search behaviour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4 Descriptive Facts on Local Joblessness in the UK and US 87
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.3 Labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Changes over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Role of local house prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.6 Local housing market characteristics in the UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.7 Migration patterns to and from London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4
4.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5 Do Households Use Homeownership To Insure Themselves? Evidence
Across US Cities 112
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.2 Homeownership and loan-to-value ratios in the data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.3 Household choice model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.4 Parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.6 Regression-based inferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
A. Data construction and supplementary estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
B. Parametrization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
C. Further robustness exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
6 Conclusions 158
Bibliography 161
5
List of Figures
2.1 Share of migrants among 16-64s (Census/ACS 1940-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.2 Position of recent migrants (last 10 years) in occupational skill distribution of
long-term residents (ACS 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Position of recent migrants and long-term residents, by education, in skill
distirbution (ACS 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Predicted and actual local migration rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local migration rate . . . . . . . 38
2.6 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local migrant share . . . . . . . . 39
2.7 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local employment hours . . . . . 40
2.8 Decomposition of occupation-specific e ects on 5-year local employment growth 42
2.9 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local native wages . . . . . . . . 45
2.10 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on wage di erential between current
and previous residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.11 Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local native employment ratio . . 49
3.1 Annual migration rates by education and experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Share of cross-county moves which are cross-state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Share of cross-state moves exceeding 2000km . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Annual migration rates disaggregated by reported reason . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.5 Share of workers changing job each year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.6 Variance of 4-month changes in log full-time hourly wages (SIPP 1996-2007) 81
3.7 Variance of 4-month changes in log full-time hourly wages (SIPP 1996-2007):
non-imputed data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.8 Variance of 4-month changes in log monthly earnings (SIPP 1996-2007) . . . 82
3.9 Ratio of online job ads to unemployment (Conference Board, Apr 2007; ACS 2007) 83
4.1 Cross-city relationships for UK and US: labour market . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.2 Disaggregation of London . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 Evolving regional correlation between non-employment (men, 16-64) and house
prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
4.4 Cross-city relationships for UK and US: local prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.5 Housing market indicators across UK cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.6 Incidence of overcrowded housing across UK cities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
6
4.7 Inter-regional and international migration, by region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.8 In- and out-migration rates for London, by age (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.9 In- and out-migration rates for London of 16-64s, by education (2001) . . . . 109
4.10 In- and out-migration rates for London, by region (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.11 Commuting patterns of East and South East workers (2001) . . . . . . . . . 110
5.1 Homeownership, price risk and price levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.2 Price levels and risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.3 Homeownership and residual price levels and volatilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.4 LTV (AHS), price risk and price levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 LTV (MIRS), price risk and price levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.6 Price risk and levels and land share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.7 Land share and land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.8 Price risk and levels and land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
5.9 Homeownership, land share and land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.10 LTV, land share and land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.11 Homeownership-price relationship by dwelling type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.12 LTV-price relationship by dwelling type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.13 E ective mortgage interest rate, price risk and price levels . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.14 House price growth and land scarcity, by decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.15 LTV and land scarcity, by buyer type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.16 Wage growth and land scarcity, by decade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
5.17 Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value levels . . . . . . . . . 146
5.18 Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value volatilities . . . . . . 147
5.19 L-M adjusted family size profile (yearly bins) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
5.20 Changing e ect of land scarcity on LTV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
7
List of Tables
3.1 Breakdown of migration motivations in main sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2 Marginal e ects from probit regressions on match-specific migration incidence 62
3.3 Marginal e ects from probit regressions on non-match migration incidence . 63
3.4 Marginal e ects from probit regressions on migration incidence . . . . . . . . 66
3.5 Marginal e ects from probit regressions on migration incidence: robustness
sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.6 Evidence on learning e ort from the SBA survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.1 Net replacement rates (%) in UK and US, relative to 67% of average wage
(2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.2 E ect of local wages on unemployment for UK and US (2010) . . . . . . . . 97
4.3 E ect of local wages on inactivity for UK and US (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 Invariant parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.2 Matched parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
5.3 Model fit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.4 Homeownership profile: data and model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.5 Slopes with respect to land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.6 Contribution from various elements: slopes with respect to land scarcity . . . 134
5.7 Ownership slopes with respect to land scarcity for select counterfactuals . . . 137
5.8 Regressions of LTV on price volatilities and levels, for samples delineated by
the loan-limit ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.9 Family size equivalence scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.10 E ects on homeownership of price, volatility and land scarcity . . . . . . . . 151
5.11 E ects on LTV of price, volatility and land scarcity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.12 Explaining cross-city variation in local price levels and volatilities . . . . . . 154
5.13 Land scarcity slopes for key parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
5.14 Robustness of land scarcity slope for house price volatility . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.15 Robustness of land scarcity slope for wage volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
8
Acknowledgments
Funding
I am grateful to the Economic and Social Research Council and the Royal Economic So-
ciety for supporting this work financially, through a PhD studentship and Junior Fellowship
respectively.
Conjoint Work
Chapter 5 is based on joint work with Jonathan Halket, and I thank him for allowing me to
include it in this thesis. The remaining chapters (1, 2, 3 and 4) are entirely my own.
Personal
I would like to thank my supervisors at UCL, Steve Machin and Jeremy Lise, for their
guidance and support throughout the process; and similarly, Alan Manning, my supervisor
at the Centre for Economic Performance. I appreciate their sincere advice, criticism and
encouragement. They have helped me to approach both empirical and theoretical problems
with greater maturity.
I have been fortunate to work with several co-authors during my time UCL, namely
Pedro Carneiro, Emanuela Galasso, Rita Ginja, Jonathan Halket and Nithin Umapathi. I
enjoyed our discussions and have learnt a great deal from them. Special thanks also to
Emanuela and Nithin for hosting me at the World Bank, and to James Banks and Rachel
Gri th for providing me a desk at the Institute for Fiscal Studies through the course of my
PhD. I am also grateful to David Green and Jan Stuhler for kindly reading drafts at various
stages of this project, and to Jan Eeckhout for his keen interest. Chapter 5 is forthcoming
in Quantitative Economics, and I thank our two anonymous referees and the editor, Jose-
Victor Rios-Rull. And thanks are also due to my fellow PhD students at UCL for all their
support and encouragement, especially Ilker Kandemir, Thibaut Lamadon, Florian Oswald,
Dan Rogger, Ali Sepahsalari and Jan Stuhler.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Interest in regional issues has grown in recent years, as local disparities in economic outcomes
have become more visible following the Great Recession. In this thesis, I address a range
of questions pertaining to urban labour and housing markets, drawing from evidence from
the US and UK. A critical force shaping the evolution of many cities is immigration, and
Chapter 2 revisits the old question of how it has a ected the wages of native-born workers.
The subject of the next chapter is the geographical integration of labour markets. I discuss
why higher skilled workers tend to migrate more between cities. The subject of Chapter 4
is the persistence of high levels of unemployment and economic inactivity in some British
cities. Another important distinction between cities is the extent of homeownership, and
Chapter 5 (co-authored with Jonathan Halket) exploits this geographical variation to study
the impact of price risk on ownership decisions.
Each of these chapters are intended to be free-standing, but it is useful to provide a brief
summary of their content and - in the case of the essays on labour markets - to draw out
the parallels between them. An important theme in the initial chapters is the role of search
frictions and imperfect competition in labour markets. Great progress has been made in this
field in recent decades, building on seminal work by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1985), who jointly received the Nobel Prize in 2010. One goal of this thesis is to
bring new insights from this literature to areas of labour economics traditionally dominated
by the competitive paradigm.
In Chapter 2, I argue that competitive models may significantly understate the labour
market impact of immigration. Despite the great energy devoted to this question, the liter-
ature is still devoid of consensus, with many studies (e.g. Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) arguing
the wage e ect is small. I take a new approach by studying wage e ects in an imperfectly
competitive world. In this context, workers’ wage demands play an important role in wage
determination. The evidence suggests new migrants have lower reservation wages than oth-
erwise identical native-born workers (e.g. Chiswick, 1978; Nanos and Schluter, 2013). This
may be due to higher job search costs, ineligibility for social transfers, risks associated with
unauthorised status or heavier discounting (since many migrants intend to work in the host
country for a limited period). As a result, in cities experiencing sustained inflows of new
migrants, employers with market power can exploit these lower wage demands by cutting
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wages for natives and migrants alike. This is consistent with public perceptions of migrants
“undercutting” long-standing wage norms in the a ected markets.
I demonstrate how this wage e ect arises in an equilibrium model with wage-posting firms.
This exercise builds on work by Albrecht and Axell (1984), who study wage and employment
outcomes where workers have heterogeneous leisure values. Following Albrecht and Axell,
the monopsonistic power of firms originates from random matching between workers and
firms. For simplicity, I assume that firms cannot discriminate between natives and migrants
in wage-setting. But, the broad result will hold as long as the markets for native and migrant
labour are not entirely segregated.
It is di cult to identify this e ect of reservation wages in the data, but I provide some
indirect empirical evidence from cross-city variation in the US. Specifically, in recent decades,
the wages and employment rates of natives in low skilled occupations (where migrants are
concentrated) have fallen in popular migrant destination states relative to elsewhere. A
competitive model can explain this if the relative supply of skilled labour has fallen in these
states; but this has not happened because of large geographical displacement of lower skilled
natives. I also show that these patterns cannot be explained by selection of workers across
states, and I propose lower migrant reservation wages as an alternative explanation.
In Chapter 3, I show how frictional models can also shed light on how labour markets
operate geographically. It is well known that higher skilled workers are more likely to migrate
long distances within a country, but the reasons for this are still under dispute. Evidence
has accumulated that low skilled workers are less likely to leave cities su ering declines in
employment. Given this limited supply response, it is often argued that the low skilled
face significant migration costs, whether due to credit constraints, lack of information or
home attachment. This debate has gained more prominence since the Great Recession, as
policymakers try to address pockets of low skilled unemployment in blighted areas. Moretti
(2012) has proposed that the US federal government fund relocation grants to help workers
in this predicament.
This focus on migration costs is natural, given the pervasiveness of the competitive urban
framework proposed by Roback (1982). There, migration is treated as a form of spatial
arbitrage between distinct local labour markets, with workers comparing local wages, amenity
values and housing costs. Any sluggishness in this arbitrage process in low skilled markets
must then then be explained by large unspecified moving costs. But, in this chapter, I
consider an alternative world where workers search for work in multiple cities simultaneously.
And I argue the obstacles to low skilled mobility are precisely those “frictions” which explain
the coexistence of unemployment and vacancies more generally. These frictions are larger in
low skilled markets, because smaller job surpluses discourage search e ort (on both sides of
the market) and job creation. And, in turn, these paltry surpluses have their source in low
average productivity and low dispersion in match quality.
I motivate this perspective with new evidence from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
in the US. Since 1999, the CPS has asked workers who changed residence for their primary
reason for moving. It turns out that, in any given year, better educated workers are much
more likely to move county or state for the sake of a specific job match; and the same is
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true of workers in higher skilled jobs within occupation groups. But, they are also less likely
to move for the sake of family, housing or amenity reasons, or to look for work. This is
a natural consequence of a large job surplus, which is more resilient in the face of external
shocks. I support these claims with evidence from other sources on skill di erences in earnings
processes, market tightness and search behaviour.
Having said that, it is important not to exaggerate the contribution of geographical
immobility to unemployment. Seminal work by Blanchard and Katz (1992), based on time
series evidence, finds that local labour supply is quick to respond to local demand shocks
in the US. And, Sahin et al. (2012) show that geographical mismatch between unemployed
workers and job vacancies did not contribute to the rise in unemployment in the Great
Recession.
In a similar vein, I document in Chapter 4 that working-age individuals are no more
likely to be unemployed or economically inactive in less productive cities (identified with
lower average wages) in the US, once I control for observable characteristics. Instead, these
cities tend to be significantly smaller in size - which is consistent with an elastic supply of
local labour. A notorious example is Detroit, whose population more than halved since a
peak of 2m in 1950 and where 23% of homes are unoccupied1.
However, a footloose workforce is not a standard characteristic of advanced economies.
In the UK, since the early 1980s, I show that less productive cities have been characterised
by significantly higher rates of joblessness. Unemployment rates in 2010 ranged from 5%
in the most productive cities to 10% in the least (with the variation driven by younger
workers), and economic inactivity among 16-64s from 20% in the most productive to 25% in
the least (driven by earlier retirement). The observable characteristics of local workers can
only explain a third of this variation. Furthermore, the cross-city city relationship between
wages and population is much weaker than in the US; this also is consistent with weak
migratory responses to shocks.2
Out-of-work benefits are significantly more generous in the UK than the US, and this
could help explain why unemployed and inactive workers can survive long-term in less pro-
ductive cities. But, the mere ability to survive is not su cient reason to stay put, and welfare
generosity is an inadequate explanation for why regional shocks from the 1980s have per-
sisted for so long. Instead, I speculate that local housing markets have played an important
role. Estimates from Gibbons et al. (2011) suggest that local spending power, accounting for
cross-city variation in housing costs, is in fact significantly higher in less productive cities.
As such, the prospect of a better quality of life in work may discourage local unemployed
workers from searching for jobs elsewhere.
One possible theory is that, following the industrial shocks of the 1980s, housing costs
in the a ected cities fell more than wages because of the durability of local housing stocks.
While human capital was destroyed (as skills specific to the old industries were rendered
valueless), the local housing stock was largely preserved. This resulted in an over-supply
1Census Bureau, 2010
2London is a unique and important outlier, with both high wages and high unemployment; I suggest that
significant and persistent immigration to the city might help explain its distinctiveness.
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of housing relative to labour, so housing costs fell relative to wages. To sustain such an
outcome, there must be some downward stickiness in local wages - otherwise, wages would
fall to clear local unemployment. This might be driven by benefit or wage policies (such
as the national minimum wage or national public sector pay scales) which bind more in
low-wage areas. Also, early retirement from the labour force is likely to reduce the pressure
on wages through a hysteresis e ect (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). The key point is that
the benefit system, together with the role of housing markets, might help explain why local
unemployment is more persistent in the UK than US - without resorting to the popular
perception that Americans are intrinsically more geographically mobile than Europeans.
The fact that these patterns in the UK pertain largely to low skilled workers is consistent
with the story in Chapter 3. Specifically, better educated workers pay less attention to
regional di erences in average wages and average housing costs, because they are more
concerned about finding the best possible job match. As a result, they search more broadly
geographically for jobs, so local pockets of unemployment do not materialise.
Chapter 5, based on joint work with Jonathan Halket, moves away from labour markets
and focuses on the determinants of homeownership. Housing has traditionally been analysed
by economists as a financial asset with relatively risky returns. But, housing also serves
an essential function in its own right: everybody needs a place to live. In recent years,
economists have argued that ownership is a form of insurance against rental price volatility
(Sinai and Souleles, 2005). Or, if households intend to own at some point in the future, they
may insure themselves against house price risk by bringing forward their ownership decision
to “get on the housing ladder” (Banks et al., 2010).
Using a calibrated life-cycle model, we argue that ownership is too blunt an instrument
for many households interested in insurance. Instead, households are more likely to respond
to price risk by accumulating liquid savings. We present supporting evidence from variation
across US cities. Riskier cities tend to have significantly lower ownership rates (conditional
on household income and other observed characteristics) and lower loan-to-value ratios at
purchase. Our model suggests the lower ownership rates reflect the fact that housing tends
to be more costly in riskier cities. The loan-to-value patterns are driven by geographical vari-
ation in price risk: since households save more in riskier cities, they put down comparatively
larger deposits when they eventually purchase.
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Chapter 2
“Cheap Labour”: Immigration and
Wages Revisited
2.1 Introduction
Migration in non-competitive markets
It is commonly accepted that, if capital is perfectly elastic, native workers benefit on average
from immigration. This result follows from a competitive model with constant returns to
scale. If natives and migrants are not perfect substitutes in production, migrants will be
paid less than their contribution to output; and assuming zero profits, this “immigration
surplus” will be returned to natives (see Borjas, 1995).
In this study, I show that the immigration surplus argument may fail if workers are not
paid their marginal product. In competitive models, any contraction of wages reflects a
decline in productivity. However, under imperfect competition, wage e ects can materialise
even with productivity held constant. Specifically, if migrants are willing to accept lower
wages than natives, a rising share of migrants (with productivity unchanged) will encourage
monopsonistic employers to cut wages for natives and migrants alike.1 This story of “cheap”
migrant labour undercutting native wages has strong resonance in the public consciousness2,
but has largely been neglected by economists.
1This idea is closely related to Beaudry et al. (2012), and the comparison is instructive. They show,
using US data, that the wage bargain in a given job is responsive to local industrial composition (keeping
productivity fixed): in a bargaining model, workers in cities dominated by high-paying industries have
more attractive outside job options. In both this study and theirs, wages respond to changes in workers’
reservation values. Here, this change orginates from the composition of workers. But there, it comes from
the composition of industries. I am grateful to David Green for this observation.
2This story is popular across the political spectrum. On the left, union leader Terence O’Sullivan claims
“workers don’t depress wages. Unscrupulous employers do” (New York Times, 2009). Ed Miliband, the
current leader of the Labour opposition in the UK, believes that “employers should not be allowed to exploit
migrant labour in order to undercut wages” (Miliband, 2010). And on the right, Hanson (2013) writes in
the National Review that “the bargaining power of other minorities, Latino- and African-American citizens
especially, is undercut by illegal labour.”
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Why should the mechanism behind the wage e ect matter? There are two reasons.
First, several studies have estimated wage e ects based on calibrations of these models,
rather than relying purely on the data for identification. Recent work using this method
(Card, 2009b; Manacorda et al., 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), allowing for imperfect
substitution between native and migrant labour, has tended to find only a weak impact on
low skilled wages. But, Borjas et al. (1997) note that such calibrations may underestimate
the wage e ects if there are price changes which are not entirely the outcome of quantity
changes. Second, there are important policy implications: in contrast to a competitive
framework, the frictional model implies that more e ective assimilation of migrants into the
labour market can support the wages of natives.
The idea that recent migrants have lower reservation wages than native-born workers
is well-rooted in the literature.3 Much of this discussion originates from early studies of
migrant assimilation in the labour market. Chiswick (1978) suggests that recent arrivals are
willing to accept low wages at the beginning of their stay, but their wage demands grow as
they gather more information about job opportunities in the host country. Using Portuguese
employer-employee matched data, De Matos (2011) finds that one third of this wage catch-
up is due to firm heterogeneity - as migrants move to larger, better-paying firms within
the same occupations. Nanos and Schluter (2013) use a structural on-the-job search model
with wage-posting to purge the native-migrant wage gap of productivity di erences. They
find that reservation wages are generally lower for migrants, but also more dispersed. The
gap is largest for low skilled service workers, but small in skilled blue-collar occupations.
Dustmann et al. (2013) link the idea that migrants are paid below their marginal product
with skill “downgrading”: they tend to work in jobs that are lower skilled than their measured
education would suggest (see also Eckstein and Weiss, 2004).
However, there are few (and only very recent) examples in the economic literature which
assess the impact of low migrant reservation wages on native outcomes. Chassamboulli
and Palivos (2014) and Chassamboulli and Peri (2014) outline theoretical models where
migrants’ low wage demands actually benefit natives. This seemingly counterintuitive result
arises from the assumption of random matching combined with Nash bargaining. Specifically,
firms respond to cheap migrant labour by creating many vacancies. And as markets become
tighter, natives benefit from higher job finding rates and more favourable ex post wage
bargains. Of course, this intuition collapses in a wage posting model, where firms set wages ex
ante. And importantly, there is evidence that wage posting is more common than bargaining
in low skilled markets (Hall and Krueger, 2012).
On the empirical side, Malchow-Møller et al. (2012) address these questions using Danish
employer-employee matched data. They find that, within firms, immigrant employees put
downward pressure on native wages; and they argue that this is because immigrants have
lower reservation wages. Also, in research conducted concurrently with this study using
French data, Edo (2013) finds that non-naturalised migrants put downward pressure on
3Note that reservation values may manifest themselves in workplace amenities as well as wages. Orrenius
and Zavodny (2009) find that migrants, and especially those with poor English skills, tend to work in riskier
industries and occupations (with higher fatality and injury rates); this finding contradicts earlier results from
Hamermesh (1998).
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native employment rates; but naturalised migrants have no e ect. These results exploit
variation in changing migrant shares across age-education cells.
In contrast, the impact on migrant wage demands is well established in the sociological
literature, as part of a debate over whether minorities work in segregated occupations4 or
compete directly with incumbent workers (e.g. Hodge and Hodge, 1965; Snyder and Hudis,
1976; Catanzarite, 2002).
Contributions
This study makes two main contributions. Firstly, I show how this result can be sustained
in an equilibrium model. And secondly, I provide indirect empirical evidence from variation
across US cities that this reservation wage e ect has (1) depressed the wages of low skilled
natives and (2) resulted in lower rates of native employment.
The model builds on Albrecht and Axell (1984), who study the wage and unemployment
implications of heterogeneous leisure values, in the context of wage-posting monopsonistic
firms. I consider an economy with standard CES technology over multiple skill factors, but
within each skill group, I allow for two worker types - natives and migrants - with di erent
reservation wages. I assume natives and migrants are equally productive and perfectly sub-
stitutable in production within skill groups5, and that there are constant (and unchanging)
returns to labour within firms. Migrants may have lower reservation values for two reasons:
(1) lower out-of-work utility: whether due to higher search costs (arising from language bar-
riers, exclusion from social networks or unauthorised status), ineligibility for social transfers,
binding visa requirements or other risks associated with unauthorised status; or (2) heavier
discounting: many migrants intend to work for only a limited period in the host country (see
Dustmann and Weiss, 2007). Realistically, many of these factors are more likely to pertain
to lower skilled workers.
Random matching makes labour markets “thin”, and this is the source of firms’ monop-
sony power6. In contrast to Albrecht and Axell (1984), I also assume workers are subject
to a continuous distribution of random job match utilities. This ensures that some natives
(with high quality matches) will be willing to accept the low wages on o er to migrants. As
a result, increasing the share of migrants in the economy causes native wages to fall. Of
course, unlike in a competitive model, the e ect on native welfare is not merely restricted
to wages. Since the value of natives’ outside options declines, they are more likely to accept
jobs that yield lower job match utilities. Throughout, I assume that firms cannot negotiate
wage bargains with individual workers or discriminate between natives and migrants. This
4For example, Nanos and Schluter (2013) assume that migrants and natives participate in independent
labour market segments.
5Of course, this is not a true description of reality. But, the aim of the model is to show that wage e ects
can arise from di erences in reservation values alone.
6Of course, a simple assumption of random matching does not address the root causes of monopsony
power (see Manning, 2003, for a discussion of these issues). However, the aim of this study is to demonstrate
the implications of monopsony for migrant wage e ects, rather than to study the origins of monopsony power
itself. Given this, the random matching assumption is an attractive simplification.
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is clearly an extreme case; but, as long as migrants compete with natives to some extent,
natives will lose part of their rents from employment.
Thus, workers lose rents through wage cuts. But who benefits? To the extent that new
firms are free to enter, profits cannot be larger in equilibrium. In my model, I assume firms
are free to enter at a fixed cost. So, the extra surplus is spent on the entry costs of new
firms. I also set out a variant of the model with heterogeneous firms. In this case, if firm
quality is in limited supply, the new entrants will be relatively less productive; and this will
also serve to exhaust the surplus.
Consumers are also likely to benefit from the decline of workers’ rents. In certain models
of the product market (with Bertand competition being an extreme case), firms will cut
prices in response to the lower labour costs. Indeed, Cortes (2008) finds that prices of
low skilled services have fallen in cities with rapidly expanding migrant populations. She
interprets these e ects in the context of rising low skilled output within a competitive model.
But, as I explain below, I disupute her claim of minimal geographical displacement. And
consequently, I would interpret her findings as reflecting falling labour costs driven by low
migrant wage demands, rather than changes in the supply of these services.
My second contribution is to provide indirect empirical evidence for this phenomenon,
based on variation across US cities. The model suggests that native earnings in a given skill
group are a function of (1) the skill-specific supply of labour (which a ects the marginal
product) and (2) the migrant share (which a ects wage demands). I wish to study the ef-
fect of migrant share, holding skill-specific labour supply fixed. Of course, migrant share is
somewhat endogenous to wages. A natural instrument in a cross-city setting, initially pop-
ularised by Card (2001), is based on migrant enclaves. Specifically, I estimate the predicted
contribution of migration to local population growth, assuming that new migrants of each
origin country settle in di erent areas proportionally with the initial geographical distribu-
tion of their co-patriot communities.7 And indeed, the instrument has a strong e ect on the
local migrant share - with most of the impact felt in low skilled markets, where migrants are
overrepresented.8
The empirical challenge here is then to deal with the endogeneity of labour supply.
Controlling for labour supply directly is not a viable option, because it itself is endogenous
to wages. My approach instead is simply to omit labour supply as a control. This may
at first appear equally unappealing: the instrument’s exclusion restriction will be violated
if areas with larger migrant enclaves experience growing labour supply as well as migrant
share. However, I present new evidence of substantial displacement of low skilled natives
and longer term migrants from large enclave areas - to the extent that the local supply of
low and high skilled labour are little changed, at least until the 2000s. Of course, at the
same time, the large native displacement greatly amplifies the e ect on migrant share in
low skilled markets. This is a significant finding, because the question of displacement has
7It is well known that migrants tend to cluster in those cities where their communities have historically
settled, whether because of job networks (Munshi, 2003) or cultural amenities (Gonzalez, 1998).
8This is despite the commonly cited fact that a similar share of migrants and natives hold college degrees.
See, for example, Card (2009b) or Ottaviano and Peri (2012).
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long been the subject of vigorous debate9. But, I argue that those studies which dispute
displacement are usually compromised by restrictive skill group definitions. Instead, I take
a flexible approach, reporting estimates separately by two-digit occupations.
Despite this large displacement, I still identify large negative e ects on low skilled native
wages (where skill is defined by occupation) - with the bulk of the e ect coming in the
1970s, at the same time as a rapid acceleration of immigration. In that decade, controlling
for local demand shock predictors, I predict that immigration triggered an 8 log point decline
in local native wages in the lowest skilled jobs in a popular migrant destination like New
York; but the e ect on high skilled wages was minimal. There may be concerns that the that
local wage changes reflect sorting of di erent types of workers across cities. But, I reject
this explanation after comparing the wages of current and previous residents of each city.
Instead, I argue that the depressing e ect of low migrant reservation wages is a plausible
explanation. Of course, this is only one component of the overall wage e ect of migration:
changes in marginal products cannot be identified using cross-city variation precisely because
of large geographical displacement (as argued by Borjas et al., 1997).
While observed wages did not respond much to migration in subsequent decades, it is still
plausible that the wage o er distribution shifted downwards. This is because I find large
e ects on low skilled native employment-population ratios in the 1980s and 1990s. This
growing number of jobless natives are likely to be rejecting wage o ers at the bottom of the
distribution. And since these o ers are unobserved, wage o ers may well be growing more
slowly than observed wages in the a ected cities. This result has important implications
for the interpretation of empirical studies in the US migration literature. Several of these
studies (such as Borjas, 2006; Cortes, 2008) are estimated on data after the 1970s, when the
bulk of the local native wage e ect materialised. Such an approach will miss important wage
e ects, if selection through employment rates is not acknowledged.
In the following section, I set out an equilibrium model that illustrates how migrant
reservation values a ect native wage and employment outcomes. Section 2.3 shows how the
model’s predictions can be tested with city-level data. I describe the data in Section 2.4
and discuss the relative merits of education and occupation-based measures of skill. I also
report some evidence on the power of the enclave instrument. The main empirical results are
presented in Section 2.5, and Section 2.6 concludes with a discussion of policy implications.
2.2 Model
Overview
I present a simple discrete-time job matching model with wage-setting monopsonistic firms.
Labour is the sole factor of production. There are ns workers of skill s, of whom nMs = ⁄sns
are migrants and nNs = (1≠ ⁄s)ns are natives. For simplicity, I assume natives and migrants
9To list a few examples, Frey (1995; 1996), Borjas et al. (1997) and Borjas (2006) provide evidence in
favour of geographical displacement; whereas Card (2001; 2009a), Cortes (2008) and Peri and Sparber (2011)
provide evidence against.
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are perfect substitutes within skill group s. The labour market is fully segmented by skill,
with workers of skill s employed exclusively to produce an intermediate good ys (priced at
ps). Intermediate goods are combined to create a final good y (whose price is normalised to
1) using a CES technology. The market for final goods production is competitive: for each
skill type s, ps is set equal to the marginal contribution of ys to the final good. But, labour
markets are not competitive due to random matching between workers and intermediate
goods firms.
For each skill type s, there are ks intermediate firms, denoted j. There are constant
returns to labour within each firm, and I assume that each worker of skill s produces one
unit of the intermediate good ys. In an extension below, I allow for heterogeneity in worker
productivity across firms within skill groups. Firms choose whether to be active or inactive;
they must pay a one-o  cost of c if they decide to enter the market. I denote the share
of active firms in market s as ◊s. Firms set wages to maximise profits. I assume that ◊sks
is large, so individual firms take other firms’ choices as exogenous when making their own
wage decision. Also, I assume firms cannot discriminate in wage o ers between natives and
migrants. This is clearly a strong assumption, but as long as labour markets are not entirely
segregated between natives and migrants, the qualitative results outlined below will hold.
Firms exist forever, but workers face a probability ”T of exiting the labour market in any
period (after which they receive zero utility forever), where ”T varies across worker types
T = {M,N}. ”T also functions as the worker’s discount rate in this model. The worker
population in skill group s is maintained by a constant flow of ”N (1≠ ⁄)ns natives and
”M⁄ns migrants entering the labour market. Each period, new workers of skill s draw a
wage wj from the endogenous o er distribution Fws ; they face an equal probability 1◊ks of
meeting any given firm. Simultaneously, workers draw a random job match utility parameter
Ái, where log Ái has an exogenous symmetric distribution F Á with mean 0. I assume the
cumulative density function F Á (Á) is continuous and di erentiable over the full support of Á
and that its density function f Á (Á) is also continuous and di erentiable. I also assume that
the hazard rate of F Á (i.e. fÁ(Á)1≠F Á(Á)) is monotonically increasing over the full support of Á.10
If workers reject a job o er, they receive a leisure flow bT > 0 and survive with probability
1 ≠ ”T to draw a new wage o er. Once they accept a job o er, they remain at the same
firm until they exit the labour market, receiving a flow utility of Áiwj each period. In setting
their wage wj, firms trade o  profit per worker with labour force size.
In this model, migrants may have relatively low reservation wages for two reasons: (1)
smaller leisure values, bM < bN or (2) heavier discounting, ”M > ”N . If either of these condi-
tions are true, I show that an increase in the migrant share ⁄ will reduce natives’ reservation
values, their equilibrium wage and their employment rate, given some marginal product ys.
This result is entirely dependent on firms having market power. In the competitive world
which characterises most of the migration literature, any wage e ect of migration can only
come through the marginal product. The aim of this exercise is to study the qualitative
results: I do not attempt to calibrate the model. In Section 2.3, I provide empirical evidence
for this reservation wage channel using geographical variation in the US.
10This is true for most standard distributions, including the normal distribution.
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The model is closely related to Albrecht and Axell (1984), who study the labour market
implications of workers with heterogeneous leisure values. In my model, within each skill
group s, there are two worker types Ts = {Ns,Ms}, i.e. natives and migrants, who share the
same productivity but di er in preference and job search parameters. They key departure
from Albrecht and Axell is heterogeneous preferences over job matches, beyond the mere
wage o er: this ensures that wages do not collapse to the value of leisure in equilibrium.
Final good production
The final output good y is produced according to the following CES technology:
y =
Aÿ
s
–sy
‡
s
B 1
‡
(2.1)
where ‡ œ [≠Œ, 1]. ys is the output of intermediate good s, and qs –s = 1. I assume the
final goods market is competitive, so the price ps of each good is set equal to the marginal
product:
ps = –s
A
y
ys
B1≠‡
(2.2)
Intermediate goods firms
There is a limited supply of firms ks in the market for good s, of which a fraction ◊s are
active. Firms in market s employ a single factor (labour of skill s) with constant returns to
scale: each worker of skill s produces a single unit of good s each period. A given active firm
j in market s maximises its profit ﬁsj by setting its wage o er wj. The firm’s wage-setting
problem is characterised as follows:
max
wj
ﬁs (wj) = (ps ≠ wj) ls (wj) (2.3)
where ls (wj) is the firm’s labour force. Assuming individual firms are small relative to the
market for good s, firms take the price ps as given.
I define lTs (wj) as the number of T type workers of skill s employed by firm j, where
lNs (wj)+lMs (wj) = ls (wj). The steady-state level of lTs (wj) can be derived from the following
equation:
1
◊sks
µTs (wj)uTs = ”T lTs (wj) (2.4)
where the left hand side is the the number of type T workers entering employment in firm
j next period, and the right hand side is the number of workers leaving. uTs as the number
of type T skill s workers currently searching for work. 1◊sks is the probability that a worker
meets firm j, and µTs (wj) is the probability that a type T worker of skill s accepts the job
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o er w (i.e. the labour supply equation). The outflow is the product of lTs (wj) and the
probability of leaving the labour force, ”T .
To solve for lTs (wj), I need a steady-state expression for uTs . Equating outflows from the
stock of searching workers uTs with inflows gives:
”TuTs +
1
1≠ ”T
2 ˆ
w
µTs (w) dFws · uTs = ”TnTs (2.5)
On the left hand side of equation (2.5), I allow for two ways to exit the job search state:
the first term (”TuTs ) represents leaving the labour force; the second represents finding a
job, where 1 ≠ ”T is the fraction of searching workers who remain in the labour force, and´
w µs (w) dFws is the unconditional probability of accepting an o er next period. The term
”TnTs is the number of type T workers entering the search state. Rearranging equation (2.5)
for uTs , and substituting this into equation (2.4) gives:
lTs (wj) =
1
◊sks
µTs (wj)nTs
(1≠ ”T ) ´w µTs (w) dFws + ”T (2.6)
Now, substituting the solutions for lNs (wj) and lMs (wj) into the firm’s problem above yields:
max
wj
ﬁs (wj) = (ps ≠ wj) ns
◊sks
ÿ
T
⁄Ts µ
T
s (wj)
(1≠ ”T ) ´w µTs (w) dFws + ”T (2.7)
where I define ⁄Ns = 1≠⁄s as the share of natives, and ⁄Ms = ⁄s as the share of migrants. Since
firms take
´
w µ
T
s (w) dFws and ◊s as given (there are many firms), the first order condition is:
ps ≠ wj =
(1≠ ⁄)µNs (wj) + ⁄sq
1
Fws , v
N
s , v
M
s
2
µMs (wj)
(1≠ ⁄)µN Õs (wj) + ⁄sq (Fw, vNs , vMs )µM Õs (wj)
(2.8)
where
q
1
Fws , v
N
s , v
M
s
2
=
1
1≠ ”N
2 ´
w µ
N
s (w) dFws + ”N
(1≠ ”M) ´w µMs (w) dFws + ”M (2.9)
Finally, let ﬁús
1
◊s, vNs , v
M
s , F
w
s
2
denote the indirect profit function, given the optimal wage
wús
1
vNs , v
M
s , F
w
s
2
. Firms will become active until ﬁús
1
◊s, vNs , v
M
s , F
w
s
2
= c.
Workers
A worker of skill s and type T = {M,N} accepts a job o er with flow utility Áiwj if Áiwj”T > V Ts ,
where V Ts is the value of searching for work. V Ts is characterised as follows:
V Ts = bT +
1
1≠ ”T
2 ˆ
w
ˆ
Á
max
;
Áw
”T
, RTs
<
dF ÁdFws (2.10)
Equivalently, this can be expressed in terms of the discounted value of searching, vTs = ”TRTs :
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vTs = ”T bT +
1
1≠ ”T
2 ˆ
w
ˆ
Á
max
Ó
Áw, vTs
Ô
dF ÁdFws (2.11)
Notice that vTs is increasing in the leisure flow bT . And, as long as the discounted value of
searching
´
w
´
Ámax
Ó
Áw, vTs
Ô
dF ÁdFws exceeds bT (as seems plausible for the average worker),
vTs is decreasing in ”T . The distribution of preferences over matches F Á is exogenous, but
the distribution of wage o ers Fws is endogenous to firm decisions.
Based on the above, µs (wj), the probability that a worker of skill s accepts a wage o er
wj, can be expressed as follows:
µs (wj) = Pr
A
log Ái > log
vTs
wj
B
(2.12)
= Pr
A
log Ái < log
wj
vTs
B
= F Á
A
log wj
vTs
B
assuming that log Á is symmetrically distributed with mean 0.
Equilibrium
Combining the equations for wage-setting (equation (2.8)) and labour supply (equation
(2.12)) yields an expression for the proportional markup:
ps ≠ wj
wj
=
(1≠ ⁄s)F Á
1
log wjvNs
2
+ ⁄sq
1
Fws , v
N
s , v
M
s
2
F Á
1
log wjvMs
2
(1≠ ⁄s) f Á
1
log wjvNs
2
+ ⁄sq (Fws , vNs , vMs ) f Á
1
log wjvMs
2 (2.13)
Based on the monotone hazard properties assumed for F Á, the right hand side of equation
(2.13) must be an increasing function of w.11 As a result, since the left hand side is decreasing
in w, there is a unique solution for the wage ws for skill group s, given vNs , vMs and Fws .
Since the wage outcome in equation (2.13) is unique, given vNs , vMs and Fws , all firms set
the same wage in equilibrium. And so, Fws collapses to a unit mass at ws. Then, assuming
that ”Ns and ”Ms are small relative to the job acceptance probabilities µMs (wj) and µNs (wj),
the function q in equation (2.9) can be approximated as:
11To see this, define HTs (w) = F Á
1
log wvTs
2
and Hs (w) = (1≠ —)HNs (w) + —HMs (w), where Hs (w) is a
mixture of two distributions HNs (w) and HMs (w), weighted by — =
⁄sq(Fws ,vNs ,vMs )
1≠⁄s+⁄sq(Fws ,vNs ,vMs ) . The right hand side
of equation (2.13) can then be expressed as Hs(w)hs(w) . Notice that both
HNs (w)
hNs (w)
and H
M
s (w)
hMs (w)
are both increasing
monotonically in w (a consequence of the monotone hazard rate assumption on F Á). And so, the same must
be true for Hs(w)hs(w) .
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q
1
Fws , v
N
s , v
M
s
2
¥ F
Á
1
log wsvNs
2
F Á
1
log wsvMs
2 (2.14)
Substituting q into the firm’s first order condition, equation (2.13), and rearranging:
ws
ps ≠ ws = (1≠ ⁄s)
f Á
1
log wsvNs
2
F Á
1
log wsvNs
2 + ⁄s f Á
1
log wsvMs
2
F Á
1
log wsvMs
2 (2.15)
which gives the equilibrium wage, as a function of natives’ and migrants’ reservation values.
There are three other equilibrium conditions. The value of rejecting job o ers for natives
and migrants respectively are:
vTs = ”T bT +
1
1≠ ”T
2 ˆ
Á
max
Ó
Áws, v
T
s
Ô
dF Á , T = {M,N} (2.16)
Equations (2.15) and (2.16) are to su cient to solve for ws, vNs and vMs . Given the solution
for these three unknowns, the fourth and final condition (arising from free entry) fixes the
share of active firms ◊:
(ps ≠ ws) ns
◊sks
ÿ
T
⁄Ts F
Á
1
log wsvTs
2
(1≠ ”T )F Á
1
log wsvTs
2
+ ”T
= c (2.17)
This equation imposes that firm profits are equal to the activation cost c.
Solution
Notice that the first three equilibrium conditions (contained in equations (2.15) and (2.16))
are su cient to solve for vNs , vMs and ws, independently of ◊s. Firm entry drives profit to
zero, but does not a ect outcomes for workers in this model.
Equation (2.16) shows that the rejection value vTs is bounded below at bT when ws = 0
and is increasing in ws thereafter. The gradient of vTs with respect to w is never greater than
one.12 Equation (2.15) shows how the firm’s mark-up relates to the distribution of workers’
outside options. The mark-up is increasing in vNs and vMs . The firm’s wage choice goes to
zero as vNs and vMs tend to zero. And, if ⁄s is small, ws grows more than one-for-one with
vNs .13 The properties of these equations guarantee the existence of a unique equilibrium in
vNs , vMs and ws.
12To see this, suppose that vTs and ws both grow at rate ’. The term
´
Ámax
)
Áws, vTs
*
therefore also
grows at rate ’. But then, given ”T < 1 and bT > 0, the right hand side of equation (2.16) must grow slower
than ’, despite the left hand side growing at ’. To keep the equation in balance, it must be that vTs grows
more slowly than ws.
13To see this, suppose that ⁄s = 0, and that vNs and ws both grow at rate ’. The right hand side of
equation (2.15) will remain unchanged, but the left hand side will shrink. And so, to keep the equation in
balance, ws must grow faster than vNs .
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The key point of interest is the impact of immigration on ws and vNs . An increase in ⁄s
enters the model through its impact on firms’ wage decisions. I assume migrants have lower
rejection values (vMs < vNs ), whether because of lower leisure values (bM < bN) or higher
discount rates (”M > ”N). Thus, firms will exploit an increase in the skill-specific migrant
share ⁄s by cutting wages and expanding their mark-ups. This intuition can be appreciated
in equation (2.16). The expression
fÁ
1
log ws
vTs
2
F Á
1
log ws
vTs
2 is the density of type T workers, conditional
on accepting the wage o er ws, who are on the margin of rejecting. When this conditional
density is larger, workers have greater wage-setting power, and the wage equilibrium will be
closer to the marginal product ps. (Notice that as the conditional density tends to infinity,
the wage outcome ws converges to ps.) Now, based on the monotone hazard rate assumption
on F Á, the conditional density of natives must be larger than that of migrants.14 And
consequently, the equilibrium wage must be decreasing in the migrant share ⁄s, conditional
on the marginal product ps.
Clearly, a decline in the wage ws will cause the native rejection value vNs to fall. But,
based on the argument above, the rejection value will decline proportionately less, so wsvNs
decreases. Consequently, a smaller fraction of natives will accept job o ers: F Á
1
log wsvNs
2
falls. Or equivalently, the native employment rate declines.
It is instructive to compare the equilibrium of this model with that of Albrecht and Axell
(1984). The framework is very similar: firms set wages to maximise profit, and there are two
worker types with high and low leisure values (equivalent to my “natives” and “migrants”
respectively). However, they do not include heterogeneity in job match preferences. As a
result, a growing share of low value workers has no e ect on the wages of high value workers.
In equilibrium, firms that wish to recruit these workers set wages at exactly their reservation
value. There is no incentive to reduce the wage below this point - even following an influx of
migrants - because high value workers will always decline such o ers. In contrast, job match
heterogeneity gives firms the flexibility to adjust their o er: the job acceptance probability
is no longer on a knife-edge, but is a continuous function of wages. A larger migrant share
will cause a fall wages, as firms face more workers with lower reservation values.
Extension with heterogeneous firms
Suppose that firms are heterogeneous in their productivity: an employee of firm j produces
“j units of the output good (rather than simply one unit in all firms, as assumed above),
where “j varies across the k firms according to some distribution F “. E ectively, there is
a limited supply of productive firms. The result will look similar to the homogeneous firm
case, except that firm entry (for example, where triggered by a larger migrant population)
will be accompanied by a declined in average firm productivity as the operations of lower
14Specifically, since vMs < vNs , it must be that
fÁ
1
log ws
vMs
2
F Á
1
log ws
vMs
2 < fÁ
1
log ws
vNs
2
F Á
1
log ws
vNs
2 .
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quality firms become viable. Furthermore, all but the marginal firm will receive positive
profits in equilibrium.
Equilibrium in each market s can be characterised as five unknowns
Ó
vNs , v
M
s , F
w
s , ◊s, “¯s
Ô
together with the following equations, where “¯s is the productivity of the marginal firm. The
discounted value of rejecting job o ers, for natives and migrants respectively, is:
vTs = ”T bT +
1
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The wage o er distribution can be derived by integrating over the distribution of firm pro-
ductivities, above the marginal productivity “¯s:
Fws (x) =
xˆ
“¯s
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where wú
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is the implicit function based on the firm’s wage-setting first order
condition:
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Free entry guarantees that the profit of the marginal firm is equal to the activation cost c:
Ë
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where
◊s = 1≠ F “ (“¯s) (2.23)
Based on equation (2.20), lower quality firms (with lower “) will set a lower wage wú in
equilibrium. As a result, they will recruit fewer workers. A positive relationship between
firm size and wages is well documented in the literature (e.g. Brown and Medo , 1989; Oi
and Idson, 1999). The idea that this correlation (partly) reflects a monopsonistic employer’s
upward-sloping labour supply curve is not new (e.g. Weiss and Landau, 1984; Manning,
2003).
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2.3 Empirical application
Multi-city model
Below, I test the predictions of the model using cross-city ariation. To begin, I extend the
model above to incorporate multiple cities or regions r. Each city r produces a distinct final
good yr based on the CES technology outlined above:
yr = zr
Aÿ
sr
–sry
‡
sr
B 1
‡
(2.24)
which aggregates intermediate goods ysr produced in that city r. For simplicity, I assume
the price of the final good yr is fixed in international markets. If yr is understood to be the
nominal output of the final good, then the aggregate shifter zr can represent either price or
productivity shocks. Given that each worker of skill s produces one intermediate good, the
marginal product of such a worker in city r is:
psr = –srzr
3
n¯r
nsr
41≠‡
(2.25)
where nsr it the local supply of workers of skill s, and n¯r = (
q
sr –srn
‡
sr)
1
‡ is a CES aggregator
across employment in all local skill groups. Substituting this into the firm’s first order
condition, equation (2.15), yields:
wsr = –srzr
3
n¯r
nsr
41≠‡ C (1≠ ⁄sr) gNsr + ⁄srgMsr
(1≠ ⁄sr) gNsr + ⁄srgMsr + 1
D
(2.26)
where
gTsr =
f Á
1
log wsrvTsr
2
F Á
1
log wsrvTsr
2 (2.27)
is the conditional density for type T workers. And finally, the unemployment value in city r
is:
vTsr = (1≠ µ)
SWU”T bT + 11≠ ”T2 ˆ
Á
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Ó
aTr + Áwsr, vTsr
Ô
dF Á
TXV+ µmax
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Ó
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, T = {M,N}
(2.28)
where, each period, workers have the opportunity with probability µ of moving to the city
with the largest unemployment value. This approach of allowing for mobility follows Beaudry
et al. (2013) .
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Linear approximation
To derive the estimating equation, I take a first order approximation of the equilibrium
conditions. Firstly, for small migrant share ⁄sr, the wage-setting curve (equation (2.26)) can
be approximated as15:
wˆsr = –ˆsr + zˆr ≠ (1≠ ‡)
1
nˆsr ≠ ˆ¯nr
2
≠ 1
gNsr
≠
C
gNsr ≠ gMsr
gNsr (1 + gNsr)
D
⁄sr (2.29)
where xˆ denotes the logarithm of x. The wage approaches the marginal product as the
conditional density for both natives and migrants approach 1. Since gNsr > gMsr , the wage is
decreasing in ⁄sr.
Of course, the conditional densities gTsr are themselves a function of wages. Notice first
that, based on the labour supply curve (equation (2.28)) - and as argued above, the ratio wsrvTsris increasing in the wage. So, given the monotone hazard rate assumption, the conditional
density gTsr must be decreasing in wsr (see equation (2.27)). That is, conditional on accepting
the wage o er wsr, fewer workers are on the margin of rejecting as the wage increases. This
grants firms more pricing power, so the markup grows with the marginal product. Assuming
a linear relation in the inverse of gTsr gives:
1
gTsr
= ’T0 + ’T1 wˆsr (2.30)
where ’T1 > 0. Since I assume ⁄sr is small, the feedback e ects through the
Ë
gNsr≠gMsr
gNsr(1+gNsr)
È
term
will also be small; so I assume that term is fixed at ’2 for simplicity. Then, substituting the
labour supply relationship (equation (2.30)) into the wage-setting curve yields:
wˆsr =
1
1 + ’N1
Ó
≠’N0 + –ˆsr + zˆr ≠ (1≠ ‡)
1
nˆsr ≠ ˆ¯nr
2
≠ ’2⁄sr
Ô
(2.31)
And taking first di erences:
wˆsr = „1 –ˆsrt + „2 zˆrt + „3
1
 nˆsrt ≠ ˆ¯nrt
2
+ „4 ⁄srt (2.32)
where   denotes a decadal change between census years t.
15The proof is as follows. Equation (2.26) can be rearranged as:
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And in logarithmic terms:
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And, for small gNsr and ⁄sr, this approximates the expression in equation (2.29).
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Theoretical challenges
Equation (2.32) describes the equilibrium response of the local wage in skill group s to (1)
skill biases in technology represented by –ˆsr, (2) the local aggregate productivity shifter or
trade price zˆrt, (3) the local relative supply of the labour skill factor
1
nˆsr ≠ ˆ¯nr
2
, and (4) the
skill-specific local migrant share ⁄sr. Assuming the model is correct, the marginal product is
fully determined by –ˆsr, zˆsr and
1
nˆsr ≠ ˆ¯nr
2
. And consequently, with the other variables held
fixed, any e ect of ⁄sr on wages must enter through the mark-up. If migrants have lower
wage demands than natives, this e ect will be negative.
The key assumption behind this result is that, within skill groups, natives and migrants
are homogeneous and perfect substitutes in production. Suppose instead that migrants
and natives are imperfect substitutes. Manacorda et al., 2012 find evidence for imperfect
substitutability within education groups in the UK, based on wage regressions; and Card
(2009b) and Ottaviano and Peri, 2012 find similar results for the US, though Borjas et
al. (2008, 2010 and 2012) dispute the US results. Also, Dustmann et al. (2013) argue
that these results are sensitive to the assignment of migrants to skill groups (in particular,
skill downgrading by migrants on arrival may complicate the interpretation): imperfect
substitutability is probably less of a concern within detailed occupation groups. In any case,
consider the following technology with imperfect substitutability:
yr = zr
Aÿ
sr
–srn¯
‡
sr
B 1
‡
(2.33)
where
n¯sr =
1
„nNﬂsr + (1≠ „)nMﬂsr
2 1
ﬂ (2.34)
The term n¯sr is a CES aggregator over skill-specific native labour nNsr and migrant labour
nMsr . Clearly, unlike in the model outlined above, the marginal products native and migrant
labour in the same skill group are now di erent. Specifically, the native marginal product
in skill group s and city r is:
pNsr = „–srzr
3
n¯r
n¯sr
41≠‡ A n¯sr
nNsr
B1≠ﬂ
(2.35)
What is the e ect of skill-specific migrant share on pNsr? With relative skill supplies and
zr and the aggregated skill factor share n¯rn¯sr held constant, an increase in the migrant share
⁄sr is associated with a rise in n¯srnNsr and an increase in the marginal product; and this inturn, will put upward pressure on native wages. Consequently, as migrant share expands,
imperfect substitutability will counteract any downward wage e ect that may arise from
growing mark-ups.
Alternatively, suppose that natives and migrants are perfect substitutes (ﬂ = 1), but
natives are relatively more productive due to language skills or past experience in the Amer-
ican labour market („ > 0.5). In this scenario, a rising migrant share would cause the total
e ective labour supply in the skill group to decline. As a result, n¯sr falls, and the marginal
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product of workers of skill s rises. And so, as with imperfect substitutability, a native-
migrant productivity gap would cause the wage e ect of migrant share to be less negative,
all else equal. This should be taken into account when interpreting the estimates below.
Finally, especially in markets with downward wage rigidity (perhaps due to minimum
wage legislation), firms may choose to respond to migration by downgrading workplace
amenities rather than native wages. Ideally, I would therefore estimate the impact of mi-
gration on native wages net of amenities. Unfortunately, the US census does not provide
information on these workplace characteristics. So, in this sense, my gross wage estimates
may understate the overall impact. Having said that, Hamermesh (1998) does not find
evidence for such e ects.
Empirical challenges
Above, I have described some theoretical considerations in interpreting the skill-specific wage
e ect of migrant share ⁄st, with –ˆsrt, zˆsrt and
1
nˆsrt ≠ ˆ¯nrt
2
held constant. But, this of course
assumes I am able to estimate this parameter consistently.
There are a number of di erent challenges in identifying the parameter of interest „4
in equation (2.32). Firstly, the migrant share ⁄srt is clearly endogenous to both wages and
the productivity parameters (–ˆsrt and zˆrt), the latter of which are unobserved. These clearly
a ect migrants’ location decisions. But, ⁄srt is also endogenous to the relative labour supply,
nˆsrt ≠ ˆ¯nrt.
A natural instrument for changes in the migrant share is the enclave instrument pop-
ularised by (Card, 2001). This instrument predicts the contribution of migration to local
population growth, assuming that new migrants of each origin country settle in di erent
areas proportionally according to the initial geographical distribution of their co-patriot
communities. This is based on the premise that migrants have a strong propensity to clus-
ter geographically, whether because of job networks or cultural amenities. Specifically, the
instrument is constructed as follows:
IVrt =
ÿ
o
„ort≠10n
Mnew
ot
nrt≠10
(2.36)
where „or is the share of migrants of origin o in year t≠ 10 who are settled in city r; nMnewot
is the number of new migrants of origin o who enter the US between years t≠ 10 and t; and
nrt≠10 is the population of city r in year t≠ 10.
Suppose for the sake of argument that this instrument is uncorrelated with productivity
growth. There will be concerns that the change in relative labour supply,  nˆsrt ≠  ˆ¯nrt,
is endogenous to this instrument. Unfortunately, there is no obvious second instrument
which can separately identify the impact of changing labour supply on wages. However,
empirically, it turns out that IVrt has little e ect on total labour supply within skill groups.
The reason is that the new migrants displace natives within skill groups in local employment,
largely through cross-city migration but also through higher native joblessness. This is a
controversial claim, and I outline the evidence below. But, if this claim is taken as fact, a
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consistent estimate of the e ect of ⁄srt can be attained by simply omitting  nˆsrt ≠  ˆ¯nrt
from the estimating equation.
As stated above, an important identifying assumption is that IVst is uncorrelated with
the productivity shocks, –ˆsrt and zˆsrt. This is commonly assumed in the empirical literature
in this field. Howeevr, there are plausible reasons why this exclusion restriction might be vi-
olated. For example, if local productivity growth is persistent, historical migrant settlement
patterns may not be exogenous to current productivity changes. Furthermore, Borjas et al.
(1997) identify large cyclical components of local wage growth, across US census years, which
are correlated with (but causally unrelated to) local immigration rates. One way to address
this is to control for predicted employment and wage growth, based on initial industrial com-
position. Following the approach popularised by Bartik (1991), I weight employment growth
(excluding the city under analysis), by two-digit industry, with initial city-level industry
shares:
hnrt =
ÿ
i
„irt≠10
ni(≠r)t ≠ ni(≠r)t≠10
ni(≠r)t≠10
where „irt≠10 is the share of industry i in employment in city r, in year t≠ 10. And ni(≠r)t is
national employment, excluding city r, in industry i. And following Beaudry et al. (2013),
I construct an equivalent control for local wage growth:
hwrt =
ÿ
i
„irt≠10
wit ≠ wit≠10
wit≠10
where wit is the mean national residualised wage16 in industry i and year t.
Another empirical challenge is selection e ects. In light of the large displacement of
native workers, changes in composition of the local labour force may bias the estimates. In
particular, if either high or low ability natives (within skill groups) are more likely to leave
the city (on net) following an increase in the migrant share, this would introduce spurious
composition e ects which would be di cult to disentangle. I attempt to address this concern
by comparing the wages of current and former residents in a city, exploiting data from the
census on previous residence.
Finally, the two-type structure of the model (natives and migrants) is clearly a simpli-
fication. Over 70% of migrants in 2010 had been living in the country for more than 10
years, and over 40% for more than 20 years. There is no reason to believe these long-term
migrants will have very di erent wage demands to natives: the wage assimilation literature
attests to this. This creates some issues with measurement, since it is not clear which is
the best indicator to prox the impact of migration on the reservation wage distribution: the
migrant share alone is likely to be misleading. This is further complicated by the fact that
the composition of migrants, in terms of years in the US, has changed dramatically since
the acceleration of immigration after the 1960s. Furthermore, as noted above, there is good
16Controlling for all available education fixed e ects (indicating di erent years of schooling and years of
college); interactions between all these education e ects and a quartic in experience; a full set of 39 potential
experience fixed e ects; a gender dummy; race dummies (black, Hispanic).
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reason to believe the migrant-native reservation wage gap is significantly smaller in lower
skilled groups. Given these complexities, I take a flexible approach and estimate all speci-
fications separately by skill group (identified by two-digit occupations) and census decade.
Also, given the likely instability in the first stage, I focus entirely on reduced form estimates
of all variables of interest on the enclave instrument.
With all the above in mind, I estimate the following empirical model:
 xsrt = —st0 + —st1IVrt + —st2hnrt + —st3hwrt + Ásrt (2.37)
where   denotes a decadal change between census years, and Ásrt is the residual. I study
reduce form e ects of the instrument IVrt on a range of di erent  xsrt dependent variables;
specifically: change in migrant share, growth in labour supply, growth in native wages, and
growth in the native employment rate. I estimate these equations separately by two-digit
occupation group and decade. And, in all specifications, I control for predicted growth in
local employment hnrt and residual wages hwrt, based on initial industrial composition.
2.4 Data
Census extracts and ACS samples
Most of my analysis is based on the IPUMS US census 2% extract of 1970, 5% extracts of
1980, 1990 and 2000, as well as the American Community Survey (ACS) 1% sample of 2010.
I supplement the 2010 sample with ACS samples from 2008-9 and 2011-2 to boost the size
of that cross-section. All this data has been organised by Ruggles et al. (2010a).
I identify local labour markets in the US with the Commuting Zones (CZs) originally
developed by Tolbert and Sizer (1996). CZs were recently popularised by Autor and Dorn
(2013) and Autor et al. (2013) as an alternative to metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).
MSAs cover only a limited proportion of the US landmass (unlike CZs whose coverage is
universal); and there have been changes in geographical definitions over time: this would
be particularly problematic for very long run analysis of this study. Tolbert and Sizler
grouped the full set of US counties into 741 CZs, applying an algorithm to cross-county
commuting data from the census of 1990. I restrict my analysis to the 722 CZs on the
mainland. By in large, county boundaries have been very stable over time, and this makes
long-run comparisons much more feasible. I make just one modification to the Tolbert-Sizler
CZ scheme to ensure consistency: incorporating La Paz County (AZ) into the same CZ as
Yuma County (AZ).17
The IPUMS micro-data does not identify specific counties, but each census year in my
sample does include sub-state geographical identifiers. These identifiers vary across years18,
17Tolbert and Sizler allocate La Paz and Yuma to di erent CZs, but the two counties only separated in
1983: within the time-frame of our analysis.
18There are 405 county groups in the continental US in 1970, 1,148 county groups in 1980, 1,713 Public
Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) in 1990, 2,057 PUMAs in 2000 and the ACS until 2011, and 2,336 PUMAs
in the ACS of 2012.
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Figure 2.1: Share of migrants among 16-64s (Census/ACS 1940-2010)
and it is not possible to perfectly identify commuting zones based on their boundaries.
Following Autor and Dorn (2013) and Autor et al. (2013), I estimate population allocations of
the geographical identifiers into CZs19; and I impute CZ outcomes by appropriately weighting
outcomes for the available geographical identifiers with these allocations.
My basic sample consists of all individuals aged between 16 and 64. When conducting
analysis on wages, I restrict the sample to native-born employees outside the armed forces
working full-time (at least 35 hours) and full-year (at least 40 weeks). These restrictions
exclude workers with marginal attachment to the labour market: Borjas et al. (2008) argue
these can confound estimates of unit labour prices. Wages are defined as weekly wages,
calculated by dividing annual wage/salary income by weeks worked. Unless otherwise spec-
ified, all estimates based on CZ-level data are calculated using CZ weights corresponding to
sample size.
19We take our data for the 1970 and 1980 population allocations
from IPUMS: see https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/volii/1970cgcc.xls and
https://usa.ipums.org/usa/resources/volii/cg98stat.xls respectively. For the remaining years, we gen-
erate the allocations using the MABLE/Geocorr applications on the Missouri Census Data Center website:
http://mcdc.missouri.edu.
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The first panel of Figure 2.1 shows the historical changes since 1940 in the migrant (that
is, foreign-born) share of the US working-age population by region of origin. There has been
a persistent decline in the share of workers born in Europe and the former USSR, as the old
generation of migrants has died out. In contrast, since 1970, there has been a significant
acceleration in migration from Latin America: based on the census, these workers now make
up 10% of the labour force, compared to just 2% in 1970. Over the same period, there has
also been a large growth in the stock of Asian migrants, who now contribute 5% of the labour
force. Interestingly though, the migrant share has grown noticeably slower in the 2000s than
the 1990s. These changes in migration flows can be better appreciated in the second panel,
which plots the share of new migrants (who arrived in the previous ten years) as a share
of the sample of 16-64s, since 1970 (arrival year is not available in earleir census extracts).
This statistic grows steeply from under 1% in 1970 to 6% in 2000, with a small decline in
the subsequent decade.
In terms of my model, it is questionable which statistic is the best proxy for the impact
of migration on the reservation wage distribution. As noted above, there is substantial
heterogeneoty among migrants - with longer term migrants expected to be better integrated
into local labour markets. As an alterative measure, the third panel plots the share of non-
citizens over the full period. A better proxy for labour market integration is permanent
residence status (that is, possession of a “green card”), which guarantees full access to the
labour market - though this is not recorded in the census. Citizenship requires additional
administrative hurdles, with the benefit of voting rights and security against deportation.
In any case, there is a clear surge in the non-citizen share of 16-64s from 1% in 1970 to
almost 10% in 2010. The fourth panel plots the population share who are migrants with
poor English or none at all, though language proficiency is only reported since 1980. This
statistic grows from 2% in 1980 to 5% in 2010.
An important concern is under-coverage of unauthorised migrants in the census - and
unauthorised Mexicans in particular. Card and Lewis (2007) summarise some of the evidence,
noting that the problem had eased considerably by the 2000 census. In particular, about
40% of unauthorised Mexicans were overlooked in the 1980 census (Borjas et al., 1991) and
30% in the 1990 census (Van Hook and Bean, 1998), but just 10% in 2000 (US Department
of Homeland Security, 2003). Equivalently, 25% of all Mexican migrants were missed in
1980, 20% in 1990, and 6-8% in 2000. I argue below that this improvement in measurement
should not a ect the broad interpretation of my main empirical results.
Defining labour markets by occupational skill
Much of the recent literature has studied the impact of immigration on native wages within
broad education groups. But, in this study, I study variation across 2-digit occupations. This
is for two reasons. Firstly, there is very large skill heterogeneity within these broad education
groups, as I illustrate below. And secondly, using British evidence, Dustmann et al. (2013)
show that migrants often downgrade in terms of skill on arrival. This may help explain why
several studies (e.g. Card, 2009b; Manacorda et al., 2012; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) find
that natives and immigrants are weak substitutes within education groups. Dustmann et
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al. study e ects by percentile of the native wage distribution. But, if one believes migrants
accept lower wages for similar work, occupations may be a better measure of skill.
I group workers into 74 minor occupation categories (excluding military jobs). I use
the time-consistent 1990-based occupation classification provided by IPUMS (Ruggles et al.,
2010a), although three of these occupations are not observed in 1970 and six in 1960. An
important concern with using detailed job categories is that occupational mobility could
complicate inference 20. But, occupational mobility is of course limited by education level.
Based on this premise, I rank occupations with a measure of skill imputed from the educa-
tion of long-term residents’ occupation group members; where “long-term residents” include
everybody living in the US for more than 10 years. And, I then compare wage e ects across
the support of occupational skill.
To construct the skill measure, I calculate the mean wage of long-term residents within
each detailed education category available in the 1990 cross-section21, restricting the sample
to male long-term residents only. Using this data, I estimate the expected wage in each
occupation group, conditional on the occupation’s educational composition of long-term
residents. For each occupation group, my skill measure is the percentile of the expected
wage within the distribution of long-term residents. Notice that this measure of skill is
consistent over time - to the extent that occupational skill requirements do not change; this
is useful given that I am studying trends over many decades.
Using data from the ACS of 2010, Figure (2.2) plots the density of recent migrants
(arriving in the last 10 years) along the support of occupational skill percentiles of long-
term residents (i.e. natives or migrants in the US for longer than 10 years). A density of
1 along the full support would indicate that recent migrants and long-term residents share
an identical skill distribution. This follows the method of Dustmann and Preston (2012),
who present similar plots - though along the support of native wage percentiles rather than
occupational skill. As it happens, the results look very similar.
Migrants are clearly concentrated at the bottom of the skill distribution and relatively
weakly represented at the top. This is a significant result, because it seems inconsistent
with the statistics on education - at least at the top of the distribution. On the one hand,
recent migrants are indeed much more likely to be high school dropouts (under 12 years
of schooling): these account for 27% of recent migrants, compared to just 8% of long-term
residents. But, the share of college graduates (at least 4 years of college) is very similar:
29% of recent migrants, compared to 32% of long-term residents.
What explains this? The evidence shows that, within education groups, migrants tend to
be lower skilled. This is consistent with British evidence from Dustmann et al. (2013) and
Manacorda et al. (2012) on skill downgrading. Figure (2.3) plots the densities of long-term
residents and recent migrants, by education group. Interestingly, the largest skill gaps fall
in the middle of the education distribution: for high school graduates and those with some
college education. This contrasts with the experience in the UK: Manacorda et al. only find
20(Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) report that, in the 1980s and 1990s, between 15% and 20% of workers
in the PSID switched two-digit occupations each year.
21Specifically: nursery to grade 4; grades 5-8; grade 9; grade 10; grade 11; grade 12; 1 year of college; 2
years of college; 3 years of college; 4 years of college; 5+ years of college.
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Figure 2.2: Position of recent migrants (last 10 years) in occupational skill distribution of
long-term residents (ACS 2010)
evidence of migrant downgrading among migrant college graduates.
Another important point to take from Figure (2.3) is the very large skill heterogeneity
within education groups. This suggests that a focus on education groups may be neglecting
some important variation. In particular, there is a great deal of overlap between high school
dropouts and high school graduates (though the latter are better repesented in higher skilled
jobs). This can perhaps help explain the instability of estimates of the substitutability
between these two education groups in production, as reported by Borjas et al. (2012). The
problem is that these groups are from from uniform.
Enclave instrument
The left panel of Figure 2.4 plots IVrt, the predicted 10-year migration rate (that is, the
enclave instrument), by decade for a selection of cities. The right panel plots the actual 10-
year migration rate, specifically n
Mnew
rt
nrt≠1 ; where n
Mnew
rt is the number of migrants in city r and
census year t who arrived in the previous ten years, and nrt≠1 is the total local population
in census year t ≠ 10. Clearly, migration rates have grown hugely since the 1960s, though
they have moderated somewhat in the last decade. By inspection, the instrument perform
reasonably well as a predictor, with cities like Los Angeles, Miami and New York having
consistently high rates of both predicted and actual migration after the 1960s.
Interestingly, migration rates in Miami are consistently underpredicted. This is because
new Cuban migrants overwhelmingly locate in Miami (for example, two thirds of Cuban
arrivals in the 1990s). But, the instrument excludes own-city new arrivals when predicting
the local migration rate (see equation (2.36) above), so these Cubans largely do not register.
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bution (ACS 2010)
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Figure 2.4: Predicted and actual local migration rates
Note: The left panel plots the predicted ten-year migration rate (i.e. the enclave instrument) for a selection of commuting
zones, by decade: 1960-70, 1970-80, 1990-2000 and 2000-10. The right panel gives the actual migration rates in those same
decades. The teny-year migration rate is estimated as the number of foreign-born individuals in some city r who arrived in the
US in the previous ten years, as a proportion of the overall city r population ten years previously. The prediction is based on
the premise that new migrants allocate across cities proportionally according to the initial geographical distribution of their
co-patriots.; see equation (2.36) for the formula.
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Notice also that migration to Los Angeles has declined markedly since its 1980s peak: from
22% to 11% in the 2000s. This is consistent with evidence on the changing geographical
distribution of Mexican migrants reported in Card and Lewis (2007). Since this change was
not driven by the number of Mexican migrants, the enclave instrument (in the left panel)
lags the decline in the actual migration rate (in the right panel) for Los Angeles.
2.5 Empirical results
Response of migration and migrant share
I begin by checking the predictive power of the enclave instrument. Specifically, I estimate
equation (2.37) for each occupation and census decade, with the contribution of new mi-
grants (arriving in the last ten years) to local occupation-specific employment growth as the
dependent variable. That is, xsrt = n
Mnew
srt
nsrt≠10 , where n
Mnew
srt is the number of new migrants in
occupation s, city r and census year t, who arrived in the US in the previous ten years; and
nsrt≠10 is the total employment count in that city/occupation cell one decade previously. The
—st1 estimates (the responses to the enclave instrument) are plotted, by census decade, in
Figure 2.5. I have arranged these estimates along the support of occupational skill percentile,
with marker sizes proportional to occupational employment counts.
Migration in the lower skill groups is much more responsive to the enclave instrument.
This is for two reasons. Firstly, as illustrated in Figure (2.2), new migrants tend to be lower
skilled than long-term residents. But, in results not reported here, I find that this does
not account for the entire e ect. This suggests that higher skilled migrants place less value
on enclaves, perhaps because job match quality plays a relatively more important role in
their location decision. Notice also that the migration response in the low skilled groups
has declined somewhat with time. This is partly due to the reallocation of new Mexican
migrants away from California (see Card and Lewis, 2007).
I repeat this exercise in Figure 2.6, but this time using the change in the occupation/city-
specific migrant share as the dependent variable xsrt. This might be considered a first stage,
to the extent that migrant share in my model determines the distribution of reservation wages
and thus drives the wage outcomes. Having said that, as I mention above, migrant share
is a somewhat flawed indicator of the reservation wage distribution - given the substantial
heterogeneity within the migrant population.
The enclave instrument has a large impact on migrant share in low skilled jobs in the
1970s and 1980s, but a minimal e ect in the 1990s and 2000s. This is despite the large
impact in these latter decades on the migration rate in Figure 2.5. The explaantion for this is
large geographical displacement of longer-term migrants. I present evidence for geographical
displacement below.
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Figure 2.5: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local migration rate
Note: For each panel in this figure (each corresponding to a particular decade), I estimate the e ect of the city-level enclave
instrument on the 10-year immigration rate separately for each occupation group. These regressions control for predicted
employment and residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national occupational counts. I also
include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
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Figure 2.6: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local migrant share
Note: For each panel in this figure (each corresponding to a particular decade), I estimate the e ect of the city-level enclave
instrument on the decadal change in migrant share separately for each occupation group. These regressions control for predicted
employment and residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national occupational counts. I also
include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
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Figure 2.7: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local employment hours
Note: For each panel in this figure (each corresponding to a particular decade), I estimate the e ect of the city-level enclave
instrument on the decadal change in log total employment hours separately for each occupation group. These regressions control
for predicted employment and residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national occupational
counts. I also include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
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Response of labour supply
As I argued above, my identification strategy is based on the assumption that the enclave
instrument has little e ect on overall employment within skill groups. And this claim is
largely supported by Figure 2.7. Here, I plot the e ect of the enclave instruemnt on decadal
change in log total employment hours, within city/occupation cells. There appears in general
to be little systematic e ect on employment across skill groups. Assuming a model with
constant returns to scale, this suggests there should be no substantial changes in marginal
products.
An important exception is the 2000s, when there are positive e ects on low skilled employ-
ment. The —st1 reduced form coe cients in the lowest skilled jobs in the 2000s are between
1 and 2 on average. Based on Figure 2.5, this is approximately the same as the e ect on
the migration rate in these jobs that decade. This suggests that the boost in migration is
largely transferred to employment - suggesting there is little displacement overall.
However, there does appear to be large displacement in the previous decades. The most
direct approach to analysing displacement is to study the cross-city migration decisions
of individuals, rather than looking at changes in employment stocks over time. This is
particularly useful in the context of this study, where mobility across occupation categories
over time can conflate occupation-specific estimates. Furthermore, the results will be further
conflated if the new migrants have children in the US: these will be classified as natives,
though they are clearly driven by historical migration patterns.
I exploit information from the census cross-sections on respondents’ city of residence
five years previously. Unfortunately, the ACS (on which I base my results for the 2000s)
only reports the city of residence one year previously, so the results are not comparable.
Consequently, I restrict attention to the three previous decades.
Card (2001) also uses this data (specifically from the 1990 census) to study displacement.
He disaggregates the workforce into groups according to time in the US. Following this
approach, within occupations, cities and census years:
nsrt = nMnewsrt + nLTsrt (2.38)
where nMnewsrt is the employment count of new migrants in occupation s, city r and census
year t, who arrived in the US in the last 5 years. And nLTsrt is the number of longer-term
residents, living in the US for more than 5 years. Then, taking di erences and scaling by
employment in occupation s and city r five years previously:
nsrt ≠ nsrt≠5
nsrt≠5
= n
Mnew
srt
nsrt≠5
+ n
LT
srt ≠ nLTsrt≠5
nsrt≠5
(2.39)
where nsrt≠5 can be estimated from the cross-section of census year t, based on information
on previous city of residence. This provides a disaggregation of the growth in employment
(between periods t≠5 and t) in city r of those currently employed in occupation s. I estimate
equation (??), using both terms on the right hand side of equation (2.39) as dependent
variables. I use the same enclave IV as before: the 10-year predicted migration rate.
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Figure 2.8: Decomposition of occupation-specific e ects on 5-year local employment growth
Note: For each panel in this figure, I estimate the e ects of the enclave IV on the 5-year growth of employment (in terms of
number of workers) separately for each occupation group. I estimate these e ects separately for migrants arriving in those five
years (“new arrivals”) and all other workers (“long-term residents”). These regressions control for predicted employment and
residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national occupational counts. I also include an OLS
fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
42
The results are presented in Figure 2.8, which reports —1st estimates for the contribution
to employment growth of new arrivals n
Mnew
gst
ngst≠5 (in blue) and of past residents
nLTsrt≠nLTsrt≠5
nsrt≠5 (in
red). In each decade, the slopes of —1st for each component are mirror images of one another.
In particular, in the highest skilled occupations, the contribution of both components tends
to be close to zero. But, in the lowest skilled jobs, there is a large positive contribution
from new arrivals but a large negative contribution from long-term residents (i.e. large net
out-migration) which appears to entirely o set the former e ect. In results not reported
here, I find that approximately half of the net ouflows are due to longer-term migrants (in
the US for more than give years) and about half are due to natives.
There are of course concerns over the coverage of unauthorised migrants in the census.
But, this should not a ect my conclusions on displacement. Specifically, the census coverage
of unauthorised Mexicans has improved over time, especially in the 2000 census (see Section
2.4 above). Also, note that unauthorised Mexicans have tended to concentrate in low skilled
occupations in popular migrant destination cities. As a result, the undercount of low skilled
workers in these cities would have been more severe earlier in the sample period. So, the true
low skilled employment growth in these cities may be smaller than estimated - suggesting
that displacement may have been even larger.
Despite the fact that I use the same data and population decomposition as Card (2001),
we come to opposite conclusions: he finds no geographical displacement. How can this be
so? The answer lies in the delineation of skill groups and empirical specificaiton. Card
probabilistically assigns his sample into six occupation groups, based on their education
and demographic characteristics (with the assignment based on predictions from a multino-
mial logit model). He then estimates the impact of migration on total population growth,
controlling for occcupation and city fixed e ects. Specifically:
nsrt ≠ nsrt≠5
nsrt≠5
= —0 + —1
nMnewsrt
nsrt≠5
+ ds + dr + Ásrt (2.40)
where ds and dr are occupation and city fixed e ects respectively; and n
Mnew
srt
nsrt≠5 is instrumented
using an occupation-specific enclave instrument. Card estimates —1 to be approximately 1,
which suggests there is no geographical displacement. The problem is that this specifcation
is derived from a simple CES model which assumes that the substitutability between any
two skill groups is identical. But, Card himself in later work (2009a) notes the fallibility
of this assumption: he finds that high school graduates are perfect substitutes with high
school dropouts, but imperfect substitutes with college graduates. Perfect substitutability
is disputed by Borjas et al. (2012), but in any case, Figure (2.3) shows there is plenty
of cross-over between the high-school dropout and high-school graduate occupational skill
distributions. Indeed, when I replicate Card’s methodology, but this time using just two
skill groups (college graduates and non-graduates), I find that —1 is close to zero: this is
consistent with my conclusions of very large displacement.
Several other studies in this literature are susceptible to similar criticisms. Card and
DiNardo (2000) use a similar structure, though this time with three probabilistically assigned
occupation groups rather than six. Card (2005) and Cortes (2008) divide the population into
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two groups: high school dropouts and everybody else. They both find that a larger share of
migrant dropouts in the local population has little impact on the overall dropout share; and
they conclude that there is no displacement. But again, if high school dropouts and high
school graduates are close substitutes in production, this specification will yield misleading
results. For example, migrant dropouts are likely to be competing with native high school
graduates.
Of course, mine is not the first to study to claim large geographical displacement. Borjas
et al. (1997) find that the migrant contribution to state-level population growth is entirely
o set by the (negative) native contribution. This result is dependent on taking di erences
over these population growth variables to purge the data of very long-run state-level growth
in labour demand. Borjas (2006) finds that, for every ten migrants who enter a city, about
six fewer natives choose to reside there. Interestingly, this level of displacement is not as
strong as that suggested by Figure 2.8. But in any case, Peri and Sparber (2011) argue that
Borjas’ (2006) empirical model is misspecified, yielding a bias towards identifying migrant
displacement of natives. On the other hand, Borjas also imposes restrictive assumptions on
substitutability between skill groups which are likely to bias his results against displacement.
Like Card (2001), his estimates are identified from skill di erences within cities (this time
using four skill groups), with high school dropouts and graduates assigned to distinct groups.
Response of native wages
Given the large geographical displacement, I impute that marginal products have changed
little - at least until the 2000s. Given this, I argue that any native wage e ects can plausibly
be understood to arise from the reservation wage channel. In Figure 2.9, I plot the responses
of decadal change in log native wages wˆNsrt to the enclave instrument. In constructing wˆgst,
I control for di erences in worker composition across cities. Specifically, for each occupation
group s and census year t, I regress log wages on a rich set of individual characteristics22. I
estimate the city means of the residuals from these regressions, and I calculate  wˆgst as the
change in these city means between period census years t≠ 10 and t.
In each decade, high skilled wages are una ected by the enclave instrument, but low
skilled wages always fall. The e ect is small in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, but very large
in the 1970s. To assess the magnitude of the e ect, consider the experience of a popular
migrant destination city like New York. As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the predicted migration
rate (that is, IVrt) in New York in the 1970s was 5.3% (and the actual migration rate was
8.7%). And based on Figure (2.9), the reduced form wage elasticity coe cient for the lower
skilled jobs is about -1.5 in the same decade. Assuming a causal e ect has been successfully
identified, this would suggest that immigration to New York in the 1970s triggered an 8
log point wage cut (for natives) in the lowest skilled jobs, through the reservation wage
mechanism.23
22These include all available education fixed e ects (indicating di erent years of schooling and years of
college); interactions between all these education e ects and a quartic in experience; a full set of 39 potential
experience fixed e ects; a gender dummy; race dummies (black, Hispanic).
23What is the overall national e ect? A naive estimate can be computed by inputting the (population-
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Figure 2.9: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local native wages
Note: For each panel in this figure (each corresponding to a particular decade), I estimate the e ect of the city-level enclave
instrument on the decadal change in log residualised native wages separately for each occupation group. These regressions
control for predicted employment and residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national
occupational counts. I also include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
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An alternative explanation for these wage e ects, in light of the large geographical dis-
placement identified above, is selection. Specifically, changes in city-level wages within oc-
cupation groups may merely reflect the sorting of workers of di erent unobserved abilities
across cities (I already control for observed characteristics), rather than a local change in
pay for a given individual. Indeed, Eeckhout et al. (2011) argue that sorting is the principle
explanation for the relatively large earnings inequality currently found in larger US cities.
In the context of migration, Bratsberg and Raaum (2012) argue that selective attrition of
the lowest paid workers out of job categories subject to a large migrant influx can result in
a spurious positive correlation, across job categories, between observed native wage changes
and immigration rates.
To address this concern, I exploit information in the census on where respondents lived
five years previously. In particular, I study the log di erential between (1) the current
average (residualised) wage of workers who were living in some city r five years previously
and (2) the average wage of workers currently living in this city r. I carry out this exercise
for the 1980 census data (thus, comparing residents of 1980 with residents of 1975), since it
was the 1970s which saw the bulk of the wage e ect.
In Figure 2.10, I estimate the response of this log wage di erential in 1980 to the enclave
instrument (predicting the migration rate of the 1970s), controlling as usual for predicted
employment and residual wage growth. If selection is responsible for the wage results above,
we should expect that, in cities with large migrant enclaves, the residualised wages of previous
residents exceeds that of current residents - in low skilled jobs. However, the figure shows
no evidence of such e ects. This casts doubt on selection explanations for the wage e ects
in the 1970s.
It is instructive to compare my wage estimates with those in other studies which exploit
cross-city variation in US census data for identification. Using data from the cross-section
of 1990, Card (2001) finds that immigration to the most popular destination cities was
responsible for a 3% larger native wage di erential between the highest and lowest skilled
occupations. But, this estimate is identified using the empirical model outlined in equation
(2.40), which imposes restrictive assumptions on substitutability between skill groups in
production. This can perhaps explain why his estimates are somewhat lower than mine.
In contrast, when Borjas (2006) and Cortes (2008) study cross-city variation, they find
statistically insigificant (though negative) e ects of migration. This may be because their
samples only begin in 1980, and their identification is based on decadal census di erences.
Consequently, they miss the large e ects of the 1970s.
Cortes (2008) argues that her weak estimates are a consequence of imperfect substi-
tutability between natives and migrants: she finds larger e ects on the wages of longer-term
migrants. But, Borjas (2006) explains the weak e ects by the large geographical displace-
ment of previous residents, which attenuates the city-level e ect on marginal products. On
weighted) average predicted migration rate (across all cities), equal to 2.1% in the 1970s. Given the reduced
form wage coe cient of -1.5 in the lowest skilled jobs, this would imply a 3 log point wage cut. But, this
is likely to be an overestimate: displacement of natives (to cities experiencing lower migration) is likely to
have somewhat moderated the overall native wage impact. Of course, these estimates correspond to the
reservation wage channel: they do not account for any changes in the marginal products of labour.
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Figure 2.10: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on wage di erential between current
and previous residents
Note: The data points represent, for each occupation group, the response of the log wage di erential in 1980, between current
and previous residents, to the enclave IV. More specifically, the dependent variable of these regressions in the log di erence
between (1) the 1980 average (residualised) wage of workers living in some city r in 1975 and (2) the average wage of the
1980 residents of city r. These regressions control for predicted employment and residual wage growth, as described above.
Data points are weighted with national occupational counts. I also include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national
occupational counts as weights.
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the other hand, he estimates much larger wage e ects using national-level data, identified
from di erences across time, education and experience groups. Of course, I exploit precisely
this attentuation e ect to argue my estimates are driven by the reservation wage channel.
Based on the evidence of Figure 2.2, lower skilled workers are likely to have su ered a rela-
tive decline in marginal products as well. But, because of geographical displacement, these
e ects cannot be identified in cross-city estimates.
Another important point is the e ect on average wages. Both Card (2001) and Borjas,
2006 identify e ects using di erences across skill groups (within cities), so average wage
e ects are not identified; and Cortes (2008) restricts attention to the low skilled. On the other
hand, Card (2009a) finds large e ects on average native wages in cross-city regressions (using
the enclave instrument) - to the extent that local wages grows across the skill distribution,
including for the lowest skilled natives. The di erence in our results can be explained by my
inclusion of the local wage and employment growth predictors, based on initial industrial
composition. The problem is that the enclave instrument is strongly correlated with these
predictors in the 1980s, which suggests Card’s average wage estimates may be spurious.
Response of native employment ratios
New migrants displace native employment geographically, as I have demonstrated above.
But, they can also displace them into joblessness, if natives are unwilling to work at the
new lower wages. In Figure 2.11, I plot the responses of decadal changes in the log native
employment-population ratio to the enclave instrument, by census decade and occupation
group.
Of course, the population denominator is unobserved because many jobless individuals
do not report an occupation. I impute population in each occupation group by allocating
non-employed workers probabilistically to di erent occupations, according to their city, age,
gender, migrant status and education. I base these allocations on the distribution of those
individuals who do report their occupation.
There is no systematic e ect over the support of occupational skill in the 1970s. In the
1980s and 1990s, there is a large negative e ect on low skilled employment ratios, with the
high skilled una ected. This pattern is also somewhat visible in the 2000s, though it is much
weaker. What is the magnitude of these e ects? Again, consider the example of New York,
which had a predicted migration rate of 14% in the 1980s and 17% in the 1990s (see Figure
2.4). The reduced form coe cient in the lowest skill jobs, based on Figure 2.11, is about -0.7
in the 1980s and -0.6 in the 1990s. This suggests that immigration to New York triggered a
10 log point decline in native employment ratios among the lowest skilled workers, in each
of these decades.
It is noteworthy that the low skilled migration shock in the 1970s is manifested in wages
but not employment ratios; and the shock in the 1980s and 1990s is manifested in employment
ratios, but with only a small e ect on wages. One natural interpretation is that low skilled
workers were willing to stomach the wage declines in the 1970s, but that was their limit.
As the wage o er distribution continued to shift downwards in the 1980s and 1990s, native
workers began to reject the lowest o ers. This supported the level of recorded wages, but
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Figure 2.11: Occupation-specific e ects of enclave IV on local native employment ratio
Note: For each panel in this figure (each corresponding to a particular decade), I estimate the e ect of the city-level enclave
instrument on the decadal change in the log native employment-population ratio, separately for each occupation group. Pop-
ulation in each occupation is estimated by probabilistically allocating the non-employed to di erent occupations, according to
their observed characteristics (based on the distribution of employed workers across occupations). These regressions control
for predicted employment and residual wage growth, as described above. Data points are weighted with national occupational
counts. I also include an OLS fit line, which is estimated using national occupational counts as weights.
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had adverse consequences for employment.
One important puzzle remains. Why were there large employment rate e ects in the
1990s, even though the enclave instrument had little e ect on local migrant share in that
decade (see Figure 2.6 above)? One possible explanation is that the migrant share among
participants was responsive to the enclave instrument in the 1990s, even if the migrant
share among residents was not. In the model, I have treated migrant share as exogenous.
But, of course, immigration to a particular city is a function of local firms’ wage-setting
decisions. Suppose firms, in cities with large predicted immigration, cut wages in response
to a growing migrant share among market participants. This could explain both the lower
native employment ratios and the lack of response of migrant share among residents (as new
arrivals to the US chose to locate elsewhere).
2.6 Conclusion
In recent years, economic studies on the wages e ects of immigration have focused on dif-
ferences in skill composition between native and migrant workers. In a competitive model,
these di erences can a ect the marginal products and wages of native workers at di erent
skill levels. However, I argue that di erences in reservation wages between migrants and
natives (see e.g. Nanos and Schluter, 2013, for evidence) can also drive the wage e ects.
This is consistent with the popular view among politicians and the media that migrants are
a source of “cheap labour” and undercut native wages.
I show how this can work in a model with wage-setting monopsonistic firms, where work-
ers draw idiosyncratic employment utilities from random job matches. The model predicts
that a rising share of migrants drives down the distribution of reservation wages, so firms
cut wages for all workers (natives included) and native employment rates fall. I test these
predictions empirically using cross-city data, within two-digit occupation groups. Geograph-
ical displacement of long-term residents by new migrants, within skill groups, allows me to
identify e ects coming through this channel: this is because marginal products are unlikely
to have shifted much. And so, I interpret the native wage and employment rate e ects as
being driven by undercutting.
Throughout this study, I have neglected the wage e ects caused by shifts in marginal
products. But, using data on occupational skill distributions, I show that migrants are
over-represented in low skilled jobs and under-represented at the top: basic theory suggests
marginal products of low skilled labour should have fallen as a result. Previous work in the
literature (such as Card, 2009b, and Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) has claimed otherwise; but it
seems likely that their focus on broad education groups may conceal some important e ects.
However, I cannot identify these e ects by exploiting cross-city variation, precisely because
of the large geographical displacement - as has been noted by Borjas et al. (1997). This calls
for new work on these shifts on marginal products, which goes beyond substitutability in
production between broad education groups.
It is worth noting that, in the model I have described, the native welfare e ects are not
just limited to wages and employment probabilities. In the face of a migrant influx, firms
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cut wage o ers and this reduces natives’ job rejection value. As a result, they are forced
to accept lower wages or face unemployment. But, more broadly, they also accept jobs and
locations with lower match utilities which are unobserved in the data. Therefore, limiting
an analysis to native wages and employment may be justified in a competitive framework,
but it risks neglecting potentially substantial costs associated with displacement across jobs
and locations.
Beyond understanding the labour market e ects of immigration, the model can also give
important insights into policy. One seemingly paradoxical implication is that native wages
can be better protected from a migrant influx if immigrants are better integrated into the
labour market. If job search costs for migrants can be reduced, the reservation wage gap
between migrants and natives will narrow - reducing the ability of firms to cut wage o ers.
This ideas is not new: advocates of the US immigration reform bill of 2013, which eases
the path to citizenship for unauthorised migrants, have argued that native workers are less
likely to have their wages undercut by legal than illegal migrants (The White House, 2013).
This calls for further research on the precise causes of reservation wage gaps to aid the
development of appropriate policy responses.
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Chapter 3
Skilled Mobility and the Job Surplus
3.1 Introduction
Contributions
It is well documented that higher skilled workers migrate more across cities: see, for exam-
ple, Schwartz (1973) and Greenwood (1975). Recent work (Malamud and Wozniak, 2012;
Machin et al., 20121) has found that the e ect of education on mobility is indeed causal. But,
the mechanisms at play remain a source of vigorous debate. Bound and Holzer (2000) and
Wozniak (2010) find that the low skilled are less likely to leave their city following a slump
in local demand. Given this limited supply response, they argue that the low skilled face
significant migration costs, whether due to credit constraints, lack of information or home
attachment. This can help explain why they su er greater wage volatility at the metropoli-
tan level, as also documented by Topel (1986). And Moretti (2012) has argued forcefully
that government should intervene through relocation vouchers (as part of unemployment
insurance) to address this problem.
This focus on costs is natural, given the pervasiveness of the competitive urban framework
proposed by Roback (1982). There, migration is treated as a form of spatial arbitrage
between distinct local labour markets, with workers comparing local wages, amenity values
and housing costs. Any sluggishness in this arbitrage process in low skilled markets must
then then be explained by large unspecified moving costs. But, in this chapter, I consider
an alternative world where workers search for work in multiple cities simultaneously. And I
argue the obstacles to low skilled mobility are precisely those “frictions” which explain the
coexistence of unemployment and vacancies more generally. These frictions are larger in low
skilled markets, because smaller job surpluses discourage search e ort (on both sides of the
market) and job creation.
The latter intuition was proposed by Wildasin (2000), in a discussion at the beginning of
a study on the merits of local human capital investment (though the focus on vacancies is new
1These studies exploit randomness from the Vietnam war draft in the US and a Norwegian compulsory
schooling reform respectively.
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to this chapter). He suggests the larger rents from skilled matches can be explained by skill
specificity: the skills of better educated workers tend to be more job or task-specific. Given
this, surgeons and university lecturers are likely to search in numerous cities for the ideal job,
according to their specialisation; and recruiters will also spend more heavily on seeking out
the ideal employee. In contrast, personal service workers have no such incentive: the jobs on
o er are much the same wherever they go. In this sense, labour markets for higher skilled
workers tend to be “better integrated” nationally. Further to Wildasin’s discussion, evidence
from US panel data does indeed confirm that lower skilled workers are subject to smaller
individual innovations in hourly wages2 (Fitzgerald, 1999). And beyond skill specificity (or
alternatively, the dispersion of match productivity), the relatively high average productivity
of skilled labour clearly also inflates job surpluses.
I make two principle contributions in this chapter. Firstly, I present new evidence from the
Current Population Survey (CPS) that the skill mobility gap is entirely driven by workers
engaged in cross-city job search. I divide cross-county and cross-state migration into (1)
“match-specific” moves, whose primary motivation relates to a match with a specific job;
and (2) “non-match” moves, which are driven by other factors - whether family, housing,
amenities or lack of jobs. It turns out that the better educated are much more likely to make
a match-specific move in any given year; and the same is true of workers in higher skilled
occupation groups within education groups. But, they are also significantly less likely to
make a non-match move, of any particular type (family, housing, amenities, job search).
The fact that lower skilled workers are more likely to move city in search of work is of
particular interest. Clearly, moving without a job in hand is a costly and risky strategy, which
explains why it is relatively rare (just 4% of cross-county moves). Low skilled engagement in
this strategy is testament to the relatively poor integration of national markets, which must
serve as a large obstacle to migration.
My second contribution is to show how these qualitative results can arise from a multi-city
job matching model. The model is very stylised, so I do not attempt to calibrate or estimate
it. There are two frictions in the model: firstly, a fixed cost paid toward non-local matches;
and secondly, uncertainty over an idiosyncratic match productivity parameter.3 The proba-
bility that the match quality between a given worker and firm is revealed is increasing in the
learning e ort directed by each agent at their match partner. An important departure from
Moen’s (1997) seminal study of directed search is that, here, workers and firms direct their
search e ort at match partners in multiple locations simultaneously. Labour markets are
integrated geographically, with the extent of this integration determined by the parameters
of the productivity process. In contrast, Moen restricts agents’ search activities to a single
submarket: notice this is the identical criticism of Roback-style urban models that I made
above.4
2This finding is not well known, because much of the literature on earnings processes has focused on
monthly or annual earnings, rather than hourly wages. I discuss this in further detail in Section 3.6 below.
3Unlike in the standard matching model, I assume the existence of all unemployed workers and vacancies
is known. The unknown quantity is the match productivity between each worker-vacancy pair. See Manning
(2003) for a discussion of these issues.
4Recent work by Beaudry et al. (2013) has integrated frictional job matching into traditional urban
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There is some precedent for this alternative approach in the literature. Jackman and
Savouri (1992) argue that internal migration should be understood as cross-city job match-
ing. As evidence, they show that gross migration greatly exceeds net flows between UK
regions; Wildasin (2000) makes a similar point using US data.5 More recently, Manning
and Petrongolo (2011) have investigated the geographical extent of labour markets, using a
model where workers simultaneously make applications to jobs in multiple locations. Using
geographically detailed data from the UK on local unemployment, vacancies and commut-
ing patterns, they find that labour markets are very local: the utility of being o ered a
job declines exponentially at around 0.3km from a worker’s residence. However, they argue
that higher skilled labour markets are likely to be broader. Marinescu and Rathelot (2013)
estimate the model using job application data from the US. Also, following an earlier draft
of this chapter, Lutgen and der Linden (2013) have developed a cross-city search model to
explore the implications of more e cient online job search.
Rather than including multiple skill groups in the model, I assume workers are homoge-
neous and explore the impact of changing key parameters. To simulate the conditions faced
by higher skilled workers, I study the implications of (1) raising average productivity and (2)
increasing the dispersion of match productivity. In each case, the job surplus distribution
shifts upwards (specifically, a hazard rate dominating transformation - though I do not yet
have a proof for the match dispersion case). As a result, both workers and firms invest
more heavily in learning e ort; and assuming free entry, more jobs are created and market
tightness grows. I validate these predictions with evidence on vacancy rates, application
counts and recruitment expenditures. Also, larger job surpluses are more likely to dominate
the non-local matching cost. And consequently, agents invest a larger share of their learning
e ort outside their home city, and most importantly, the rate of match-specific migration
grows.
I then study the response to various local shocks. An adverse local productivity shock
has relatively little e ect on high skilled markets, because the shock is more easily absorbed
by the large surpluses. In order to study the response to a given decline in local employment,
I consider the extreme case where all jobs in a given city are destroyed. In that case, high
skilled workers are more likely to match with jobs elsewhere, because the larger surpluses are
more likely to dominate the migration cost. The low skilled su er more in terms of welfare;
and this can help explain why they are more likely to make a “non-match” move in search
of work.
On the other hand, the migratory response to a shock to the local amenity value is larger
among the low skilled. This is because the high skilled are less willing to give up their
large job surpluses to realise gains in amenity value. This can help explain the negative skill
frameworks, focusing on the joint determination of local wages, employment rates, house prices and city
size. Each city is modelled with its own job matching function. When unemployed, workers choose a city
and are then randomly matched with local firms. In contrast, in my model, agents are free to search across
locations.
5The fact that gross flows exceed net flows is of course central to Wildasin’s contention that the movement
of skilled workers is driven primarily by the specialisations of individual workers and firms: these idiosyncratic
matches dominate aggregate adjustments between local areas.
54
gradient in non-match migration outlined above.
Related Literature
Before moving on to the evidence and model, it is worth relating my work to other stud-
ies on the skill mobility gap. Estimating a dynamic structural model6 on US panel data,
Kennan (2013) also finds that college graduates face greater geographical wage dispersion
and greater uncertainty in a location-match component in wages - compared to high skilled
graduates. However, this can only explain a small fraction of the observed mobility gap: he
puts the residual down to unspecified “costs”. But, this is not inconsistent with my findings
or Wildasin’s (2000) claims: specifically, this residual is likely to be picking up di erences in
learning behaviour and market tightness across skill groups (these processes are absent from
his model).
Other economists argue that the role of skill di erentiated costs is minimal. Using a
calibrated Roy model, Lkhagvasuren (2014) has found that di erences in worker-location
match productivity dispersion can account for most of the skill di erences in gross migration
rates; though his match dispersion parameter is itself calibrated (based on observed net
migration rates across census divisions). But, like Kennan, he does not allow for endogenous
learning e ort or market tightness: he assumes perfect information on wage o ers.
Notowidigdo (2011) argues that low skilled workers migrate less because they are rel-
atively sheltered from local demand shocks. Specifically, they are better compensated by
declining housing costs (they spend a larger share of their income on housing) and transfer
payments. This is a strong claim, given Hoynes’ (2002) finding that the low skilled are sub-
ject to larger local wage and employment volatility. But importantly, it o ers an alternative
explanation for the relatively inelastic local supply of low skilled labour, aside from costly
mobility (a principle aim of this chapter). On the other hand, he does not consider the role
of match dispersion, which is likely to play a crucial role.
Many cost-based explanations have been proposed in the literature. Wozniak (2010)
argues that the high skilled su er less from credit constraints. Gregg et al. (2004) and
Malamud and Wozniak (2012) suggest that college graduates have weaker home attachment,
having already left home to study; and both articles also argue that long-distance job search
is more costly for lower skilled workers.
My evidence of a negative skill gradient in non-match migration casts doubt on the
importance of credit constraints and home attachment. But, this is not the case for skill-
di erentiated job search costs: clearly, these costs constrain only match-specific migration,
and this is entirely consistent with the evidence reported in this chapter. But, I argue that
these costs are just one (endogenous) manifestation of the underlying productivity processes,
which are fundamentally responsible for the skill mobility gap. In this respect, an important
contribution of my work is to identify the commonality between returns-based and cost-
based explanations of the mobility gap. This distinction does matter for policy: it suggests
6The model is based on Kennan and Walker (2011), who use it to measures the responsiveness of cross-
state migration to expected gains in lifetime income, taking local wage processes as exogenous.
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improvements in search technology (through the internet for example) cannot be a complete
solution because they do not address the underlying cause.
As an aside, it is worth noting that one important practical component of “learning e ort”
and search costs lies in social networks. Social networks play an important role in job search:
most studies tend to show around half of workers found their job through a personal contact
(see Granovetter, 1995, for a survey and original analysis). Since higher skilled workers have
more to gain from a successful match, my model suggests they should invest more heavily
in developing broader social networks. Indeed, Granovetter finds that lower skilled workers
are relatively more likely to have found their job through “family/social” contacts rather
than “work” contacts (where the latter can be though of as more “socially distant” than the
former).
In the following section, I disaggregate the skill-mobility relationship in the CPS by
reported reasons for moving. Section (3.3) describes the multi-city matching model. Then,
in the following two sections, I assess the implications of average productivity and match
dispersion for (1) market tightness, search behaviour and match-specific migration, and
(2) for responses to local shocks. Section (3.6) presents evidence on skill di erences in
average productivity and match quality dispersion from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), building on Fitzgerald’s (1999) findings on hourly wage volatility. And
Section 3.7 reports some evidence on skill di erences in market tightness and learning e ort.
I conclude in Section 3.8.
3.2 Migration patterns
Basic facts
In this section, I study cross-county and cross-state migration patterns across education
groups and by occupational skill within education groups. Migration across counties and
states should be understood as long-distance moves, in the sense that most commuting
happens within county or state boundaries: the American Community Survey of 2011 shows
that 72% of employed Americans work in their county of residence and 96% in their state
of residence.7 For this exercise, I use the IPUMS CPS samples organised by King et al.
(2010). The March CPS reports whether respondents moved county or state in the previous
12 months. And since 1999, respondents have also given their primary reason for moving.
All statistics below are based on pooled cross-sections between 1999 and 2013.
My sample consists of labour force participants outside the armed forces aged 25 to 64.
Restricting the sample to over-25s helps ensure my results are not conflated by individuals
leaving college. In any case, I also exclude movers who explicitly report moving primarily to
attend or leave college, as well as those who move because of natural disasters: these account
for 2% of the remaining cross-county migrant sample. In Table 3.1, I report migration rates
(1) across states and (2) across counties within states, broken down by primary reason for
moving. The first column gives the percentage of the full sample who changed state for each
7See Table S0801, American FactFinder (US Census Bureau).
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recorded reason, and the second column reports the percentage of cross-state migrants who
moved for each recorded reason. The final two columns repeat this exercise for cross-county
moves within states. The CPS categorises primary motivations into a range of responses.
I group these into three broad categories: (1) “match-specific” moves, where the move is
driven by the requirements of a specific job; (2) “non-match” moves, which are motivated
by factors unrelated to a specific job; and (3) “ambiguous” moves, which are di cult to
categorise either way.
The bottom row shows that, each year, about 2% of the sample move across states
and another 2% switch county within states. More than a third of cross-state moves are
motivated by a specific job, compared with a quarter of within-state moves. Most of these
match-specific moves relate to a job change or transfer, but many are driven by the desire for
a shorter commute: in particular, this explains a third of within-state match-specific moves.
I group “non-match” moves into five subcategories: family, housing, amenities, looking
for work and other reasons. Family and housing reasons each account for about a quarter
of all moves across counties. Recorded family motivations include change in marital status
and establishing own household, but the residual “other family reasons” category is the most
common. Under housing motivations, the CPS records responses under desire for ownership,
new/better housing and cheaper housing. The amenities category is significantly smaller,
accounting for 6% of cross-state and within-state moves; most of these are driven by a desire
for a “better neighbourhood”. Notice that I record “looking for work” as a non-match move,
since it relates to local job availability rather than a specific job. This sort of speculative job
search is notably rare, accounting for just 5% of cross-state and 3% of within-state moves.
Finally, I mark the CPS’s “other job-related reasons” category as “ambiguous” (in terms
of whether they are match-specific), because it is not clear whether they are motivated by
specific jobs or local job availability. This ambiguous group accounts for just 4% of cross-state
and 2% of within-state moves.
Figure 3.1 plots annual cross-county migration rates disaggregated into three age groups:
25-34, 35-44 and 45-64. There is a clear education gradient, but only for the youngest
experience group. Among the young, workers without college degrees (i.e. less than 4 years
of college) have an average migration rate of 7.0%. But, the rate for young workers with a
first college degree (4 years of college) is 9.0%; and for those with further degrees (5+ years),
it is 10.7%. Among older workers, migration rates are lower (see Greenwood, 1975, and
Kennan and Walker, 2011, for discussion of this point); and there is little di erence across
education groups.
Higher skilled workers also tend to move longer distances when they do migrate (Davis
and Dingel, 2012). Figure 3.2 reports the share of all cross-county moves that are cross-
state, again by education and age groups. For workers of all ages, there is a clear education
gradient. On average, among high school dropouts, 41% of cross-county moves fall across
states. But, this reaches 55% for workers with post-graduate qualifications. This e ect can
also be seen for very long distance moves: in Figure 3.3, I plot the share of cross-state moves
that exceed 2000km8. Again, this share is increasing in education: from 16% among high
8Migration distances are based on states’ internal latitude and longitude values, taken from the Census
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Table 3.1: Breakdown of migration motivations in main sample
State moves County moves (within states)
Primary reason % full sample % state migrants % full sample % county migrants
MATCH-SPECIFIC
Specific job 0.71 37.42 0.49 24.71
New job or job transfer 0.65 34.20 0.32 16.25
Easier commute 0.06 3.23 0.17 8.46
NON-MATCH
Family 0.47 24.64 0.53 26.76
Change in marital status 0.11 5.86 0.17 8.75
Establish own household 0.07 3.91 0.13 6.44
Other family reasons 0.28 14.86 0.23 11.57
Housing 0.36 19.31 0.69 34.74
Want to own home 0.08 4.08 0.19 9.31
New or better housing 0.12 6.35 0.24 12.16
Cheaper housing 0.07 3.48 0.11 5.30
Other housing reasons 0.10 5.39 0.16 7.97
Amenities 0.12 5.94 0.13 5.54
Better neighbourhood 0.05 2.46 0.08 4.23
Climate, health, retirement 0.07 3.48 0.03 1.30
Looking for work 0.10 5.43 0.05 2.69
Other reasons 0.06 3.10 0.06 3.08
AMBIGUOUS
Other job-related reasons 0.08 4.16 0.05 2.48
ALL REASONS 1.89 100 2.00 100
This table presents migration rates by primary reason in CPS cross-sections between 1999 and 2013, excluding
those who move primarily to attend or leave or college or because of natural disasters (these account for 2
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Figure 3.1: Annual migration rates by education and experience
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Figure 3.2: Share of cross-county moves which are cross-state
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Figure 3.3: Share of cross-state moves exceeding 2000km
school dropouts to 23% among post-graduates.
The key part of this analysis is the disaggregation of these migration patterns by reasons
for moving. Figure 3.4 reports separately the annual rate of match-specific and non-match
migration across counties. The di erence between the two is striking. There is a very
steep and positive education gradient in match-specific rates. The e ect is strongest among
the youngest workers: 1.2% of high-school dropouts make match-specific moves each year,
compared with 5.8% of post-graduates; but even among older workers, there are positive
e ects. However, for non-match moves, there is a negative education gradient. For workers
under 35, this gradient appears weak and only manifested for post-graduates. For 35-44s
though, the non-match migration rate falls from 3.4% for high-school dropouts to 2.2% for
post-graduates; and there is a clear but shallower education slope for the oldest age group.
These migration rates appear to be small, so the di erences between education groups
might be considered inconsequential. But, in the context of job-matching, these observed
rates should really be compared with job finding rates In my CPS sample, only 12% of
workers have a di erent job to 12 months ago9. As Figure 3.5 shows, job changing rates do
increase somewhat with education. But, the e ect is relatively small: among the youngest
age group, growing from 14% for high school dropouts to 19% for postgraduates. As a result,
these di erences cannot explain the skill gap in migration: among 25-34s who changed job
in the previous 12 months, 2.4% of high-school dropouts made a match-specific cross-county
move, compared with 16% of post-graduates. This is a very large di erence.
Bureau: http://www.census.gov/geo/www/2010census/statearea_intpt.html. I calculate the distances using
the GEODIST Stata module, written by (Picard, 2012).
9I define a worker as “changing job” in the CPS if (1) he worked for two or more employers over the past
year or (2) he was unemployed or in education for part of the previous year.
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Figure 3.4: Annual migration rates disaggregated by reported reason
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Figure 3.5: Share of workers changing job each year
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Table 3.2: Marginal e ects from probit regressions on match-specific migration incidence
Dependent variable: takes 1 for a cross-county match-specific move in previous 12 months
Age group 25-34 25-34 35-44 35-44 45-64 45-64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-school graduate 0.381** 0.200 0.104 0.012 -0.016 -0.051
(0.176) (0.177) (0.113) (0.115) (0.065) (0.066)
Some college 1.054*** 0.675*** 0.455*** 0.261** 0.155** 0.083
(0.176) (0.181) (0.113) (0.117) (0.065) (0.068)
College graduate 2.279*** 1.610*** 0.824*** 0.506*** 0.390*** 0.277***
(0.177) (0.191) (0.114) (0.124) (0.066) (0.072)
Post-graduate 3.786*** 2.933*** 1.310*** 0.904*** 0.482*** 0.338***
(0.192) (0.211) (0.120) (0.134) (0.069) (0.077)
Occupational skill last year 1.585*** 0.773*** 0.276***
(ranges from 0 to 1) (0.178) (0.114) (0.00067)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,303 315,303 384,840 384,840 521,642 521,642
Migration rate (%) 2.542 2.542 1.243 1.243 0.656 0.656
Each column reports marginal e ects of various education levels from probit regressions on annual
cross-county match-specific migration incidence. I also estimate models which control for occupational
skill percentile measure, as described in footnote 12. I report results separately for three age group
samples. For binary education indicators, marginal e ects relate to change in regressor from 0 to 1
(the excluded category is high-school dropout); for the occupational skill measure, I report the average
marginal e ect. All marginal e ects scaled by 100 and reported in percentage terms. Estimates are
based on a panel of CPS cross-sections between 1999 and 2013. The sample is restricted to labour force
participants outside the armed forces. Individuals who move primarily to attend or leave or college or
because of natural disasters are also excluded (these account for 2
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Table 3.3: Marginal e ects from probit regressions on non-match migration incidence
Dependent variable: takes 1 for a cross-county non-match move in previous 12 months
Age group 25-34 25-34 35-44 35-44 45-64 45-64
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
High-school graduate -0.482** -0.384* -0.441*** -0.388*** -0.170* -0.148
(0.195) (0.197) (0.136) (0.137) (0.092) (0.093)
Some college -0.772*** -0.561*** -0.588*** -0.474*** -0.169* -0.124
(0.2) (0.207) (0.141) (0.146) (0.094) (0.099)
College graduate -0.889*** -0.508** -0.849*** -0.660*** -0.343*** -0.271**
(0.209) (0.230) (0.149) (0.163) (0.099) (0.110)
Post-graduate -1.209*** -0.718*** -1.101*** -0.857*** -0.518*** -0.426***
(0.252) (0.280) (0.169) (0.189) (0.107) (0.123)
Occupational skill last year -0.929*** -0.463*** -0.179*
(ranges from 0 to 1) (0.230) (0.161) (0.106)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 315,303 315,303 384,840 384,840 521,642 521,642
Migration rate (%) 5.053 5.053 2.847 2.847 1.753 1.753
Each column reports marginal e ects of various education levels from probit regressions on annual cross-
county non-match migration incidence. I also estimate models which control for occupational skill percentile
measure, as described in footnote 12. I report results separately for three age group samples. For binary
education indicators, marginal e ects relate to change in regressor from 0 to 1 (the excluded category is
high-school dropout); for the occupational skill measure, I report the average marginal e ect. All marginal
e ects scaled by 100 and reported in percentage terms. Estimates are based on a panel of CPS cross-
sections between 1999 and 2013. The sample is restricted to labour force participants outside the armed
forces. Individuals who move primarily to attend or leave or college or because of natural disasters are also
excluded (these account for 2
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In Tables 3.2 and 3.3, I show that the migration patterns described above are robust
to observable characteristics for match-specific and non-match moves respectively; and I
also show that migration rates are responsive to occupational skill within education groups.
The reported coe cients on education indicators (high-school graduate, some college, college
graduate and post-graduate) are marginal e ects (expressed in percentage point terms) from
individual-level probit regressions on binary migration variables. The omitted category is
high-school dropout. I also estimate models controlling for an occupational skill percentile
measure as a regressor, imputed from the educational composition of the occupation group,
which varies from 0 (for the lowest skilled jobs) to 1 (for the highest)10. I base this mea-
sure on workers’ occupation 12 months prior to the survey11 (which the CPS reports) to
reduce concerns about endogeneity. In each regression, I also control for a detailed range of
individual characteristics.12
For match-specific cross-county migration in Table 3.2, there are positive and strongly
significant education e ects within each age group. The magnitude of the e ects are very
similar to the unconditional e ects reported in Figure 3.4, with the e ects decreasing in
age. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show that job-motivated migration rates are also increasing in
occupational skill within education groups. The e ect is large: moving from the bottom to
the top occupational skill level has a comparable e ect to moving from high school dropout to
college graduate. Interestingly also, occupational skill explains about a third of the observed
e ect from education levels; this can be appreciated by comparing the education coe cients
across adjacent columns. These within-education e ects are important, because they suggest
the migration patters are driven somehow by the di erent jobs that workers do, rather than
just by their educational qualifications.
Conversely, for non-match moves in Table 3.2, the education slope is negative and strongly
significant in each age category - including for the under 35s, for whom the slope was weak in
Figure 3.4. Results from some experimentation (not reported here) reveal that the di erence
comes from controlling for a Hispanic indicator in the Table 3.2 regressions: Hispanics tend to
make relatively few non-match moves, despite having relatively low education levels. For the
older two age groups though, the size of the e ects is similar to the unconditional statistics
in Figure 3.4. Columns 2, 4 and 6 show that non-match migration rates are significantly
decreasing in occupational skill level within education groups. The e ect of job skill is again
substantial: the e ect of moving from the lowest to highest skill category is comparable to
10More specifically, I calculate the mean wage within each of 16 detailed education category available
in the CPS. Using this data, I estimate the expected wage in each occupation group, conditional on the
occupation’s educational composition. For each occupation group, my skill measure is the percentile of the
expected wage within the distribution of occupations. I use the time-consistent 1990-based classification
provided by IPUMS, grouping workers into 74 minor occupation categories.
11Of course, I have no data for workers who had no job 12 months prior to the survey, who account for
3% of the sample. For these observations, I impute an expected occupational percentile based on a linear
regression of occupational percentile (for the sample who had a job in the previous year) on the 16 available
education indicators, as well as detailed demographic characteristics (see following footnote).
12Specifically: age, age squared, black and Hispanic race dummies, immigrant status, marital status, a
range of indicators for number of own children, a gender indicator which is also interacted with all previously
mentioned variables, and a set of year fixed e ects (for the individual CPS cross-sections).
64
the e ect of moving from high school dropout to postgraduate education. And similarly to
non-match migration, occupational skill explains about a third of the observed education
e ects (comparing adjacent columns).
Further detail and robustness
Of course, the non-match gradients reported above are aggregates over many distinct moti-
vations. But, I show below that the negative slopes are common across more disaggregated
non-match categories, related to family, housing and amenities. I report the results from
this disaggregation exercise in Table 3.4. Firstly, I decompose cross-county moves into cross-
state (first four rows) and within-state cross-county moves (last four rows). Secondly, across
the rows of the table, I decompose match-specific and non-match moves into more detailed
reasons, and I also include results for the “ambiguous” category. For simplicity though, I
pool all age groups together - so the education coe cients represent average e ects across
the full age sample.
The first row reports e ects for all motivations combined. Interestingly, the positive ed-
ucation gradient is only present for cross-state moves and not within-state. This is for two
reasons. Firstly, the education slope for migration motivated by a new job (the following row)
is much larger for cross-state than within-state moves (though positive and significant for
both): controlling for individual characteristics, post-graduates are on average 0.97 percent-
age points more likely than high school dropouts to make a cross-state move, while just 0.34
points more likely to switch county within state for the same reason. Secondly, the negative
education slopes for the various non-match motivations tend to be larger for within-state
moves (with looking for work a notable exception13). Unsurprisingly, within-state education
e ects are also larger for migrating for the sake of an easier commute.
The principal drivers of the negative overall non-match education slope are “other family
reasons”14 (with a 0.12 percentage point gap in cross-state migration propensity between
post-graduates and high school dropouts, and 0.21 within-state), cheaper housing (0.04 gap
across states and a 0.1 gap within), “other housing reasons”15 (negligible across states, 0.13
within), better neighbourhood (0.02 across, 0.05 within), and looking for work (0.08 across,
0.07 within). In almost all these cases, the e ects are monotonic across education categories.
Interestingly, there is only one non-match motivation with a significant positive education
slope: the desire to purchase a home.
I will argue below that these negative slopes partly reflect the large surpluses in high
skilled job matches: workers are unwilling to forfeit these surpluses to realise gains in amenity
value (with amenities broadly defined to include family, housing and local job availability).
Of course, it is also plausible that low skilled workers are subject to larger shocks which
13This is intuitive, given that labour market shocks tend to be correlated between nearby localities.
14Unfortunately, this “other family” category is not further disaggregated in the CPS data. An important
component of this response is likely to be moving closer to relatives. Interestingly, neither of the the other
family motivations (change of marital status or establishing own household) contribute to the negative slope.
15Like the “other family” category, this “other housing reasons” category is not further disaggregated in
the CPS.
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Table 3.4: Marginal e ects from probit regressions on migration incidence
Dependent variable: takes 1 for a move (of specified motivation) in previous 12 months
CROSS-STATE CROSS-COUNTY WITHIN STATE
Primary reason HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad
All reasons -0.102 -0.036 0.383*** 0.936*** -0.243*** -0.134* -0.159** -0.249***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.069) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076) (0.079) (0.089)
MATCH-SPECIFIC
New job/transfer 0.028 0.213*** 0.605*** 0.974*** 0.049 0.165*** 0.280*** 0.341***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039)
Commute -0.002 0.007 0.009 0.034*** 0.025 0.067*** 0.082*** 0.107***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
NON-MATCH
Change in marital status 0.007 0.004 -0.016 -0.001 0.042* 0.062** 0.018 0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Establish own household -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017 -0.002 -0.031 -0.056**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.026)
Other family reasons -0.056** -0.061** -0.068*** -0.124*** -0.054** -0.080*** -0.139*** -0.207***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.032)
Want to own home -0.001 -0.012 0.009 0.01 0.017 0.057** 0.079*** 0.054*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028)
New or better housing 0.01 -0.01 -0.015 -0.021 -0.014 -0.027 -0.022 -0.071**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.031)
Cheaper housing -0.014 -0.027** -0.046*** -0.039*** -0.028* -0.053*** -0.065*** -0.110***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022)
Other housing reasons 0.005 -0.02 -0.014 -0.002 -0.068*** -0.097*** -0.118*** -0.133***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Better neighbourhood -0.015* -0.017* -0.031*** -0.018* -0.022 -0.021 -0.035** -0.051***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018)
Climate, health, retirement 0.015 0.019 0.015 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 -0.016* -0.003
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Look for work -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.060*** -0.075*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.066*** -0.068***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015)
Other reasons 0.015 0.007 0.030*** 0.034*** -0.026** -0.029** -0.042*** -0.050***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.016)
AMBIGUOUS
Other job reasons 0.012 0.024 0.043*** 0.081*** -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
This table reports marginal e ects of various education levels from probit regressions on annual migration incidence. Each row reports the
e ects on moving for the motivation specified, with the first row presenting education e ects on the overall migration incidence (all reasons).
The first four columns gives results for cross-state moves and the final four for cross-county moves within states. Marginal e ects relate to
change in variable from 0 to 1; they are scaled by 100 and reported in percentage terms. Estimates are based on panel of CPS cross-sections
between 1999 and 2013. The sample is restricted to labour force participants outside the armed forces, aged 25-64. Individuals who move
primarily to attend or leave or college or because of natural disasters are also excluded (these account for 2
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encourage non-match moves. For example, lower educated workers tend to be more credit
constrained, so may pay more attention to housing costs when choosing a location. Also,
they are more commonly unemployed, which makes them more likely to move to look for
work (though it is clearly significant that so few of them engage in match-specific migration).
And family instability and disruption may be more common among low income families (see
e.g. McLanahan, 1985). But in any case, the fact that the statistically significant non-match
education slopes are almost always negative and monotonic is certainly striking.
An important caveat in interpreting these results is that migration decisions are often
made in the context of a household, rather than at the individual level where I have conducted
my analysis. Of course, many individuals migrate to meet the needs of another household
member. For example, a husband might move state to allow his wife to take up a new
job. Now, the CPS question on primary reason for moving is asked of individuals. But, it
appears that many individuals simply report the reasons of fellow household members. In
the previous example, both the husband and the wife may report moving for the sake of
a new job; even though the husband should really report a family-related reason (from an
individual perspective). In 68% of multi-person households with at least one member moving
for the sake of a new job or job transfer, all households members report moving for this same
reason.16 It seems unlikely that, in so many of these households, the change of residence
was motivated by multiple members finding jobs in the same county. In particular, 83% of
children under 16 in these households also report moving for the sake of a new job.17 This
will not a ect the broad conclusions from the analysis above if households are composed of
individuals with similar levels of education; but to the extent that this is not the case, this
could conflate the results.
To address some of these concerns, I re-estimate the equations of Table 3.4 using a
robustness sample. Firstly, to deal with misreported reasons among household dependents,
I restrict the sample to the top-earning individual in each household.18 And secondly, to
address the problem of household instability among low income families, I further restrict
the sample to top-earners living (1) alone or (2) with a spouse and children only.19
The results for the robustness sample are reported in Table 3.5. For comparability, the
table structure is identical to Table 3.4. Interestingly, the education slopes of match-specific
migration are now significantly steeper: post-graduates are 1.32 percentage points more
likely to make a cross-state move, compared to 0.97 in the full sample. Unlike the full
sample though, the e ect of education on commuting-motivated migration is insignificant.
Also, the magnitudes of many of the non-match education e ects have held up reasonably
well in the robustness sample. In particular, the within-state e ect of postgraduate education
16This statistic is based on all household members, including those excluded from the sample under
consideration in the analysis above (i.e. the economically inactive, and those under 25 or over 64).
17Indeed, the IPUMS documentation comments that “while data [on the primary reason for moving] were
collected for all movers age 1 and older, the responses for minors doubtless reflect the rationales given by
adults in the household.” See https://cps.ipums.org/cps-action/variables/WHYMOVE#description_section
18I exclude all households with multiple individuals earning the same top wage and all households with
no wage income.
19I exclude single parents living with children, in case this is linked with family instability.
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(relative to high-school dropouts) is -0.16 for “other family reasons”, compared to -0.21 for
the full sample. This suggests this e ect is not driven by misreporting of migration reasons
or education-di erentiated household instability.
3.3 Model
Overview
I present a continuous-time job matching model with directed search across z cities, where z
is large. The economy consists of n workers. Each worker is characterised by a fixed “origin
city”, with an equal number of workers assigned to each city. These origins determine
each worker’s geographical centre of job search (I explain what this means below); and
they are fixed, irrespective of worker’s migration histories. Workers are either employed
or unemployed, and the latter receive a flow utility b. For simplicity, I assume that only
the unemployed search for work. Firms are homogeneous and are free to open vacancies
anywhere along the circumference. Each firm employs a single worker to produce a single
output good, with price normalised to 1.
Productivity is the sum of y and a random match component ‡Á. I assume Á is distributed
according to F , with mean 0 and with hazard rate f(x)1≠F (x) monotonically increasing in x20. The
parameter ‡ modifies the dispersion of the productivity shock. Matches are consummated
if the associated job surplus exceeds zero. In this case, the wage is set according to a Nash
bargain.21 Job separations occur at an exogenous rate ”.
I assume that the unemployed know of the existence and location of all vacancies; and
recruiting firms have equivalent information on the unemployed. In this sense, workers and
firms do not need to look for matches. Instead, there are two frictions that separate a given
worker i and firm j. Firstly, it is costly to learn the idiosyncratic match productivity. This
information is randomly revealed according to a Poisson process defined by a “revelation
function” q. The arguments of this function are (1) the learning e ort22 ew,ij directed by
worker i to firm j and (2) the learning e ort ef,ji directed by firm j to worker i. For simplicity,
I assume a match can only be accepted or rejected once this information is revealed. Learning
e ort is subject to a cost 12“X· (e·,ij)
2 for · = {f, w}. The superscript X denotes the match
type, where X = L denotes a local match (where the firm’s location coincides with the
worker’s origin) and X = N denotes a non-local match. Non-local e ort is more expensive:
“N· > “
L
· . But, because of the convexity of learning costs, firms and workers do exert some
e ort outside their home city.
The second friction is a matching cost mX , paid by the worker on the acceptance of a
match, with mL = 0 and mN > 0. In this sense, the matching cost can be understood to
20This property is characteristic of the uniform, normal and exponential distributions.
21The precise rent sharing rule is not important, as long as both wages and profits are increasing in job
surplus: this ensures that both workers and firms invest resources in learning.
22Practically speaking, this would include costs related to advertising, application, interview and any
necessary travel.
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Table 3.5: Marginal e ects from probit regressions on migration incidence: robustness sample
Dependent variable: takes 1 for a move (of specified motivation) in previous 12 months
CROSS-STATE CROSS-COUNTY WITHIN STATE
Primary reason HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad HS grad Some coll Coll grad Post grad
All reasons -0.106 0.12 0.610*** 1.238*** -0.199 0.081 -0.005 -0.111
(0.116) (0.117) (0.117) (0.120) (0.123) (0.124) (0.126) (0.135)
MATCH-SPECIFIC
New job/transfer 0.016 0.341*** 0.845*** 1.317*** 0.039 0.229*** 0.332*** 0.395***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.091) (0.093) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) (0.071)
Commute 0.015 0.022 0.025 0.037 -0.024 0.006 0.001 0.036
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043) (0.045)
NON-MATCH
Change in marital status -0.019 -0.014 -0.036 -0.023 0.056 0.085** 0.026 0.027
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045)
Establish own household -0.016 -0.031* -0.015 -0.026 -0.052 -0.017 -0.054* -0.113***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.038)
Other family reasons -0.046 -0.024 -0.025 -0.092** -0.041 -0.044 -0.090*** -0.157***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.041) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040)
Want to own home 0.019 0.012 0.034 0.046* -0.009 0.023 0.058 0.024
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044)
New or better housing -0.004 0.005 -0.01 -0.018 -0.063 -0.05 -0.079* -0.120**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.047)
Cheaper housing 0.01 -0.002 -0.033 -0.023 -0.022 -0.048** -0.056** -0.104***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.028)
Other housing reasons -0.009 -0.024 -0.028 -0.01 -0.038 -0.042 -0.060* -0.073**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)
Better neighbourhood -0.019 -0.021 -0.031** -0.018 0.023 0.018 0.003 -0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Climate, health, retirement 0.011 0.02 0 0.005 0.006 0.004 -0.002 0.015
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Look for work -0.023 -0.040** -0.042** -0.057*** -0.030** -0.028** -0.042*** -0.031**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Other reasons 0.015 0.022 0.043** 0.047*** 0.003 0.005 0.006 -0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
AMBIGUOUS
Other job reasons 0.007 0.006 0.03 0.065** 0.028 0.050** 0.036 0.027
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025)
This table re-estimates the equations of Table 10, but using a robustness sample. Specifically, I further restrict the sample to top-earners
in households living (1) alone or (2) with a spouse and child only. I exclude households with joint top earners, and I also exclude parents
living alone with children. The sample size in each regression is 513,756. SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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represent a one-o  moving expense: a worker who finds a job outside his home city must
reside next to the firm (there is no commuting). Once a worker loses his job, he returns to
his origin at no cost.
I study the e ect of raising (1) the di erence between productivity and out-of-work utility
y≠ b and (2) the match productivity dispersion ‡, all else equal, to simulate a higher skilled
labour market. I show these markets are tighter and are characterised by greater investment
in learning e ort. I then derive the implications for responses to local shocks.
Productivity revelation
The productivity of the match between a given worker i and firm j is revealed according to
the following Poisson process:
q (ew,ij, ef,ji) = µe–w,ije1≠–f,ji (3.1)
where µ is the revelation e ciency parameter and – œ (0, 1). ew,ij is the learning e ort
directed by worker i to firm j, and ef,ji is the firm’s learning e ort directed at worker i.
Given the symmetry of the model, the learning e ort of workers can take one of two values,
depending on whether the match is local or non-local; and the same is true of firms’ e ort.
Specifically, ew,ij = ew (X) and ef,ji = ef (X), where X = {L,N} specifies whether the
match is local or non-local. And so, the instantaneous revelation probability between a
worker and firm for match type X can be expressed as:
q (X) = µew (X)– ef (X)1≠–
Worker and firm values
For a worker of any origin, the value of being unemployed is:
rU = b+
ÿ
X={L,N}
max
ew
;
µew (X)– ef (X)1≠– Uˆ (X)≠ 12“
X
w ew (X)2
<
ÊXv (3.2)
where, for each match type X, workers choose the optimal learning e ort ew. The total stock
of vacancies is v, and this is weighted by ÊX which denotes the share of vacancies which
are local (X = L) or non-local (X = N). Given the symmetry of the model, ÊL = 1z and
ÊN = z≠1z , where z is the number of cities. Workers choose the optimal learning e ort ew (X),
according to match type X = {L,N}. r is the discount rate, and Uˆ (X) is the expected
value to the worker (before the match quality is revealed) of a type X match. Specifically:
Uˆ (X) =
ˆ
Á
max
Ó
E (X, Á)≠ U ≠mX , 0
Ô
dF (3.3)
On discovering the productivity of a type X match, the worker accepts it if E (X, Á)≠ U Ø
mX , where E is the employment value and mX is the matching cost, which is positive only
in a non-local match. The employment value is given by:
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rE (X, Á) = w (X, Á) + ” (U ≠ E (X, Á)) (3.4)
where w (X, Á) is the negotiated wage, given match type X and a productivity draw of Á.
The problem faced by firms is similar. Unlike workers, firms choose the city j that yields
the largest vacancy value23:
V = max
j
Vj (3.5)
In a spatial equilibrium, Vj = V for all j, where:
rV =
ÿ
X={L,N}
max
ef
;
µew (X)– ef (X)1≠– Vˆ (X)≠ 12“
X
f ef (X)2
<
ÊXu (3.6)
The intuition is identical for the value of unemployment: for each match type X, firms
choose the optimal learning e ort ef . u is the stock of unemployed, and ÊX is the fraction of
workers corresponding to match type X. Vˆ (X) is the expected value to the firm of a match
of type X, where:
Vˆ (X) =
ˆ
Á
max {J (X, Á)≠ V, 0} dF (3.7)
The match is consummated if J (X, Á) Ø V . The value of a filled job J (X, Á) varies with the
match type X because the wage bargain is a ected by the matching cost. Specifically, J is
given by:
rJ (X, Á) = y + ‡Á≠ w (X, Á) + ” (V ≠ J (X, Á)) (3.8)
Conditional on the productivity draw Á, I define the match surplus gross of the matching
cost as:
  (Á) = E (X, Á)≠ U + J (X, Á)≠ V
= 1
r + ” (y + ‡Á≠ r (U + V )) (3.9)
A type X match between a worker and firm is accepted if   (Á) Ø mX , or equivalently if
Á Ø Á˜ (X), where:
Á˜ (X) = rU + rV ≠ y + (r + ”)m
X
‡
23Notice I do not grant workers a similar choice over origin cities. But despite this, the value of unemploy-
ment is still invariant across origins in equilibrium (because of the symmetry of the model). Consequently,
this equilibrium would still exist if I allowed workers to choose their origin. However, that equilibrium would
be unstable because workers and firms would be better o  if they all clustered at a single location, minimising
search and matching costs. In this framework, I could ensure stability by incorporating diminishing returns
to locations (whether through the local production function, congestion externalities or imperfectly elastic
housing supply). But since this is not my focus, I keep the model simple and assume fixed origins.
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In this case, the surplus net of the matching cost is shared according to a Nash bargain:
E (X, Á)≠ U ≠mX = „
Ë
  (Á)≠mX
È
(3.10)
where „ denotes the bargaining power of workers. The equilibrium wage can be derived by
substituting equation (3.4) for E (Á,⁄) in the Nash bargain:
w (X, Á) = „ (y + ‡Á≠ rV ) + (1≠ „)
1
mX + rU
2
(3.11)
Learning e ort choices
Given a match type X, the first order conditions for workers’ and firms’ learning e ort are:
ew (X) =
µ–„
“Xw
A
ef (X)
ew (X)
B1≠– ˆ
Á
max
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô
dF (3.12)
and
ef (X) =
µ (1≠ –) (1≠ „)
“Xf
A
ef (X)
ew (X)
B≠– ˆ
Á
max
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô
dF (3.13)
respectively. Clearly, learning e ort is larger for local matches. This is because (1) the
learning cost is smaller (“L < “N) and (2) no matching cost m is paid.
Also, these two equations yield a simple expression for relative learning e ort of workers
and firms:
ew (X)
ef (X)
=
ıˆıÙ –
1≠ –
„
1≠ „
“Xf
“Xw
(3.14)
The relative e ort will vary with match type X if either workers or firms have a comparative
advantage in non-local learning. Substituting this back into the first order conditions yields:
ew (X) =
µ–„
“Xw
A
1≠ –
–
1≠ „
„
“Xw
“Xf
B 1≠–
2
ˆ
Á
max
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô
dF (3.15)
and
ef (X) =
µ (1≠ –) (1≠ „)
“Xf
A
–
1≠ –
„
1≠ „
“Xf
“Xw
B–
2 ˆ
Á
max
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô
dF (3.16)
Notice that applying the first order conditions to equations (3.2) and (3.3) gives:
rU = b+ 2≠ –2–
ÿ
X={L,N}
“Xw ew (X)2 ÊXv (3.17)
in equilibrium. Similarly, applying them to equations (3.6) and (3.7):
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rV = 1 + –2 (1≠ –)
ÿ
X={L,N}
“Xf ef (X)2 ÊXu (3.18)
And combining equations (3.17) and (3.18):
rU ≠ b
rV
= 2≠ –1 + –
„
1≠ „
v
u
(3.19)
where the ratio of the unemployment and vacancy values is increasing in the tightness of the
labour market, vu .
Equilibrium
The job finding rate ﬂ for unemployed workers is given by:
ﬂ = µ
ÿ
X={L,N}
ew (X)– ef (X)1≠– [1≠ F (Á˜ (X))]ÊXv (3.20)
so the equilibrium unemployment rate is:
u
n
= ”
” + µqX={L,N} ew (X)– ef (X)1≠– [1≠ F (Á˜ (X))]ÊXv (3.21)
I have so far described six key equations: (3.17), (3.18), (3.9), (3.15), (3.16) and (3.21).
But, these contain seven unknowns: U , V ,   (Á,⁄), ew (⁄), ef (⁄), u and v. To complete the
system, I impose a free entry condition. Suppose the cost of opening a vacancy is fixed at
V¯ , so firms have an incentive to enter the economy as long as V Ø V¯ . In equilibrium, the
following condition must be satisfied:
V = V¯ (3.22)
The equilibrium wage w (Á,⁄) can then be solved as a function of the unknowns above using
equation (3.11).
The model has a constant returns to scale property: holding the number of cities z (and
hence the ÊX weights) fixed, the equilibrium outcomes are invariant to the worker popula-
tion n. But, based on equation (3.21), the unemployment rate is increasing in the number
of cities.24 This arises from an agglomeration e ect familiar from the urban economics liter-
ature, where higher quality matches materialise more e ciently in more densely populated
areas or larger cities; see Helsley and Strange (1990).
24As the number of cities z grows, ÊN becomes larger relative to ÊL. But of course, non-local search of
course entails greater frictions (in terms of learning and matching costs); so fewer matches are formed.
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3.4 Equilibrium results
Hazard rate dominance
Let G be the distribution of   (Á), the job surplus gross of matching cost. Specifically:
G (x) = Pr (  (Á) Æ x) (3.23)
= Pr
A
Á Æ rU + rV ≠ y + (r + ”)x
‡
B
= F
A
rU + rV ≠ y + (r + ”)x
‡
B
Then, it can be shown that, for any given surplus x, the hazard rate g(x)1≠G(x) is:
1. Decreasing in y≠b, the di erence between average productivity and out-of-work benefit
2. Decreasing in ‡, the dispersion of match productivity (I do not yet have this proof)
What is the significance of this result? Suppose a high skilled economy is characterised by
relatively large y ≠ b and/or large ‡. Then, the job surplus distribution in a high skilled
economy will dominate that of a low skilled economy, according to the hazard rate criterion.
The existence of large job surpluses has important implications for job creation, search
behaviour and mobility, as I demonstrate below.
The first statement, on the impact of changes in y ≠ b, is simple to prove. Notice that:
g (x)
1≠G (x) =
r + ”
‡
· f
1
(rU≠b)+rV≠(y≠b)+(r+”)x
‡
2
1≠ F
1
(rU≠b)+rV≠(y≠b)+(r+”)x
‡
2 (3.24)
The term (rU≠b)+rV≠(y≠b)+(r+”)x‡ represents the match productivity Á which guarantees a gross
surplus x. As y ≠ b grows, this term will contract (for given x). This is because part of the
gains from the larger productivity are not captured by workers and firms (in the sum of rU
and rV ), since workers are not always employed and vacancies are not always filled. And,
since I have assumed the hazard rate of F is monotonically increasing, equation (3.24) shows
that g(x)1≠G(x) must decrease for all x.
Next, consider the second statement on the impact of ‡. Intuitively, job surpluses must
grow: given the possibility of match rejection, workers and firms only take the upside of the
larger dispersion. Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to prove hazard rate dominance
formally. Still, I do believe such a proof is feasible - and, for the remainder of this chapter,
I assume that hazard rate dominance holds as ‡ grows.
E ect of y ≠ b and ‡ on learning e ect and market tightness
The hazard rate dominance result implies that, as y ≠ b and ‡ grow, the surplus value of
a job match
´
Ámax
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô
will be larger for both local (X = L) and non-local
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(X = N) matches. It immediately follows from equations (3.15) and (3.16) that learning
e ort directed at each individual firm and worker, ew (X) and ef (X), must also be larger
for each match type X.
I next derive the implications for the unemployment stock and unemployment value.
Since (1) the vacancy value V is fixed at V¯ and (2) ef (X) is larger for each X, equation
(3.18) implies that the unemployment stock u must be smaller in equilibrium (and the job
finding probability must be larger). Also, while V is fixed, the larger match surplus is
manifested in a larger unemployment value U .25
Equation (3.19) then demonstrates that a larger U and fixed V implies that market
tightness vu is larger. Interestingly, while firms direct more learning e ort at each individ-
ual worker (ef (X) is larger for each match type X), equation (3.18) shows that the total
expenditure by individual firms on learning, qX={L,N} “Xf ef (X)2 ÊXu, is no larger in high
skilled markets (since V is fixed). Instead, firms exhaust the larger job surplus through
entry: this explains the tighter labour market.26 Workers, in contrast, respond by increasing
their learning expenditure
´
X “
X
w ew (X)2 ÊXv (implied by the larger U in equation (3.17)).
Intuitively, this is because the number of workers is fixed by assumption.
25The formal proof is as follows. The probability of finding a job, ﬂ, is:
ﬂ = µ
ÿ
X={L,N}
ew (X)– ef (X)1≠–
#
1≠G !mX"$ÊXv
= µ2
3
–„
“Xw
4–A (1≠ –) (1≠ „)
“Xf
B1≠– ÿ
X={L,N}
ˆ
Á
max
)
  (Á)≠mX , 0* #1≠G !mX"$ÊXv
where the second line follows after substituting the first order conditions. Next, substituting the first order
condition for ew into equation (3.17) gives:
rU = b+ ⁄
ÿ
X={L,N}
5ˆ
Á
max
)
  (Á)≠mX , 0* dF62 ÊXv
= b+ ⁄
ÿ
X={L,N}
5ˆ
Á
max
)
  (Á)≠mX , 0* dF6 · #1≠G !mX"$ · E #  (Á)≠mX |  (Á) Ø mX$ÊXv
where
⁄ = – (2≠ –)µ
2„2
“Xw
A
1≠ –
–
1≠ „
„
“Xw
“Xf
B1≠–
and E
#
  (Á)≠mX |  (Á) Ø mX$ is the expectation of the job surplus conditional on the match being
accepted. Now, the expected conditional surplus must increase with y ≠ b and ‡ according to the hazard
rate dominance result. And, since I have shown that the unemployment stock u falls, the job finding rate ﬂ
and the expression
q
X={L,N}
´
Ámax
)
  (Á)≠mX , 0* #1≠G !mX"$ÊXv must also increase. It follows that
the unemployment value U must grow.
26Intuitively, in a world where entry is more restricted, the e ect on market tightness will be smaller, and
individual firms will increase their total learning expenditure.
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E ect of y ≠ b and ‡ on match-specific migration
Let ﬂX be the probability of finding a job of match type X. Then:
ﬂX = µew (X)– ef (X)1≠–
Ë
1≠G
1
mX
2È
ÊXv (3.25)
= µ2
A
–„
“Xw
B– A(1≠ –) (1≠ „)
“Xf
B1≠– ˆ
Á
max
Ó
  (Á)≠mX , 0
Ô Ë
1≠G
1
mX
2È
ÊXv
= µ2
A
–„
“Xw
B– A(1≠ –) (1≠ „)
“Xf
B1≠– Ë
1≠G
1
mX
2È2 · E Ë  (Á)≠mX |  (Á) Ø mXÈÊXv
where E
Ë
  (Á)≠mX |  (Á) Ø mX
È
is the expectation of the job surplus conditional on the
match being accepted. The model is ambiguous on whether ﬂN or ﬂL is larger. On the one
hand, non-local matches are subject to a matching cost m and larger learning costs “w and
“f . On the other hand, most vacancies are non-local (ÊN > ÊL). Clearly though, the former
e ect dominates empirically, so ﬂL > ﬂN . The odds ratio of finding a non-local, relative to
a local, job is:
ﬂN
ﬂL
=
A
“Lw
“Nw
B– A “Lf
“Nf
B1≠–
ÊN
ÊL
C
1≠G (m)
1≠G (0)
D2 E [  (Á)≠m|  (Á) Ø m]
E [  (Á) |  (Á) Ø 0] (3.26)
Based on the hazard rate dominance result, it can be shown that the odds ratio ﬂNﬂL is
increasing in y ≠ b and ‡. This statement can be proven by showing that both 1≠G(m)1≠G(0) and
E[ (Á)≠m| (Á)Øm]
E[ (Á)| (Á)Ø0] are increasing (i.e. becoming closer to 1) in y≠ b and ‡.27 Notice that these
conditions also imply that the ratio of non-local to local learning e ort, eNweLw and
eNf
eLf
, are also
increasing (again, moving closer to 1) in y ≠ b and ‡.
27Consider first the term 1≠G(m)1≠G(0) < 1. The elasticity of the acceptance probability (given a matching cost
m), 1≠G (m), with respect to the matching cost m is:
” [1≠G (m)]
”m
· m1≠G (m) = ≠
g (m)
1≠G (m)m
Clearly, this elasticity is negative. Since the hazard rates g(m)1≠G(m) are decreasing in y ≠ b and ‡ for all m,
the elasticity of 1≠G (m) must be increasing (i.e. becoming less negative). Consequently, the term 1≠G(m)1≠G(0)
must also be increasing (i.e. becoming closer to 1). Next, consider the term E[ (Á)≠m| (Á)Øm]E[ (Á)| (Á)Ø0] < 1. Firstly,
notice that the conditional expected surplus (given a matching cost m) can be expressed as:
E [  (Á)≠m|  (Á) Ø m] =
´Œ
m xg (x) dx
1≠G (m) ≠m
The elasticity of the conditional surplus with respect to m is then:
ˆE [  (Á)≠m|  (Á) Ø m]
ˆm
· mE [  (Á)≠m|  (Á) Ø m] = ≠
5
1 + g (m)1≠G (m)m
6
m
E [  (Á)≠m|  (Á) Ø m]
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It follows then that the “match-specific” migration rate ﬂN (i.e. the migration rate due to
cross-city job matching) must be increasing in y ≠ b and ‡. This is for two reasons. Firstly,
as I showed in the previous subsection, the overall job finding rate is increasing in y≠ b and
‡. And secondly, the odds ratio result implies that a larger proportion of these job finds are
non-local.
The intuition is as follows. Larger y ≠ b and ‡ generate larger job surpluses; so the
non-local matching cost m will act as a weaker deterrent to long-distance matching. Notice
that this result is entirely dependent on the matching cost friction: if this friction did not
exist, the non-local odds ratio ﬂNﬂL would be una ected by y≠ b and ‡, even if learning costs
were increasing in distance. In such a world, workers and firms would be just as happy ex
post with a local match compared to a non-local one (all else equal). Consequently, larger
surpluses would have no e ect on the relative value of non-local and local matches - and so,
they would have no e ect on the relative learning e ort or job finding rates.
3.5 Response to local shocks
Local productivity shock
Consider an adverse demand shock in some city c. What does the model say about how
migratory responses vary by skill group? The largest hurdle in this exercise is specifying
the form of such a shock. It can presumably be approximated as some downward shift
in the local match productivity distribution; so the local average productivity, denoted yc,
will fall. But, the impact of a “typical” shock on the local match dispersion ‡c is unclear.
Furthermore, the shift in this productivity distribution is likely to vary across skill groups:
for example, Hoynes (2002) makes the point that the larger business cycle volatility observed
in low skilled labour market outcomes can partly be explained by the industries in which
they are typically employed.
Given these uncertainties, it is perhaps useful to study the migratory response to given
contraction of local employment. To ensure this employment shock is exogenous, I consider
the extreme case of the destruction of all local jobs, caused by a drop in yc to ≠Œ. Clearly,
since no local matches are viable, the migratory inflow to city c drops to zero. But, following
such a shock, how does the migratory outflow response of origin c workers vary with y ≠ b
and ‡? - and equivalently, what are the implications for unemployment of origin c workers?
The unemployment rate of origin c workers is:
uc
nc
= ”
” + ﬂLc + ﬂNc
(3.27)
where nc is the stock of origin c workers, and uc is the number who are unemployed. Following
the shock, the local finding rate ﬂLc goes to zero. All else equal, the impact on unemployment
Since (1) the hazard rates are decreasing in y ≠ b and ‡ and (2) the conditional expected surplus is
increasing, the elasticity of the conditional expected surplus must be growing (i.e. becoming less negative).
And so, the term E[ (Á)≠m| (Á)Øm]E[ (Á)| (Á)Ø0] must also be increasing (i.e. becoming closer to 1).
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is larger in low skilled markets: in this case, a larger proportion of matches would usually
be local (the odds ratio ﬂNcﬂLc is smaller), so the destruction of local jobs causes more unem-
ployment. The e ect is somewhat (though not entirely) moderated by local feedback e ects.
Specifically, workers with origins in low y ≠ b and ‡ economies will su er a larger decline
in their unemployment value, Uc. This will trigger a larger increase in the job surplus from
non-local jobs - and a larger upward response of non-local learning e ort eNw and job-finding
ﬂNc .
I have so far assumed workers’ origins, which represent bases for job search, are fixed.
But, suppose workers can switch origins, even if this adjustment is costly and sluggish. In
the example above, given the larger local disparity in local unemployment values in low
skilled markets, we might expect a larger response in terms of origin switches. And, this is
consistent with the finding that low skilled workers are more likely to move city to look for
work: the job surpluses are too small to sustain substantial match-specific migration, so this
sort of “non-match” move may be the only exit route.
Local amenity shock
Suppose now that city c receives an adverse amenity shock ≠ac, which takes the form of a
utility flow for all unemployed workers of origin c and all workers employed in the city. As
with the shock to productivity, this reduces the set of viable matches in city c. But, notice
that the e ect on migratory inflows and outflows will be smaller in high skilled economies
with larger y ≠ b and ‡. Again, given the hazard rate dominance result, job surpluses are
larger - so fewer matches are made unviable by the shock. Intuitively, given the large job
surpluses, workers care less about local amenities when choosing their job. This can help
explain why amenity-driven “non-match” moves are more common for the low skilled.
3.6 Evidence on the productivity process
In this chapter, I argue that the high employment and migration rates experienced by skilled
workers depend fundamentally on two key features of the productivity process: (1) that
labour productivity is larger (relative to the out-of-work utility flow) in higher skilled mar-
kets; and (2) that dispersion in match productivity is also larger. Both of these contribute
to larger job surpluses. In this section, I draw on the Survey of Income and Program Par-
ticipation (SIPP) for evidence of these features.
For my purposes, the SIPP has three attractive features. Firstly, it is nationally repre-
sentative sample. Secondly, the samples are very large: the latest panel (beginning 2008)
covers 126,000 individuals. Another popular panel survey, the Panel Study of Income Dy-
namics (PSID), covered 9,000 families in its latest wave; and the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) followed 13,000 individuals. The SIPP panels are limited by short
time-frames; but in this chapter, I am only interested in short-term transitions. And thirdly,
unlike the PSID or the NLSY, the SIPP records data at high frequencies.28 In particular,
28PSID respondents were interviewed annually from 1968 until 1999, and every two years since then. NLSY
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waves of the SIPP are just four months apart; and in the interview at the end of each wave,
survey participants are asked to report information (including wages) for each month since
the previous interview. These relatively frequent interviews should reduce the measurement
error attributable to memory recall. And more importantly, this frequency allows me to
better distinguish wage shocks that are due specifically to job transitions: this is essential
for identifying the dispersion of match productivity.
To improve my sample size, I combine three (pre-Great Recession) SIPP samples: 1996,
2001 and 2004: these cover the period from March 1996 to December 2007. I restrict
my analysis to the month at the end of each wave (i.e. outcomes contemporaneous to the
interview), rather than studying variation between months in the same wave. This should
reduce the incidence of measurement error due to poor recall. In particular, it is known
that the SIPP su ers from severe seam bias (see e.g. Marquis and Moore, 2010): monthly
changes in individuals’ outcomes (whether employment status or wages) tend to be larger
between months at the seam of two waves than between months within the same wave.
I study active labour force participants aged 25 to 64. When estimating wages, I only
look at full-time employees (at least 40 hours per week) still working at the end of the wave;
and I exclude those with other jobs or businesses in the final month of the wave. I use hourly
wage data for workers paid by the hour, and I estimate hourly wages for salaried workers
using monthly earnings and monthly hours. I drop wage observations under $5 in 2000 prices
and top-coded observations .
The first claim that skilled workers benefit from larger labour productivity relative to out-
of-work utility is trivial. It is clear that higher skilled labour is significantly more productive;
and indeed, the wage gap has been growing since the late 1970s (see e.g. Autor et al., 2008).
In my SIPP sample, high-school dropouts earn $10.37 per hour in 2000 dollars on average,
high-school graduates earn $12.73, workers with some college $14.91, college graduate $20.28,
and post-graduates $24.90. Of course, out-of-work utility is unobserved. But, it seems
intuitive that it varies less across education groups than earnings: in particular, replacement
ratios are smaller at higher incomes29.
The second claim is on the dispersion of job match productivity facing a given individual.
An important question is whether this dispersion is measured over productivity levels or log-
arithms; and similarly, whether worker and firm utility is linear or logarithmic. In the model
below, I assume linear utility, with search e ort costs and migration costs invariant across
skill groups. In this case, larger job surpluses in absolute terms will be su cient to ensure
that higher skilled workers invest more job search e ort and migrate more. As well as being
analytically simpler, this approach has some foundation in the literature: Grogger and Han-
son (2011) show that a Roy model with linear utility and skill-invariant migration costs can
better explain the observed selection of high and low skilled migrants across countries than
an alternative specification with log utility and migration costs which are proportional to in-
come. However, it is not clear whether this result for international migration is generalisable
respondents are interviewed annually.
29According to 2012 data from the OECD, single earners in the US earning 67% of the average wage were
subject to an initial net replacement rate of 60%; this compares to 32% for those earnings 150% of the
average wage. See http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/NRR_Initial_EN.xlsx
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to internal migration in the US.
Now, it is entirely intuitive that higher skilled workers are subject to larger match disper-
sion in absolute terms, simply because their wages are significantly higher. Rather than test
this hypothesis, I study the more demanding claim that skilled workers face larger dispersion
in log productivity; and I show that they indeed do. Consider the following wage bargaining
rule:
logwig = „g log yig + (1≠ „g) logwRig (3.28)
where the wage wig of individual i in skill group g is expressed as a function of labour
productivity yig and the worker’s reservation wage wRig. Consider variation in wig driven
by match productivity o ers received by a searching worker. Taking di erences with an
individual’s expected wage wúig and productivity yúig gives:
logwig ≠ logwúig = „g
1
log yig ≠ log yúig
2
(3.29)
And taking variances within skill group g:
Varg
1
logwig ≠ logwúig
2
= „2gVarg
1
log yig ≠ log yúig
2
(3.30)
I am interested in how the parameter Varg
1
log yig ≠ log yúig
2
varies across skill groups g.
If I assume that the bargaining parameter „ varies relatively little across skill groups,
then the e ect of skill on Varg
1
logwig ≠ logwúig
2
can serve as a proxy for the e ect on
Varg
1
log yig ≠ log yúig
2
. But of course, I do not observe the wage o er distribution facing
job-hunting individuals. If I wish to study wage variation within individuals, I am restricted
to looking at variation in accepted o ers over time. That is, I proxy Varg
1
logwig ≠ logwúig
2
with Varg
1
 job logwigj
2
, where  job logwigj denote the growth in an individual’s wage be-
tween a job j and his previous job. This proxy will be suitable as long as skill groups facing
relatively large dispersion in job-to-job wage transitions are also subject to large dispersion
in wage o ers.
Figure 3.6 reports variances in wave-to-wave log wage changes for full-time workers within
di erent age/education groups in my SIPP sample. That is, I study Varg (logwigt ≠ logwigt≠1),
where t denotes waves of 4-month frequency. I plot these by age group separately for wage
shocks involving a job change and wage shocks within jobs. There is a clear positive educa-
tion gradient for both, but the e ect for job changes in much larger. Within the same job,
the variances grows from about 0.03 for high school dropouts to 0.08 for postgraduates; and
for job changes, the variance grows from about 0.1 to between 0.2 and 0.3 for postgraduates
(depending on age group). Of course, wage growth corresponding to job changes matters
more for job surplus and matching behaviour. But, where workers are forward-looking,
variances over wage growth within jobs are also relevant to match quality dispersion.
One possible concern is wage imputation. The Census Bureau imputes wage and earn-
ings data when these are missing using statistical matching on the cross-sectional dimension.
Observations based at least partially on imputed data account for 21% of my wage growth
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Figure 3.6: Variance of 4-month changes in log full-time hourly wages (SIPP 1996-2007)
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Figure 3.7: Variance of 4-month changes in log full-time hourly wages (SIPP 1996-2007):
non-imputed data
sample. Since these imputations are not conditional on wage mobility within education
groups (the object of interest), they may confound my results. However, the share of these
observations varies little across education groups: 22% for high school dropouts, compared
to 19% for postgraduates. In Figure 3.7, I reprocess the results excluding all imputed obser-
vations. Unsurprisingly, the variances are significantly smaller for the non-imputed sample:
they are about half the size within each demographic group. However, apart from this general
scaling e ect, the patterns look very similar to before.
Of course, there is already a mature literature on earnings processes, and several studies
have estimated these separately by education group. The focus is usually on the change
in earnings instability over time, and an important concern in this respect has been to
distinguish between permanent and transitory earnings components. In the most simple
specification (implemented by the seminal study by Gottschalk et al., 1994), the permanent
component is estimated as an individual’s average earnings over an extended period of time
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Figure 3.8: Variance of 4-month changes in log monthly earnings (SIPP 1996-2007)
(equivalent to wúig); and transitory earnings are the deviation from this mean.30Using data
from the PSID, Gottschalk et al. (1994) show that lower skilled workers faced a significantly
larger variance in the transitory component of annual earnings in the 1970s and 1980s;
though this gap was reversed from the 1990s (Gottschalk and Mo tt, 2009), at least in
binary comparisons between workers with less than 12 years of education and those with
more.
It turns out that the lack of education gradients can be explained by the choice of
earnings variables: this literature tends to study annual earnings, but I am interested in
hourly wages. I confirm this in Figure 3.8, where I plot variances in log changes in monthly
earnings (measured in the final month of each wave). The sample is identical to before,
but this time I do not exclude part-time workers. I use reported monthly earnings for
full-time workers, which I estimate as the product of hourly pay and monthly hours for
workers paid by the hour. The variances are now flat across skill groups. These findings are
consistent Fitzgerald (1999), who shows (using SIPP panels covering the 1980s and early
1990s) that better educated workers face much larger transitory variance in hourly wages,
but not monthly earnings. Here, I have built on Fitzgerald’s work by disaggregating wage
innovations by job change status.
30The object I study is somewhat di erent from Gottschalk et al. (1994). They use the following model:
logwigt = logwúig + Áigt
where logwúig is the permanent earnings of individual i in demographic group g, and Áigt is the transitory
component. They estimate the variance of Áigt separately for each individual and then take the mean of these
variances across individuals in group g: Eg [Varig (Áigt)]. I remove the permanent component by computing
di erences in earnings   logwigt =  Áigt, and I study the variance in  wigt across all individuals and time
periods in group g: Varg ( Áigt). The latter object is more useful for this chapter because I am interested in
the variance of shocks arising from job changes, so it is more natural to look at the variance of  Áigt than
Áigt.
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Figure 3.9: Ratio of online job ads to unemployment (Conference Board, Apr 2007; ACS 2007)
3.7 Market tightness and search behaviour
Assuming free entry, the model predicts that skilled labour markets should be tighter (i.e.
larger vu). I test this using the Conference Board’s Help Wanted Online (HWOL) data
series. Every month, the Conference Board reports the number of new online job ads and
ads reposted from the previous month on 16,000 online job boards.31 The HWOL data is
also disaggregated by occupational SOC classification. I use a (pre-recession) data release
from April 200832 and take the ratio of these vacancy counts to occupational unemployment
estimates from the IPUMS American Community Survey (ACS) of 200733. In the ACS,
unemployed workers were asked to report their most recent occupation. In Figure 3.9, I plot
these vu ratios on occupational college employment share (also from the ACS). For low skilled
occupations (with college share below 40%), market tightness ranges from 0.02 to 0.32; and
this range is 0.14 to 3.40 for occupations with more than 40% college employment.34 An
important concern with this data is that online job ads clearly do not represent the universe
of occupations; and it is plausible that higher skilled jobs are more likely to be advertised
online. However, it does not seem plausible that this can explain the very large e ect of skill
evident from Figure 3.9.
Learning e ort is an abstract concept, and as a result, di cult to quantify. But, some
31See https://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/press/TechnicalPDF_5202_1401797782.pdf for further
detail.
32http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/HWOnLine043007_PR.pdf
33The IPUMS ACS data was compiled by Ruggles et al. (2010a)
34The tightness range for skilled occupations is large. It is plausible that the loose markets that characterise
the arts/sport/media or education/training categories are attributable to restricted firm entry in those
industries, but this is merely speculation: there are certainly many factors at play.
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Table 3.6: Evidence on learning e ort from the SBA survey
Reported statistics are means, per worker hired for advertised position
PANEL A: SBA survey 1992
Education of Applications Applicants HR labour Sample
most recent hire received interviewed hours
HS dropout 9.89 2.61 4.76 72
(27.15) (2.84) (6.94)
HS graduate 9.91 4.54 9.31 415
(16.18) (5.75) (12.44)
Some college 12.31 4.83 12.16 290
(23.05) (4.92) (16.60)
College graduate 26.25 5.72 25.89 207
(54.41) (5.65) (43.56)
Post graduate 35.49 7.66 33.77 51
(56.54) (8.82) (37.79)
PANEL B: SBA survey 2001
Education of Applications Applicants HR labour Sample
most recent hire received interviewed hours
HS dropout 3.66 3.03 11.19 85
(4.49) (3.79) (22.55)
HS graduate 5.30 3.15 8.10 415
(12.10) (3.32) (11.78)
Some college 6.21 4.33 13.15 182
(7.98) (5.66) (21.00)
College graduate 12.36 4.77 23.12 148
(23.99) (8.71) (37.83)
Post graduate 10.51 3.80 40.51 33
(13.03) (3.11) (76.89)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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useful evidence for firms can be garnered from a pair of employers surveys in 1992 and 2001
funded by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and conducted by the Survey Research
Center at the University of Kentucky35 (see Berger et al., 2001). Of interest to this chapter,
respondents were asked a number of questions related to the application process of their
most recent hire, together with that hire’s highest qualification. I divide the sample into six
education categories; and for the sample of respondents within each category, I report three
measures of learning e ort in Table 3.6: (1) the mean number of applications received, per
worker hired for the advertised position; (2) the mean number of applicants interviewed, per
worker hired; and (3) the mean number of human resource hours invested in the application
process, per worker hired.
I report results for the 1992 and 2001 surveys separately in Panels A and B. It should
be noted that the results do vary across surveys. In particular, the number of applications
received per hire was significantly larger in the earlier survey, with a sample average of 15.1
compared to 6.7 in 2001; though the reported standard errors for this variable were much
larger in 1992. In any case, across both surveys, it is clear that the three firm learning e ort
indicators are almost always increasing in education. In 1992, the e ects are very large and
monotonic across education groups. On average, firms receive 35 applications, conduct 8
interviews and spend 34 human resource hours per hire at postgraduate level; but these
numbers are just 10, 3 and 5 at high school dropout level. The story is qualitatively similar
in 2001, but firms in that sample do receive more applications and conduct more interviews
at college graduate than post graduate level; though the education e ects on human resource
hours are monotonic.
Note that, despite high skilled markets being much tighter (as demonstrated in Figure
3.9), there are still many more applicants per position. It follows that higher skilled workers
must individually be applying to many more jobs than the low skilled: that is, in higher
skilled markets, the workers are appear to be investing more learning e ort - and not just
the firms. This is consistent with the model’s predictions.
The model also predicts that firms apply learning e ort more broadly geographically when
recruiting high skilled workers. The SBA survey does not request this sort of information.
But, there is some useful evidence in an annual survey of recruitment conducted by the
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) in the UK. In particular, the
annual report of 2004 presents data on firms’ advertising strategies by occupational rank. In
the CIPD sample, 61% of firms recruiting managers and professionals post job ads in national
newspapers and 67% post ads in the trade press; this compares to just 8% and 6% respectively
for firms recruiting manual or craft workers. In contrast, manual/craft recruiters are more
likely to post ads in local newspapers: 78% compared to 48% for manager/professional
recruiters.
35In both 1992 and 2001, the investigators contacted a nationally representative sample of establishments.
In 1992, 1,288 establishments completed the survey (with a response rate of 55.9% to 60.6%, depending on
the method used); and in 2001, there were 1,024 completions with a response rate of 47.1% to 48.1%.
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3.8 Conclusion
Low skilled workers are less mobile geographically; and the evidence suggests they are less
likely to leave cities following local declines in labour demand. It is often claimed that
prohibitive migration costs can explain these facts. But, in this chapter, I have presented
new evidence that skill di erences in cross-city mobility can be better understood in the
context of job matching frictions.
To this end, I have presented new evidence on migration rates, disaggregated by primary
motivation, from the CPS. While higher skilled workers are more likely to migrate across
counties and states for the sake of a specific job match, they are less likely to move for
other reasons - whether due to family, housing, amenities or to search for work. This is true
whether I study di erences across education groups, or di erences by occupational skill level
within education groups.
Using a multi-city matching model, I argue that matching frictions in skilled markets
are overcome through large job creation and investment in learning e ort by both firms and
workers; and I present evidence to that end on vacancy rates and recruitment strategies.
These market features are driven by the large job surpluses in these markets, which in turn
originate from large average productivity and dispersion in match quality. This superior
geographical integration of skilled markets facilitates swifter exits from declining cities - with
workers searching for jobs in multiple cities simultaneously, rather than making speculative
moves in hope of work. And, the large surpluses can explain why skilled workers are less
willing to give up a job match for family, housing or amenity reasons.
Steep cross-city search costs in low skilled markets (whose importance has been empha-
sised by Gregg et al., 2004, and Malamud and Wozniak, 2012) are an endogenous outcome
of the model. But, these are one just one manifestation of the paltry job surpluses in these
markets. Given these substantial obstacles to mobility, it is not clear whether policy inter-
ventions (such as relocation vouchers) can have a large e ect. Ultimately, any successful
policy will, to some extent, have to address the root causes of the problem, namely loose
markets and limited investment in learning by both workers and firms.
While I have focused on migration in this chapter, the model may also yield interesting
insights for commuting decisions. In particular, because of the larger job surpluses, higher
skilled workers are likely to accept jobs which necessitate a longer commute. On the other
hand, in a monocentric city, they may be able to better a ord the high rents associate with
proximity to the central business district. Indeed, I show above that high skilled workers
are more likely to change residence to reduce their commute to work. These countervailing
e ects and their implications for residential segregation are worthy of further study.
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Chapter 4
Descriptive Facts on Local Joblessness
in the UK and US
4.1 Introduction
The incidence of joblessness and poverty varies greatly across regions and cities. Much of
this is clearly driven by the characteristics of the local population. But, there is a widespread
perception that, even controlling for these di erences, location matters for economic oppor-
tunity. Of course, such disparities in welfare can only exist to the extent that individuals
are immobile geographically. As a result, policymakers have always paid close attention to
the “mobility” of the workforce.
In this field, cross-Atlantic comparisons have traditionally generated much interest. Re-
gional disparities in participation and unemployment rates tend to be larger in Europe than
the US; and a popular explanation is that migration across regions is more common in the US
(OECD, 2005). Blanchard and Katz (1992) find that inter-state migration is very responsive
to local demand shocks in the US, and state-level unemployment shocks usually dissipate
after just five to seven years. Also, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) find that net population
flows between regions are significantly more responsive to local shocks in the US compared
to Europe.
In this study, I document some stark new descriptive facts on local joblessness, based
on cross-city comparisons within the US and UK. I proxy the productivity of labour in a
city by its average wage. In the US, more productive cities are larger and more densely
populated - though unemployment rates are unrelated to wages. Participation rates were
higher in productive cities in 2010, though this seems to have been a temporary result of
the recession: it was not the case in 2000. In contrast, the UK’s most productive cities do
not generally have larger populations - though they have had significantly (and persistently)
lower unemployment and inactivity rates since the 1980s. (London is an important outlier
- with both high wages and high unemployment, and I include a separate analysis on the
city below.) These e ects cannot be explained by local di erences in observable worker
characteristics.
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All this confirms that employment in American cities responds relatively quickly to
shocks. A notorious example is Detroit, which bore the brunt of the decline in the American
automobile industry: the population has fallen by more than half since the 1950 peak of 2m,
and 23% of homes are unoccupied1. But, in British cities, local downturns are more likely to
result in persistent unemployment than large out-migration and a smaller population. The
variation in joblessness is largely due to the low skilled (consistent with evidence from Gregg
et al., 2004) and men rather than women. Also, it is largely the young who are responsible
for the high unemployment in low-demand cities, and older workers are responsible for low
participation.
Beyond documenting key facts, I speculate on possible explanations for these patterns.
Given that these shocks have persisted in the UK for several decades, it seems unsatis-
factory to simply explain these patterns by a relatively “immobile” British workforce. An
important factor may be di erences between the two countries’ welfare regimes. This puts
a geographical slant on Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). They argue that unemployment was
more persistent in Europe than the US after the 1980s recession, because generous benefits
discouraged job search. And in the context of this chapter, it may be that generous benefits
in the UK have discouraged workers from searching for jobs outside their home city.
Table 4.1 compares net replacement rates (after tax) for various scenarios in the US2 and
UK, relative to an individual earning 67% of the average wage.3 Unemployment benefits are
in fact more generous in the US (see Panel A), but the UK gives considerably more in terms
of means-tested social assistance (Panel B). As a result, at the initial stage of unemployment,
net replacement rates are comparable for the two countries for means-tested individuals: for
example, these are 54% for a single person in the UK and 60% in the US.
But, once unemployment insurance has expired4, the British system performs far better
at alleviating poverty for those with social assistance. In the US, the net replacement rate
is just 10% for a single person, and 40% for a loan parent with 2 children (Panel B). For the
UK, the numbers are 54% and 72% respectively. It is worth noting that British replacement
rates are even higher for low income areas, given that most welfare payments are uniform
geographically (with the exception of housing benefit).
Much of the di erence between the countries is accounted for by housing benefit in
the UK (OECD, 2007), which covers a household for the full rental cost of suitably sized
accommodation, with allowances reflecting local prices (see Jin et al., 2010). The US does
provide housing vouchers to impoverished households, but the supply of vouchers is limited
and subject to long waiting lists: take-up of eligible households is just 20% (Committee on
Ways and Means, 1998; referenced in Brewer, 2001; these vouchers are not accounted for in
the statistics above). Also, the numbers above do not account for benefits in kind; and in
1Census Bureau, 2010
2Benefit systems vary across the US; all US data in the table relate to Michigan, whose system is typical
of the country as a whole.
3All information in the table is taken from the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesoecdindicators.htm.
An accompanying analysis can be found in OECD (2007).
4In the US, benefit duration used to be limited to 26 weeks at the most, though this has been extended
to 99 weeks in response to the recent recession. The UK allows for 12 months over the course of two years.
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Table 4.1: Net replacement rates (%) in UK and US, relative to 67% of average wage (2010)
PANEL A: WITHOUT SOCIAL ASSISTANCE *
Single-person household Lone parent, 2 children ºº
With UB º Without With UB º Without
UK 19 0 45 0
US 60 0 53 0
PANEL B: WITH SOCIAL ASSISTANCE **
Single-person household Lone parent, 2 children ºº
With UB º Without With UB º Without
UK 54 54 72 72
US 60 10 60 40
PANEL C: DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT
UK 12 months over the course of 2 years
US 14-26 weeks (2007), up to 99 weeks (2009)
This table lists net replacement rates (percent) for various scenarios
in the UK and US, relative to an individual earning 67 percent of
the average wage. All rates are after tax and relate to a 40-year-old
with a long and uniterrupted employment history. Benefit systems
vary across the US; all US data in this table relate to Michigan,
whose system is typical of the country as a whole. * Panel A: No
social assistance "top-ups" or cash housing benefits are assumed to
be available in either the in-work or out-of-work situation. ** Panel
B: Social assistance and other means-tested benefits are assumed to
be available subject to relevant income conditions. Housing costs are
assumed equal to 20 percent of the average wage. Where receipt
of social assistance or other minimum-income benefits is subject to
activity tests (such as active job-search or being "available" for work),
these requirements are assumed to be met. º Unemployment benefit.
Any income taxes payable on unemployment benefits are determined
in relation to annualised benefit values (i.e. monthly values multi-
plied by 12) even if the maximum benefit duration is shorter than
12 months. ºº Children are aged four and six, and neither child-
care benefits nor childcare costs are considered. All information in
this table is taken from the OECD Benefits and Wages program,
http://www.oecd.org/els/benefitsandwagesoecdindicators.htm.
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particular, public health coverage, which is comprehensive in the UK.
Still, the remarkable persistence of local employment di erentials in the UK cannot all
be ascribed to the welfare system. If there are more jobs elsewhere, then workers should
eventually move away, even if this takes some time. I speculate that the missing ingredient
is the adjustment of local housing markets. Local prices are so low in the low-demand cities
that real wages (or local spending power) are actually higher than elsewhere; this can be
appreciated from local real wage estimates from Gibbons et al. (2011). These high real wages,
available on an eventual return to employment, discourage workers from moving elsewhere.
But, how could prices have dropped more than wages in these areas? One possible answer
is the durability of housing: housing stocks do not disappear, even if a city is in decline
(Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005). A decline of local industries can destroy much of the stock of
human capital (as skills become valueless). But, housing capital is largely una ected, and
this relative excess of housing can cause prices to fall quicker than wages.
The low housing costs discourages unemployed workers from moving elsewhere. But, for
high unemployment to persist for many years, there must also be some downward stickiness
of wages that prevents the local labour market from clearing. There are a number of possible
reasons for such stickiness. Firstly, early retirement from the labour force is likely to reduce
the pressure on wages through a hysteresis e ect (Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Secondly,
welfare payments in the UK are largely insensitive to local living costs (with the important
exception of housing benefit which provides financial support for rental payments), so they
form a more rigid floor for reservation wages. Perhaps more importantly, wage policies also
tend to be uniform nationally. In particular, the UK’s National Minimum Wage has a larger
“bite” in low-wage areas, and Dolton et al. (2008) show that the impact on the wage structure
has been larger in these places. Public sector scales are also largely invariant across regions
(with the exception of London bonuses), so they are likely to impose a larger constraint on
private sector wage setting in low-wage areas. Indeed, using geographical variation, Faggio
and Overman (2013) find that public sector employment crowds out local jobs in tradable
sectors.
The fact that the employment patterns pertain largely to the low skilled is consistent
with the story from Chapter 3. In particular, better educated workers pay less attention to
local average wages and average housing costs when choosing where to live: they are more
concerned with finding the best possible individual job match. As a result they search for
jobs over longer distances, so local pockets of unemployment and inactivity are less likely to
form.
These ideas contribute to a growing literature on the impact of the housing market
on regional job mismatch. In particular, Sterk (2010) links the housing crash in the US
with the breakdown of the Beveridge Curve in 2009. A negative shock to house prices
reduces home equity levels, and this makes it harder to provide the down payment for
a new mortgage. Therefore, he argues that more unemployed homeowners are forced to
reject job o ers outside their home city. This results in larger unemployment, at any given
level of vacancies. Karahan and Rhee (2013) provide MSA-level empirical evidence for this
phenomenon.
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Returning to the evidence, London is an important outlier in the relationships I described
above. While wages are extremely high, unemployment and inactivity rates are comparable
to Northern areas. In fact, in 2005 (before the recent recession), London had a higher
unemployment rate than any other region. The origin of much of this appears to be the the
recession of the early 1990s, which hit the South the hardest. But, in fact, unemployment
had already begun rise in London relative to elsewhere in the 1980s. As time has progressed,
it has become clearer that London’s distinctiveness is not a mere temporary blip, but rather,
appears to be a more structural phenomenon. However, there has been little analysis in the
literature on this subject.
The coexistence of high wages and high unemployment in London is suggestive of per-
sistent shocks to labour supply. One possible candidate is immigration. Since the 1980s,
London has experienced distinctively large inflows of foreign migrants, with annual net for-
eign inflows to the city reaching 1% of the local population in the early 2000s. Evidence from
Dustmann et al. (2013) suggests the wages of low skilled Londoners have been adversely af-
fected by migration. Also, foreign investment and possibly immigration have contributed to
rapid house price growth in the city (The Economist, 2012). These factors can help explain
persistent net out-migration from London to the rest of the country (of relatively older and
lower skilled workers) of a similar magnitude as the local migrant inflows. For those who
remained in the city, it is possible that depressed low skilled wages and high prices have
reduced the returns to work in the face of the welfare alternative. Of particular importance
is housing benefit, which compensates families for the local cost of housing.
In the following section, I discuss the data I use for the UK and US. Section 4.3 documents
the key cross-city labour market patterns in each country in 2010. In Section 4.4, I study
the historical evolution of the patterns currently observed in the UK. Section 4.5 provides
some evidence on the role of local house prices in cementing regional employment disparities
in the UK, and in Section 4.6, I document related features of local housing markets. I look
at the case of London in more detail in Section 4.7, and Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Data
UK
In the British data, I identify cities with travel-to-work areas (TTWAs), as defined by the
ONS in 2001. There are 232 TTWAs (excluding Northern Ireland), covering the full landmass
of the country. They are intended to represent labour market zones: their boundaries have
been drawn to ensure that 75% of the residents of each TTWA work in the same one, and
that 75% of those who work in each TTWA live in the same one.5
However, most of the local data I use is based on Local Authority Districts and Unitary
Authorities (LAs), of which there are 380. In many cases, the boundaries of TTWAs and
LAs do not match exactly. Therefore, I reconstruct the TTWAs into entities that are fully
5http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/beginner-s-guide/other/travel-to-work-
areas/index.html
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identifiable by the LAs, based on geographical look-up tables from the Cathie Marsh Centre
for Census and Survey Research6. Specifically, I assign each LA to the TTWA which occupies
the largest share of its area. As a result of this exercise, I dropped many of the smaller
TTWAs, leaving me with 178.
Average house prices for LAs are based on Land Registry data, and compiled by the
Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) for England and Wales7 and
by the Registry for Scotland8. The DCLG also provides local-level information on planning
refusal rates for England, which I use as a proxy for constraints on local housing supply.
This is the share of planning decisions for residential developments (1 dwelling or more) that
were negative. A number of studies on housing supply (e.g. Hilber and Vermeulen, 2010)
have made use of this data.
My local weekly earnings data is based on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE), extracted from Nomis9. For my TTWA-level unemployment data, I use ONS
model-based estimates also from Nomis. These are based largely on the Annual Population
Survey10 (APS) of 2010, together with local information on claimants counts to improve
precision for small areas. To study employment patterns within local areas, I use the APS
microdata itself. I also use the APS to construct other TTWA-level housing and labour
market indicators, including housing benefit take-up and housing tenure.
A variable that is particularly important to this chapter is the local real wage: the
spending power of local workers, given geographical variation in house prices. These have
been calculated by Gibbons et al. (2011) for 121 of the TTWAs in my dataset. Their
motivation was to create a proxy for local amenity values, based on the assumption that, in
equilibrium, workers should be on average indi erent between locations; given this, amenity
values should be inversely related to the local real wage. Their estimates are adjusted
for taxes and also labour and housing quality: they control for individual characteristics
in the calculation of wages (as well as individual fixed e ects, using longitudinal earnings
data between 1998 and 2007); and similarly, for housing characteristics in the calculation
of local housing costs. They present a number of di erent “quality of life” estimates; the
local real wage is the negative of these. I use the estimates predicated on the assumption
that households in di erent cities spend the same fraction of earnings on housing (based on
Cobb-Douglas utility); these are the most comparable with the available estimates for US
cities (Albouy, 2012)
I also study historical patterns in local employment. Unfortunately, I currently only have
access to historical labour and housing market data at TTWA-level for the last ten years
or so. To study local patterns further back in time, I use the statistical regions of the UK:
there are 12 of these, or 11 excluding Northern Ireland. My regional non-employment series
6http://www.ccsr.ac.uk/research/lookup.htm
7http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/
8http://www.ros.gov.uk/public/news/quarterly_statistics_time_series.html
9http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/
10The APS is based on the Labour Force Survey (LFS) samples, with the addition of booster samples to
aid estimation of local area statistics.
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are estimated from LFS cross-sections11 since 1975.
In Section 4.7, I make use of regional-specific migration data, collated by the ONS in
the Regional Trends reports since 200012. For each region (and over a number of years since
1981), the ONS has estimated in/out-migration to/from abroad and in/out-migration from
other parts of the UK. The international data is based on the International Passenger Survey
(IPS), which samples passengers passing through air and sea terminals both in and out of
the country; one question asks for the respondents’ region of origin or destination in the UK.
The inter-regional data is based on administrative records of patients re-registering with
NHS doctors elsewhere in the country.
I also look more closely at the characteristics of migrants entering and leaving London.
However, the APS samples are too small for this kind of local analysis, given the relatively
small number of migrants. Instead, I use the Small Area Microdata sample from the UK
census, which is a 5% sample with detailed geographical information. In terms of migration,
the census asked respondents for their area of residence both currently and 12 months pre-
viously. I also use the census data for information on household density (persons per room),
which cannot be constructed from the APS.
Finally, I estimate local population densities using population data from Nomis and local
land area data from UK Standard Area Measurements at the ONS13.
United States
I identify the cities in my model with the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of the US.
They consist of a central densely populated city, together with surrounding areas which have
close economic ties to the centre. Like the TTWAs, they can be understood as representing
local labour markets. All city-level variables are estimated from the IPUMS American Com-
munity Survey (ACS) of 2010, a nationally representative 2% sample organised by Ruggles
et al. (2010a). Information on land area is included in the IPUMS 5% census extract of 2000,
which I use to estimate population density.
I take estimates for local real wages from Albouy (2012): the negative of his “quality of
life” indicators. These are calculated using similar assumptions to Gibbons et al. (2011) and
adjusted for both local labour and housing quality.
4.3 Labour market
Stylised facts
Figure 4.1 gives the key stylised facts that motivate this project. The general picture is as
follows: in the UK, local productivity manifests itself more in terms of employment rates;
11The LFS was conducted on a quarterly basis since 1992, with a limited five-quarter longitudinal aspect.
In these cases, my annual sample consists of the first observation of each individual in the quarterly samples.
12http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/all-releases.html?definition=tcm%3A77-21847
13http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/geography/products/other/uk-standard-area-measurements–
sam-/index.html
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and in the US, more in terms of local employment density or size.
Each graph is a plot, across cities, of a local variable of interest on the log mean weekly
full-time wage, my proxy for local labour productivity. The left column is based on the
TTWAs of the UK, and the right column reproduces these same graphs for the MSAs of the
US.
The first row of graphs looks at unemployment rates. In the UK, more productive cities
(with the exception of London, to which I return later) have significantly lower unemployment
rates. In 2010, these rates range from, on average, 5% in the most productive cities to 10% in
the least. Excluding London, the R squared is over 30%. In the US, there is also a negative
relationship, but it is significantly weaker: the estimated coe cient of the e ect is about a
fifth of the UK’s, and the R squared is just 2%.
A similar picture exists for inactivity rates (for all individuals aged 16-64), though the
di erence across countries is not as stark. For the UK, excluding London, these range from
under 20% in the most productive cities to around 25% in the least. In the US, the estimated
e ect of wages is about half of that in the UK. This is not because of cross-country di erences
in local inactivity di erentials, but rather because the range of local wages in the US is larger.
Much of this correlation in the US is simply a result of the recent recession: in 2000, the R
squared is only 2%. For the UK, as I show below, these e ects have been very persistent
over time.
The last row looks at log local population density. In the UK, density is totally uncorre-
lated with local wages, but in the US, there is a strong positive correlation between the two
(with an R squared of 37%). The most productive cities are about three times the size of
the least. The patterns for log population size, not reported here, are very similar.
Before moving on, I briefly discuss the case of London. Despite its high average wage,
London has relatively high unemployment and inactivity rates. One explanation is based on
London’s size: it is much larger than the other British cities, and people commute very long
distances. So, decomposing London into its constituent pieces may shed some light.
In the first graph of Figure 4.2, I plot local unemployment rates against log wages, across
British TTWAs. But, this time, I disaggregate London into its boroughs and the surrounding
LAs in its TTWA. Note that the wage variable reflects the wage of local residents rather
than employees. It is clear that almost all London’s boroughs su er from relatively high
unemployment given their local wage. Interestingly, unemployment rates in the city seem
to reflect the full range of rates across the country: unemployment in Richmond is under
6%, but over 13% in Newham. I also repeat the same exercise in the second graph of Figure
4.2, but this time put log house prices on the x-axis. The same pattern emerges: given local
prices, almost all of London’s boroughs have very high unemployment rates. In Section 4.7,
I propose an explanation for these facts based on recent migration trends.
Patterns across demographic groups
To better understand these phenomena, it is important to check exactly which demographic
groups are responsible for them. Also, there may be concern that the observed e ects
94
Birmingham
Bristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
LondonManchester
Newcastle
Oxford
Stoke
Swansea
4
6
8
10
12
14
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8
Log wage
Coeff: −9.874 (1.107), R2: .313, N: 177
UK (2010)
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
San FranciscoScranton
Washington
5
10
15
20
25
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
6.5 7 7.5 8
Log wage
Coeff: −2.026 (.781), R2: .022, N: 297
US (2010)
Birmingham
Bristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
London
ManchesterNewcastle
Oxford
Stoke
Swansea
10
15
20
25
30
In
ac
tiv
ity
 ra
te
 (%
)
6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8
Log wage
Coeff: −16.102 (2.089), R2: .26, N: 171
UK (2010)
Boston
ChicagoDallas
DetroitLos Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Scranton
Washington
15
20
25
30
35
40
In
ac
tiv
ity
 ra
te
 (%
)
6.5 7 7.5 8
Log wage
Coeff: −8.063 (.974), R2: .189, N: 297
US (2010)
Birmingham
Bristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
London
Manchester
Newcastle
Oxford
Stok
Swansea
−
2
0
2
4
Lo
g 
po
p 
de
ns
ity
6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.8
Log wage
Coeff: −.562 (.711), R2: .004, N: 177
UK (2010)
BostonChicago
DallasDetroit
Los Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Scranton
Washington
−
12
−
10
−
8
−
6
−
4
Lo
g 
po
p 
de
ns
ity
6.5 7 7.5 8
Log wage
Coeff: 3.691 (.279), R2: .373, N: 297
US (2010)
* UK OLS results and fit lines exclude London
Figure 4.1: Cross-city relationships for UK and US: labour market
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Figure 4.2: Disaggregation of London
are merely due to cross-city di erences in local demographic compositions. Controlling for
individual characteristics can address this criticism.
Using microdata from the UK (the APS of 2010) and the US (the ACS of 2010), I
regress individual-level unemployment and inactivity against the log local wage, separately
for di erent demographic groups. In the UK, I exclude London from the sample. In this
version, I have used OLS linear probability models rather than probit because of temporary
technical problems. The estimating model is:
yic = —0 + —1wc +Xic“ + Áic (4.1)
where i denotes individual, and c is city. yic is a binary variable, taking 1 for unemployment
or inactivity; wc is the log local mean weekly full-time wage; and Xic is a vector of detailed
individual characteristics (quartic in age, interacted with education categories; ethnicity and
immigrant indicators). The errors Áic are clustered by city.
Table 4.2 reports the results for unemployment, based on the sample of labour market
participants aged 16-64. The first two columns of results are for the UK, and the final two
for the US. For each country, the first column restricts the sample to men and the second
column to women. The reported numbers are estimates of —1, the coe cient on wages, with
its standard error in parentheses below.
The first row is an unconditional regression with no individual controls. Consistently
with Figure 4.1, the e ect of log wages is about five times as large for the UK compared
to the US for men. Interestingly, for the UK, the e ect for men is more than double that
for women. When individual controls are included in the second row, the UK estimates fall
by about 30%, but they remain strong and large. In the US, including controls causes the
estimates to go to zero.
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Table 4.2: E ect of local wages on unemployment for UK and US (2010)
Sample Indiv UK UScontrols? Men Women Men Women
All No -0.135*** -0.062*** -0.031*** -0.013
(0.017) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
All Yes -0.094*** -0.043*** 0.011 0.008
(0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Age: 16-21 Yes -0.237*** -0.216*** 0.012 0.004
(0.070) (0.072) (0.026) (0.021)
Age: 22-29 Yes -0.099*** -0.002 0.019 -0.005
(0.037) (0.036) (0.014) (0.014)
Age: 30-39 Yes -0.112*** -0.044** -0.002 -0.005
(0.028) (0.020) (0.013) (0.011)
Age: 40-49 Yes -0.092*** -0.045*** 0.008 0.020
(0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
Age: 50-64 Yes -0.040** -0.018 0.018 0.016
(0.019) (0.015) (0.014) (0.011)
Edu: < A-level º Yes -0.189*** -0.098** -0.038* -0.051
(0.032) (0.039) (0.021) (0.027)
Edu: A-level º Yes -0.065* -0.098*** 0.014 -0.001
(0.036) (0.025) (0.016) (0.015)
Edu: Tertiary Yes -0.073*** -0.004 0.022** 0.020**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009)
Homeowners Yes -0.046*** -0.021** 0.019 0.013
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010)
Renters Yes -0.253*** -0.130*** -0.006 -0.008
(0.034) (0.040) (0.013) (0.013)
This table reports coe cients from individual-level OLS regressions of unem-
ployment on local mean wage (weekly, full time), for both the UK (exlcuding
London) and US. The UK microdata is the APS of 2010, and the local wage
data is from the ASHE (extracted from Nomis). All US data is from the ACS
of 2010. In each case, the sample is restricted to labour market participants
aged 16-64. The full UK sample is 130,000 observations, spanning 171 TTWAs;
and the full US sample is 1.1m observations, spanning 297 MSAs. In all rows
but the first, I control for individual characteristics (quartic in age, interacted
with education categories; ethnicity and immigrant indicators). Coe cients are
estimated separately for men and women, and for a range of sample groups. All
regressions are clustered by city, SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. º A-level in UK, high school diploma in US.
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The remaining rows report the e ects for various age and education groups, as well
as separately for homeowners and renters. In each case, I have included the full range of
individual controls. For the US, there is little evidence of significance for any subgroup -
though there is a strange positive result for those with tertiary education. For the UK,
a number of interesting patterns emerge. The e ect is much larger for younger workers,
especially for those aged 16-21: their coe cient is six times as large as for the over 50s. The
e ect is also much larger for the low skilled: the coe cient for those without A-levels (or
equivalent) is more than twice as large as those with higher education. And finally, the e ect
is largely driven by renters (though these do tend to be younger and lower skilled anyway).
In Table 4.3, I repeat the same exercise for inactivity. For the UK, controlling for in-
dividual characteristics in the second row again removes about 30% of the e ect for men,
though it remains large and significant. In the US, including individual controls makes the
coe cient statistically insignificant for men, though not for women.
As before, for the UK, the e ect is much larger for men: about fives times as large as for
women for the conditional full sample e ect (in row 2). And again, the e ect is larger for
the low skilled; the coe cients are very similar to those for unemployment. However, the
age e ects are reversed. The coe cient is now insignificant for those under 30, and reaches
-0.22 for the over 50s. Interestingly, this is exactly the same number as for the 16-21s for
unemployment (Table 4.2). This may have a life-cycle explanation. In the UK, low skilled
men are the most sensitive to regional variation. When they first enter the labour market in
low-demand cities, they are frequently unemployed, with little prospect of skill accumulation.
And, as a result, they may be more likely to leave the labour force early in later life.
In the US data, while the e ects are sometimes negative and significant for inactivity,
they are much smaller than in the UK, and there are fewer clear patterns. For some groups,
the e ect is larger for women, and for others, for men. The e ects do tend to be larger for
older workers (strangely, there is a strong positive e ect of wages for men 16-21s). And, for
education groups, the e ects are larger for low skilled women, though it is the reverse for
men. As I explained above, these e ects are specific to 2010 only; they are hardly present
in 2000. So, di erences in patterns across subgroups may simply be a by-product of the
selective impact of the recession - as opposed to a longer term life-cycle phenomenon.
Note that these di erences between the UK and US are not the result of di erences
in sampling error. In fact, the standard errors for the US tend to be smaller. This is
unsurprising: the US data has over 100 more cities and a much larger individual sample
(1.4m compared to 170,000) than the UK.
4.4 Changes over time
The UK relationship between local employment and productivity, illustrated above, was not
always so strong. But, once it appeared, it has proved remarkably persistent. In this section,
I discuss its historical evolution.
Data has not been available for TTWAs for many years, so I look at regions instead.
Also, since I cannot currently access high-quality regional wage data before 1990, I study
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Table 4.3: E ect of local wages on inactivity for UK and US (2010)
Sample Indiv UK UScontrols? Men Women Men Women
All No -0.190*** -0.134*** -0.073*** -0.065***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.022)
All Yes -0.125*** -0.032* -0.023 -0.037**
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
Age: 16-21 Yes -0.081 -0.066 0.115*** 0.050
(0.066) (0.082) (0.042) (0.044)
Age: 22-29 Yes -0.066 -0.079 0.001 -0.049**
(0.042) (0.054) (0.021) (0.023)
Age: 30-39 Yes -0.061*** 0.118*** -0.027*** -0.028
(0.019) (0.033) (0.010) (0.018)
Age: 40-49 Yes -0.139*** -0.003 -0.035*** 0.006
(0.022) (0.043) (0.012) (0.017)
Age: 50-64 Yes -0.219*** -0.134*** -0.090*** -0.106***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.017) (0.012)
Edu: < A-level º Yes -0.195*** -0.190*** -0.001 -0.053*
(0.033) (0.038) (0.028) (0.032)
Edu: A-level º Yes -0.126*** -0.095*** -0.019 -0.061***
(0.038) (0.029) (0.018) (0.022)
Edu: Tertiary Yes -0.097*** 0.065*** -0.029** -0.020
(0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013)
Homeowners Yes -0.066*** 0.025 -0.024* -0.026*
(0.016) (0.021) (0.013) (0.015)
Renters Yes -0.267*** -0.178*** -0.027 -0.069***
(0.042) (0.053) (0.021) (0.023)
This table reports coe cients from individual-level OLS regressions of inactivity
on local mean wage (weekly, full time), for both the UK (exlcuding London) and
US. The UK microdata is the APS of 2010, and the local wage data is from the
ASHE (extracted from Nomis). All US data is from the ACS of 2010. In each
case, the sample is restricted to all individuals aged 16-64. The full UK sample
is 170,000 observations, spanning 171 TTWAs; and the full US sample is 1.4m
observations, spanning 297 MSAs. In all rows but the first, I control for individual
characteristics (quartic in age, interacted with education categories; ethnicity and
immigrant indicators). Coe cients are estimated separately for men and women,
and for a range of sample groups. All regressions are clustered by city, SEs in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. º A-level in UK, high school diploma
in US.
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the changing relationship between non-employment and house prices (I show below in Figure
4.4 that local wages and prices are closely correlated anyway). Specifically, I look at the non-
employment rate of men aged 16-64: this measure takes into account both unemployment
and non-participation.
In Figure 4.3, I plot the non-employment/price relationship across regions for a number
of di erent years since 1975, based on LFS data. I also include OLS fit lines, but note that
(as above) these are based on all regions excluding London, which appears to exhibit very
di erent patterns.
The relationship has been negative throughout the period. But, excluding London, it
was statistically insignificant in the 1970s. At the time, non-employment was quite low:
about 13% on average. This changed with the recession of the early 1980: since then, non-
employment has grown substantially (particularly because of declining male participation),
and it now stands at about 25%. The increase in joblessness has been largely regional in
character, with Northern areas and Wales su ering most.
Excluding London, the coe cient on the non-employment/price relationship soared from
-11 in 1975 to -27 in 1985; this number measures the percentage point change in the non-
employment rate associated with a doubling of house prices. It hovered between -27 and -30
until 1995, and has fallen to about -16 today. This recent fall is not because of contracting
employment di erentials, but rather because of soaring house prices in the South East.
The correlation between non-employment and house prices (excluding London) was no
more than 11% in the 1970s, and between 50% and 85% since then. There is no sign of
this tight relationship abating. Since the 1980s then, joblessness has remained persistently
higher in less productive areas.
This set of graphs also illustrates well London’s growing distinctiveness. In 1975, London
resembled the rest of the South East, with high prices and non-employment of around 11%.
But, already by 1979, a small gap had opened between the two regions, with London non-
employment rising to 13%. After the recession of the early 1990s, London was almost on
par with the North West at 28%. And these high levels have persisted until today: non-
employment was 25% in 2010. But, despite all this, house price di erentials between London
and the rest of the country have ballooned in the last few decades: in the 1970s, London
prices were about 50% higher than the North (the cheapest region), but they now almost
twice as high. This combination of rising prices and unemployment in London is suggestive
of a prolonged supply shock, a theory on which I elaborate in Section 4.7 below.
4.5 Role of local house prices
Why are British workers less likely to migrate in the face of local shocks, and more likely to
risk unemployment or inactivity? The answer may lie in the generous welfare support in the
UK (as discussed above). This allows workers to remain long-term cities despite a lack of
jobs. However, this should not not be enough to cause shocks to persist for decades. I propose
that local housing market equilibrium plays a role in cementing employment di erentials over
the longer term.
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Figure 4.3: Evolving regional correlation between non-employment (men, 16-64) and house
prices
101
BirminghamBristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
London
Manchester
N wcastle
Oxford
Stoke
Swanse
6
6.
2
6.
4
6.
6
6.
8
Lo
g 
wa
ge
11 11.5 12 12.5 13
Log house price
Coeff: .307 (.019), R2: .608, N: 177
UK (2010)
Boston
Chicago
DallasDetroit Los Angeles
New York
San Francisco
Scranton
Washington
6.
5
7
7.
5
8
Lo
g 
wa
ge
11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14
Log house price
Coeff: .277 (.013), R2: .6, N: 297
US (2010)
Birmingham
Bristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
LondonManchester
Newcastle
Oxford
Stoke
Swansea
4
6
8
10
12
14
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
11 11.5 12 12.5 13
Log house price
Coeff: −4.963 (.368), R2: .51, N: 177
UK (2010)
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
San FranciscoScranton
Washington
5
10
15
20
25
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
11.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14
Log house price
Coeff: .084 (.283), R2: 0, N: 297
US (2010)
Birmingham
Bristol
Edinburgh
Liverpool
London
Manchester
Newcastle
Oxford
Stoke
Swansea
2
4
6
8
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
−.5 0 .5
Real wage (1998−2007)
Coeff: 3.208 (.448), R2: .303, N: 120
UK (2004)
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los AngelesNew York
San Francisco
Scranton
Washington
0
5
10
15
Un
em
p 
ra
te
 (%
)
−.3 −.2 −.1 0 .1 .2
Real wage
Coeff: −2.852 (1.144), R2: .025, N: 243
US (2000)
* UK OLS results and fit lines exclude London
Figure 4.4: Cross-city relationships for UK and US: local prices
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In Figure 4.4, I present some stylised facts on variation in local house prices, for both
the UK and US. The first row shows a tight relationship between log local wages and log
house prices across cities. For both countries, a doubling of prices is associated with an
approximately 30% increase in local wages; and in each case, the R squared is about 60%.
This can be understood in the context of the standard spatial equilibrium model. Prices will
adjust to make workers indi erent between cities with di erent labour productivities (and
wages). Assuming Cobb-Douglas preferences over housing and traded goods, the theory
predicts that the regression coe cient should be equal to the share of housing consumption
in total expenditure; this is indeed about 0.3 (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009).
Given the tight price-wage relationship, it is unsurprising that there is a strong negative
correlation between local prices and unemployment in the UK (second row). Excluding Lon-
don, a doubling of local prices is associated with a 5 percentage point drop in unemployment;
and the R squared is 50% (which is even larger than for the unemployment-wage relationship
in Figure 4.1). In the US, the unemployment-price correlation is zero; again, this should be
no surprise.
Given the variation in prices and wages, what does this mean for spending power in
di erent cities? In the final row, I plot local unemployment rates against the real wage (as
estimated by Gibbons et al., 2011, for the UK; and Albouy, 2012, for the US), adjusted
for both labour and housing quality.14 In the US, the correlation is weak (R squared under
3%). But, in the UK, the two variables are strongly positively related (again, excluding
London), with an R squared of 30%. That is: low-wage, high-unemployment cities actually
have relatively high real wages. E ectively, local house prices are so much lower in these
places that real wages are actually larger.
This has a spatial equilibrium interpretation: workers may be trading o  the high job-
less risk in low-demand cities with the higher spending power (that accrues once they find
employment). This is not a new idea: Gibbons et al. (2011) discuss local job availability as
an amenity and show it is correlated with their real wage estimates. But still, mechanically,
what could cause prices to fall further than wages in low productivity cities? One possible
explanation is inertia in local housing stocks. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) point out that
housing is durable: if a city is in decline, housing will not simply disappear. Instead, local
house prices will fall steeply to maintain housing demand. In the case of the UK, we might
think of the decline in Northern industries as a contraction of the human capital stock: local
workers’ skills became devalued. But, housing capital was largely una ected (most of the
UK’s housing stock was built many decades before). As a result, in those areas, there is likely
to be a large excess of housing capital - relative to the local human capital to be housed.
The outcome was a relative fall in the price of housing capital relative to the price of human
capital (the quality-adjusted wage). This reasoning is currently merely speculative, and I
would need a rigorous model to test its internal and external consistency.
14I use my earliest unemployment estimates (2004) for the UK to match the dates of the real wage estimate
(1998-2007). For the US, Albouy’s estimates are from 2000; so I construct unemployment rates for that year
(from the 5% census extract).
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Figure 4.5: Housing market indicators across UK cities
4.6 Local housing market characteristics in the UK
To provide further clues on the role of housing markets, it is useful to document other features
of local housing characteristics in the UK. In Figure 4.5, I plot a number of di erent TTWA
housing indicators against log wages, my proxy for local labour productivity.
The first graph shows that the share of planning refusals (as a percentage of all decisions)
is strongly increasing in the local wage, ranging from on average 15% in the least productive
cities to over 30% in the most. This suggests housing supply is more constrained in those
cities with the most available jobs. This presents an important obstacle to the adjustment
of employment to local shocks. The US is quite di erent in this respect: while there are
several prosperous cities that have little physical potential for growth (like San Francisco,
Los Angeles or New York), there are many rapidly growing cities with almost no constraints
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Figure 4.6: Incidence of overcrowded housing across UK cities
on expansion, particularly in the Sun Belt.
The second graph shows that homeownership rates (based on the APS of 2010) are
moderately larger in high-wage cities, though the correlation is weak (R squared is 5%).
London is an outlier, with ownership under 50%.
In the third graph, it can be seen that the share of households in social housing (APS
2010) is decreasing in local wages, ranging from on average 10% in the most productive
cities to 20% in the least. The greater availability of social housing in low-wage cities may
further encourage the unemployed to remain. Furthermore, social tenancy may well reduce
the geographical mobility of its residents (Gregg et al., 2004). Again, London is an exception,
with relatively large stocks of public housing given its high wage.
The last graph gives data on local take-up of housing benefit, also from the APS of 2010.
Unsurprisingly, with the exception of London, this is larger in less productive cities - reaching
up to 20% of all households. These high rates are demonstrative of the availability of welfare
support in cities su ering economic problems.
Finally, I consider local di erences in the quality of housing. At the lower end of the
income scale, an important problem is overcrowded housing. One standard benchmark for
overcrowding is 0.75 persons per room. In the first graph of Figure 4.6, I plot the incidence of
overcrowding in cities against the local wage. The relationship is slightly negative, but very
weak - with an R squared of under 3%. London is a notable exception, with extraordinarily
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high overcrowding incidence: over 17% across all households, compared to a national average
of 11%. In the second graph, I restrict the sample to those households in social housing.
This time, there is a strong positive relationship: the incidence in the highest-wage cities
is about 20%, but only 15% for the lowest. Therefore, low-productivity areas tend to have
more - and better quality - social housing, another draw for the unemployed to remain.
Of course, all these results are merely correlations, and more work needs to be done to
understand where they come from - especially in terms of general equilibrium.
4.7 Migration patterns to and from London
As discussed in Section 4.5 above, the combination of rising prices and unemployment in
London is suggestive of a prolonged shock to labour supply. One possible candidate is immi-
gration. In Figure 4.7, I plot the evolution (over 1980-2008) of net inter-regional migration
rates (in blue) and net international migration rates (in red) by region, based on ONS data
(see Section 4.2 for further details). I have borrowed this method of presenting these results
from The Economist (2003), but extended the analysis to other regions in the country apart
from London. All rates are expressed as a percentage of the particular region’s population.
London is clearly exceptional: net foreign migration is much higher than elsewhere. It
was zero in the early 1980s, but has been increasing steadily since, reaching about 1% in the
early 2000s; it has shrunk somewhat since the latest recession. In contrast, London’s net
inter-regional migration rate has been consistently negative, and almost a mirror image of
the international rates, peaking at below -1% in the early 2000s.
So, while foreign migrants have been entering London en masse, there has been a large
exodus of Londoners to other parts of the country. This is not a new observation (see e.g. The
Economist, 2003; Gordon et al., 2007), but my contribution is to link it with employment
patterns. There is evidence that immigration has put downward pressure on the wages
of low skilled Londoners (Dustmann et al., 2013), and it may have contributed to rising
housing costs - amplified by significant constraints on local housing expansion (see Hilber
and Vermeulen, 2010). Certainly, foreign investment in London property from Asia and the
Middle East has also played a (probably more) important role (The Economist, 2012). The
result of all this is falling real wages, which may have encouraged many Londoners to leave
the city. It also possible that this has driven some Londoners to benefit dependency (and
housing benefit in particular, which is linked to local rents) to support themselves in place of
long-term work. This is consistent with the story from Chapter 2 of migrants undercutting
native wages in the labour market. But of course, this is all merely speculation.
It is worth checking which demographic groups are responsible for the patterns we see in
London. Ideally, it would be good to decompose the migrant groups for each year separately
to observe their evolution. However, the LFS samples are too small to carry out a within-
region analysis. Instead, I focus on the 5% sample available from the UK census of 2001.
The census asks responds for their current region and in which region they lived in 12 months
previously. This allows me to estimate annual migration rates.
In Figure 4.8, I plot annual migration rates to and from London by age group. All rates
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Figure 4.7: Inter-regional and international migration, by region
107
0
5
10
An
nu
al
 m
ig
 ra
te
 (%
)
0−15 16−19 20−24 25−29 30−39 40−49 50−64 65+
In−migration (regional) Out−migration (regional)
In−migration (foreign)
Figure 4.8: In- and out-migration rates for London, by age (2001)
are expressed as percentages of London’s population in the particular age group. For each
age category, the first bar represents the rate of in-migration to London from other parts of
the UK (i.e. regional in-migration); the second bar is the rate of regional out-migration from
London; and the third bar is the rate of in-migration to London from abroad. (Of course, it
is not possible to observe the characteristics of foreign out-migrants in the census.)
Unsurprisingly, the bars are highest for individuals in their 20s: the young are known to
be more mobile. But, looking at the di erence between the blue and red bars, it is clear
that the net regional out-migration from London is entirely due to the over-30s (and under-
20s; but these are children who simply reflect the movements of their household heads).
Older individuals are more likely to be homeowners, and many of the out-migrants will be
capitalising their gains from rapid growth in London house prices. On average, net regional
migration is -1.3% for the over-30s; notice that this statistic is driven by many individuals of
working-age and not just retirees. In contrast, net regional migration to London is positive
for 20-29s, and particularly large for 20-24s (5.4%). Immigrants make up a large proportion
of total in-migration to the city (44%). And, the composition of foreign in-migrants also
seems to be relatively dominated by the 20-29s. Incredibly, if we consider all forms of in-
migration, 16% of London’s population of 20-24s (the sum of the red and green bars) were
living elsewhere 12 months previously.
In Figure 4.9, I repeat the same exercise but across education groups, for the sample of
16-64s. Skilled workers tend to be more mobile, and this is reflected by the higher bars on the
right. Comparing the blue and red bars, we can see that the regional exodus from London
is entirely due to lower skilled workers. For workers with NVQ level under 3 (i.e. less than
A-level), net regional out-migration is -1.4%. In contrast, for those with NVQ levels 4/5 (i.e.
with higher education), net regional migration is positive: 1.4% on average. Looking at the
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Figure 4.9: In- and out-migration rates for London of 16-64s, by education (2001)
distribution of the green bars, immigration from abroad also tends to be dominated by the
high skilled. However, Dustmann et al. (2013) show that well-educated migrants commonly
downgrade on arrival to the UK to lower skilled occupations.
Where in the UK have the London out-migrants gone? This is addressed by Figure 4.10.
For each region, I plot the migration rate to London (in-migration) and the migration rate
from London (out-migration), always as a percentage of the London population. It turns out
that almost all of the net-migration out of London has gone towards its neighbouring regions,
the East and South East. This opens up the possibility that many of these migrants have
kept their jobs and are simply commuting longer distances from cheaper areas. Indeed, the
evidence supports this theory. In Figure 4.11, I plot the distribution of commuting distance
for two groups: (1) employed residents of the East and South East who lived in London 12
months previously and (2) all other employed residents of those regions. Many more of the
ex-Londoners are commuting over 20km: over 40%, compared to under 20% for the rest of
the local population.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have documented key facts on local joblessness in the US and UK. In the
US, local rates of unemployment and inactivity are unrelated to labour productivity, which is
instead reflected in the local population. In the UK though, local employment shocks have
persisted for many decades, and there is a strong correlation across cities between wages
and joblessness (with the important exception of London, which has both high wages and
high unemployment). I have speculated that the country’s generous means-tested welfare
system has made this persistence possible, and that the adjustment of local housing markets
109
0
.
5
1
1.
5
An
nu
al
 m
ig
 ra
te
 (%
)
No Yk NW EM WM Ea SE SW Wa Sc NI
In−migration (regional) Out−migration (regional)
Figure 4.10: In- and out-migration rates for London, by region (2001)
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
Sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l
0−5km 5−20km 20km + No fixed place
Distance to work
Migrants from London (last 12 months) All others
Figure 4.11: Commuting patterns of East and South East workers (2001)
110
has cemented it. While adverse demand shocks have brought about this situation in the
old industrial towns, London appears to have experienced a prolonged supply-side shock.
A possible candidate for such a shock is persistently high immigration (pushing down low
skilled wages), together with large foreign investment in local housing. These factors may
have encouraged Londoners to leave or resort to welfare, given that low skilled pay is often
insu cient to support a reasonable life style.
This hypothesis is merely speculative, but if accurate, the clearest policy solution to
the problems posed in this chapter would be to liberalise the local housing supply. Hilber
and Vermeulen (2010) argue that much of the growth in house prices in the UK has been
due to artificial planning restrictions. This is particularly hazardous in job-creating areas,
as it impedes the adjustment of employment. However, this must be balanced with any
preferences to preserve the British rural environment, and there are also many political
obstacles to this kind of policy.
Another area of discussion is welfare policy, currently in a state of flux with the intro-
duction of Universal Credit. Reducing the generosity of means-tested benefits to American
levels would certainly help reduce persistence, but this may not be the optimal approach:
the possible downside is a Detroit-style scenario. Interestingly, the government has recently
discussed the idea of introducing regional variation in benefit payments (these are largely
invariant geographically, with the exception of housing benefit). While this may help ame-
liorate poverty in many expensive areas, it could be detrimental to the employment situation
in London if it makes the welfare alternative more attractive.
A more sensible approach to addressing the problems in London may be on the earnings
side: regional pay in the public sector and more widespread application of “living wages” (or
a nationally varying minimum wage) should help improve the returns to employment in the
city. There may also be a role for strategic investment in social housing in terms of location:
investment in job-rich parts of the South could help to encourage in-migration. Housing
benefit may be counterproductive in this respect, for example, in allowing jobless families to
survive in expensive London.
This work is currently purely descriptive, and the next step is to develop a rigorous model
to test the theory. More immediate empirical concerns would be to estimate local real wages
at di erent points in time since the 1980s, in the style of Gibbons et al. (2011), to see how
they have evolved. It would also be useful to calculate the returns to employment in di erent
cities, based on a rigorous analysis of local prices and the tax and benefit system - for both
the UK and US.
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Chapter 5
Do Households Use Homeownership
To Insure Themselves? Evidence
Across US Cities1
5.1 Introduction
Are households more likely to own their home when “housing risk” is higher? There is a large
literature on how homeowners use home equity to smooth the transmission of earnings shocks
into consumption2. In this chapter, we explore how the decision to become a homeowner is
influenced by exposure to housing market risk and motives for insurance.
Some have argued that households may bring forward their home purchase as a hedge
against future house price fluctuations (e.g. Sinai and Souleles (2005); Banks et al. (2010)).
But, an earlier purchase would often necessitate a larger mortgage and increased risk to
consumption. Using a life-cycle model, we argue that, in response to di erences in housing
risk, otherwise similar households are more likely to di er in their liquid savings than the
timing of their ownership decision. Empirically, these savings di erences manifest themselves
in observed variation in loan-to-value ratios (LTV). In other words, in response to higher
price risk, households do not bring forward ownership decisions (nor do households that
never own choose to become homeowners) - but rather, conditional on owning, they may
instead reduce their LTV.
Theoretically, when markets are incomplete there are several reasons why homeownership
may be a peculiar and attractive form of insurance against certain risks in the housing
market3. In Ben-Shahar (1998), Nordvik (2001), Sinai and Souleles (2005) and Ortalo-Magne
1This chapter is based on joint work with Jonathan Halket.
2Hurst and Sta ord (2004) and Hryshko et al. (2010) look at how households use mortgage refinancing
decisions and home equity, respectively, to smooth unemployment shocks and earnings shocks. Leth-Petersen
(2010) finds that household expenditure increases moderately after credit constraints are relaxed. Paciorek
and Sinai (2012) finds that the cross-sectional variance of housing consumption is lower for homeowners that
have moved between cities whose house prices are strongly correlated.
3Formal, direct means to insure against changes in house prices are limited (Caplin et al., 1997), and the
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and Prat (2010), households may use homeownership to insure themselves against the risk of
changes to the local rental price (or user-cost) of housing. However, Ortalo-Magne and Rady
(2002) suggest that if a household’s expected future earnings are more strongly correlated
with local house prices, then it already has partial insurance through their labor earnings.4
Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) and Banks et al. (2010) propose and find supporting evidence
for a housing-ladder theory in which households that plan on eventually owning a large house
(in part because larger houses may not be available on the rental market) are more likely
to own a smaller home (rather than rent) first if they live in a risky area. In this case,
homeownership partially insures young households against increases in the price of a good
in their future consumption bundle (the larger house).
If financial constraints prevent some households from insuring themselves through own-
ing, there may be important welfare improvements from policies designed to make ownership
“accessible”. However, measuring the size or even the overall sign of the insurance motive on
homeownership is challenging, in part because it is di cult to isolate di erences in house-
holds’ exposure to housing risks that are independent from other factors that a ect their
homeownership decisions.
This chapter proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we present some empirical facts based on
cross-city5 variation. As documented by Banks et al. (2010), households in high-risk cities are
less likely to become homeowners. We also find that they are more likely to make a large down
payment (in percentage-of-house-value terms) when they do buy. These relationships hold
when controlling for household characteristics. However, causal inference is confounded by
house price levels, which are systematically correlated with housing volatility in an intuitive
way: in cities where the land value is larger relative to the local cost of structures, house
prices are higher and more volatile. When we look at the variation in homeownership rates
and LTV by land share (the ratio of local land values to total housing costs), we see the same
strong negative relationship. This is true even after instrumenting for possible endogeneity,
using a measure of physical local land scarcity constructed by Saiz (2010). So, secondly,
we use a quantitative life-cycle model with homeownership to disentangle the e ects of
higher risk from higher price levels on the life-cycle timing of homeownership and mortgage
decisions.
We focus on the cross-sectional dimension in our empirical work, rather than the time-
series, for several reasons. For one, in the data, the amount of heterogeneity both in house-
hold and price behavior is much larger across cities than within cities over time. For another,
the land scarcity instrument o ers a way to measure the e ect of higher price levels and risk
(jointly) on household behavior in the cross-section. However we cannot use it to control for
endogeneity within a city over time. In this sense, our work is complementary to much of
correlation between house prices and other financial assets is small (Flavin and Yamashita, 2002).
4Davido  (2006) finds that households purchase less housing when they work in an industry whose workers’
income are relatively more correlated with local house prices. However, he finds very small e ects of the
same on the probability of homeownership.
5Throughout we refer to Metropolitan Statistical Areas as “cities” and “LTV” always refers to the loan-
to-value at origination (that is, at the time of purchase). We will sometimes refer to the time-series standard
deviation of the annual changes to log house prices within a city as its “volatility”.
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the previous literature (e.g. Sinai and Souleles (2005)), which exploits within-city variation
in volatility (controlling for prices) to measure the insurance motive.
In order to measure the e ect of higher volatility on homeownership, we disentangle its
impact from that of higher prices by building a life-cycle model of homeownership choice.
We account separately for innovations to house prices that are correlated with city wages
and those that are not. The model has a flexible housing ladder where medium-sized housing
can either be rented or owned, which enables the model to match the relative consumption
of owner-occupied to rental housing in the average city according to land scarcity. Impor-
tantly, households have another means of imperfectly insuring themselves in addition to
homeownership: a risk-free bond.
In our setup, households have several potential reasons why they might use homeown-
ership to insure against housing risk. They may use homeownership to insure themselves
against the risk of changes to the rental price of housing, though their labor earnings will
provide some partial insurance. Also, the housing ladder assumption forces households that
wish to live in large houses to own them so that the model nests the theories of Banks et al.
(2010) and Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006). Otherwise, the basic elements of our life-cycle
model of homeownership are similar to those in Cocco (2005), Li and Yao (2007) and others.
Key model parameters are chosen to match moments from the average city based on
land scarcity. Cities in the model di er ex ante only in their land scarcity and, through land
scarcity, their stochastic processes for house prices and wages. The model endogenously
captures most of the variation by land scarcity in household behavior. Given that, we
then perform counterfactual analyses where we vary one element at a time (e.g. vary the
level of prices, keeping volatility constant). We find that most of the observed variation in
homeownership across cities comes from the observed variation in house price levels and not
the variation in risk. Instead, higher risk leads to slightly lower LTVs and homeownership
rates in the model.
The weak e ect of risk on homeownership comes despite the large dispersion across cities
in the local volatility of house prices, which is as large as the dispersion in price levels.
Furthermore, absent other factors, more risk would lead to more homeownership in the
model (and as in Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010)); homeownership is the only asset available
for purchase in the model that has returns correlated with any shock. However in our
model, homeownership also has many extra costs that potentially increase with more price
volatility (such as the transactions costs for buying a house). Moreover, households also have
an alternative to using homeownership for insurance: they can accumulate precautionary,
non-housing savings instead. We find that, given the extra costs to homeownership, young
households with rising income profiles would rather save a little in liquid precautionary
savings than save a lot to a ord a down payment. These extra savings help explain the
lower LTV ratios in the high-risk cities. The precautionary savings motive is not su cient
in our model to generate the same magnitude of LTV dispersion as in the data so it is likely
that there are other explanations beyond those discussed here that are also important in
explaining the dispersion in mortgage behavior. The qualitative concurrence of volatility
and LTV in the model and data should then be treated as corroborating our other, more
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definitive evidence that higher housing risk does not lead to more to more homeownership.
In the model, dispersion in price levels has a much larger e ect than risk on homeown-
ership choices due to the housing ladder. With a housing ladder, a household in our model
must own (rent) if it wants to live in a particularly large (small) house. Higher prices in a
city decrease housing consumption and, therefore, reduce homeownership rates.
Patterns in the data corroborate our conclusions that di erences in price levels cause
di erences in homeownership rates through housing ladder e ects, while di erences in LTV
are independent of housing ladder e ects and are instead due to risk. In the data, once
we condition on whether a household lives in an apartment or a house (a proxy for the
housing ladder in the model), the negative correlation between homeownership rates and
price levels disappears. However, the negative relationship between LTV and volatility does
not disappear after conditioning.
In the last section of the chapter, we discuss why regression-based inferences of risk’s e ect
on homeownership may be biased. Homeownership decisions in economies with transaction
costs are durable decisions. Unsurprisingly for an (S,s)-type model, not only contemporane-
ous prices but also the past history of prices help determine whether a household currently
owns or not. Therefore, homeownership rates within the city economy are also a function of
the history of prices. In many studies, expected housing risk is measured using the volatility
of area house prices around the time that the homeownership rate is measured6. Thus, the
volatility variable picks up the history dependence of homeownership on price levels, leading
to potential bias.
Related literature
A key contribution of this chapter is that we document systematic cross-city variation in
homeownership and LTV using both micro and aggregate (city-level) data. Banks et al.
(2010) use both variation within and across U.S. states and U.S.-U.K. comparisons on home-
ownership. Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) look across developed countries for the e ect of fi-
nancial market imperfections on homeownership. Albouy (2009a) and Albouy (2009b) look
at the e ects of cross-city variation in taxes and amenities. Han (2010) looks at the e ects
of housing risks on housing demand and homeowners’ propensity to move, using cross-city
and time variation. City-level data is appealing since it is more plausible to assume, as we
do, that financial market conditions are similar across the areas, in contrast to cross-country
comparisons. But there is still enough plausibly exogenous, observable variation in price
levels and risk across cities to find systematic di erences in household choices.
Han (2008) builds a model where homeowners may choose to accumulate more housing so
as to hedge against housing risks. Under the assumption of separable utility and no income
risk, she provides conditions for when the hedging motive outweighs the household’s normal
disinclination to hold riskier assets (as in Rosen et al. (1984)). Han (2013) finds evidence
6For example, Sinai and Souleles (2005); Banks et al. (2010). Han (2010, 2013) look at the variance of
house price forecasts instead of house prices where prices are forecasted using an AR(1) process and the
variance of innovations is forecasted using a GARCH(1,1) process.
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that the hedging motive may be priced into housing risk premia in markets where housing
supply is constrained. Our work expands on this contribution by adding the option of renting
and looking at homeownership and borrowing behavior jointly.
There are a few studies that examine the opposite causal direction - the e ect of home-
ownership and borrowing decisions on prices. Stein (1995) proposes a model where price
changes have asymmetric e ects on sales due to down payment constraints. Lamont and
Stein (1999) find that cities with high LTVs have higher rather than lower elasticities of
house prices with respect to changes in income, but the instrument they use turns out to
be weak. Genesove and Mayer (1997) find that within a specific market (the Boston con-
dominium market), sellers with higher LTVs have higher expected time on the market and
receive higher prices.
We do not o er a general equilibrium model of housing; neither do we deal with issues of
regional mobility7 or time variation in the stochastic process for prices. By using the time-
invariant di erences in land scarcity across cities to calibrate the di erent price processes,
we largely sidestep issues of endogeneity that may normally arise from examining only one
side of a market. Providing structural explanations for the relationship between land values
and house prices and for the existence of a housing ladder are interesting explorations that
we hope the facts presented here will encourage.
The rest of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 shows the striking variation in homeown-
ership, LTV, house prices and housing risk across U.S. cities, Section 5.3 presents the model,
and Section 5.4 discusses its parametrization. Section 5.5 presents our results. Section 5.6
discusses bias in regressions and concludes. We include appendices with further details on
our data work and model parameterization.
5.2 Homeownership and loan-to-value ratios in the data
In this section, we present some basic facts from cross-city data. First, we show that local
homeownership rates are decreasing in price volatility (as Banks et al. (2010) document).
But, we cannot draw causal inference from this result, because local price volatilities are
themselves closely correlated with local price levels. And indeed, homeownership is also
strongly negatively correlated with price levels across cities.
We then show that cities with high and volatile prices are also characterized by low LTV
ratios. So, households in these cities are less likely to own. And when they do choose to own,
their purchases are less leveraged. But, again, it is not clear solely from the data whether
these outcomes are insurance-type responses to local price volatility, local price levels or
something else entirely.
7See Halket and Vasudev (2013) for a model with both, but without the changes in housing supply
that we would need here to close our model. Paciorek (2012) has a model of housing supply where the
elasticities di er according to factors like land scarcity. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2010) looks at inter-
and intra-regional risk sharing and home values but not homeownership.
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Local price levels and volatilities are closely related for a simple intuitive reason. They
share the same statistical source: variation in land share, i.e. the share of the price of
the city’s typical house that is attributable to the value of land (as opposed to the cost of
the structure). As a result, it is not possible to empirically disentangle the impact of price
volatilities from that of price levels without the use of behavioral models and counterfactuals.
Data
This chapter is based on a number of data sources, with our analysis restricted to the
cross-section of 2000 for simplicity8. Ownership rates and local mean price levels (based on
reported values of owned dwellings) are constructed from the Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series (IPUMS) 5 percent extract of the US 2000 census, organized by Ruggles et al.
(2010b). We use two di erent measures of LTV ratios, taken from the American Housing
Survey (AHS) and the Monthly Interest Rate Survey (MIRS)9; the latter is maintained by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Quarterly metropolitan house price indices
are also taken from the FHFA10 to estimate local price volatilities. And, our metropolitan-
level average earnings series come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) regional
program11. Finally, we use data on local land scarcity from Saiz (2010) and land share from
Davis and Palumbo (2008); we discuss these further below. Where survey data are used, we
restrict our sample to households with heads aged 21-7512, living in houses or apartments.
Throughout this chapter, we weight all city-level regressions and scatter plots; our weights
correspond to the local sample of households with heads aged 21-75, living in houses or flats
(as estimated from the census extract).
We identify cities with the set of (Primary13) Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs),
of which there are 297 in the census data in 2000. However, we restrict our sample to the
221 MSAs for which FHFA price data, BEA wage data and the land scarcity instrument are
available. Of these, 42 cities are available in the AHS (for the estimation of local LTV ratios)
and in the Davis-Palumbo (2008) data on land shares (itself based on the AHS). And, just
25 are available in the metropolitan MIRS LTV data - though these tend to be the most
prominent cities. Further details on the city sample can be found in Appendix A.
Our measure of local house price volatility is the standard deviation of log annual changes
in the FHFA local price index (measured in the first quarter of each year) over the previous
five years (1995-2000).14 This approach is based on Banks et al. (2010). We estimate wage
volatility in the same way using annual BEA data.
8In Appendix C, we show that the general patterns also hold for 1990, with the exception of the systematic
patterns of LTV discussed below which have become considerably stronger since 1990.
9http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=250
10All-transactions index; http://www.fhfa.gov/DataTools/Downloads/Pages/House-Price-Index-
Datasets.aspx. The Case-Shiller indicies distributed by Standard & Poor’s (which is the other popular
publicly available data set) cover a much smaller sample of cities.
11http://www.bea.gov/iTable/index_regional.cfm
12In the case of the AHS, age is calculated at purchase year.
13We do not aggregate these into “consolidated” areas.
14Appendix C contains robustness results for alternative volatility window lengths.
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We present much of the evidence on cross-city correlations between ownership rates/LTV
and price levels/volatilities graphically. But, there are of course concerns that any observed
e ects will simply be driven by di erences in local household composition. Therefore, in all
cross-city analysis (including graphs), we use local ownership rates and LTV that condition
on local household characteristics and household income in particular. See Section 5.6 for
more details.
There are concerns of large measurement error in the LTV data estimated from the AHS
(Lam and Kaul, 2003). And so, we also present our analysis using MIRS data. The MIRS
reports (among other statistics) mean LTV ratios for conventional (i.e. excluding federally
guaranteed Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) loans; see
Appendix A for description of loan types) single-family loans in 25 cities, based on a monthly
survey of mortgage lenders. However, the AHS does have a number of advantages for our
purposes: it covers more cities, it covers non-conventional loans also, and (being a household
survey) it allows us to control for household characteristics.
Our data on land shares are taken from Davis and Palumbo (2008)15. They construct a
data set containing, by city and quarter, the average local house price, as well as the share
of the local price that is attributable to land value and structure cost, respectively, so that:
housevaluej,t = landvaluej,t + structurevaluej,t
lj,t =
landvaluej,t
housevaluej,t
where lj,t is then the land share for city j at time t. Their land value estimates are the
residual part of house values within a city that is not explained by structure costs. Since it
is partially based on the AHS, these data are only available for 42 MSAs in our sample.
As a supply-side instrument for the share of the price attributable to land, we adopt
Saiz’s (2010) measure of local land scarcity, based on physical constraints on housing supply.
For each city, this is the share of a circle around the city center, of 50km radius, that is
either steeply inclined land (at an incline of over 15 percent) or water.16. Saiz estimates this
variable with satellite data.
Homeownership and LTV
As the first panel of Figure 5.1 shows, the local homeownership rate (conditional on house-
hold income and other characteristics) is negatively correlated across cities with house price
volatility. The predicted (OLS) e ect shows ownership rates ranging from about 0.7 (for
the least volatile cities) to 0.4 (for the most), with an R squared of 41 percent. But, as
the second panel shows, it is also strongly negatively correlated with price levels (see the
first two panels of Figure 5.1): here, the correlation is 60 percent. It should be noted that
15Their data are available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values.
16Mian and Sufi (2011) and Chaney et al. (2012) similarly use this data to instrument for elasticities of
supply, while Paciorek (2012) builds a model of housing supply that directly connects Saiz’s measure of land
scarcity to the theoretical elasticity.
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New York appears to be an important outlier in these homeownership figures; however, we
argue in Section 5.5 that this relates to the local abundance of apartments and the results
presented here are anyway robust to excluding it.
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Figure 5.1: Homeownership, price risk and price levels
Unsurprisingly, volatilities and levels are themselves closely related, with a correlation of
38 percent (see Figure 5.2). Consequently, it is di cult to disentangle their respective e ects.
To see this graphically, we isolate the portion of variation in volatilities that is uncorrelated
with price levels (i.e. the residuals from an OLS regression of volatilities on levels). In the
first panel of Figure 5.3, we plot homeownership against these volatility residuals: the e ect
is much weaker than before, with less than half the coe cient and an R squared of under
5 percent. In the second panel, we plot homeownership against price level residuals (from
a regression on volatility). The relationship is stronger than the one from the volatility
residuals17, though still much weaker than in Figure 5.1: the correlation is 23 percent.
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los AngelesNew York
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Washington
11
11
.5
12
12
.5
13
Lo
g 
m
ea
n 
ho
us
e 
pr
ice
, 2
00
0
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
House price volatility, 1995−2000
Coeff: 15.798 (1.359), R2: .382, N: 221
Figure 5.2: Price levels and risk
17This is perhaps unsurprising given that volatility is measured with more error than levels.
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Figure 5.3: Homeownership and residual price levels and volatilities
As with homeownership, average city loan-to-value ratio at origination (LTV), as mea-
sured by the AHS (controlling for household characteristics including income), is strongly
negatively correlated with both local price volatility and level (Figure 5.4). In the first panel,
moving from the lowest to highest price volatilities in the MSA sample, following the OLS-
predicted line, LTV falls from 0.85 to 0.79, with an R squared of 19 percent. But again,
unsurprisingly, the second panel shows a strong negative correlation between LTV and price
levels of 46 percent.
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Figure 5.4: LTV (AHS), price risk and price levels
These relationships also exist for the MIRS data, as Figure 5.5 shows. The correlation is
much tighter than for the AHS data: the AHS is likely to be subject to substantial sampling
and reporting error. But, the magnitudes of the e ects on LTV are very similar for the two
datasets: for example, for volatility, the MIRS e ect is -1.2 compared to -1.0 for the AHS.
Notice that the mean LTV is lower for the MIRS (0.77) than for the AHS (0.84) estimates.
This is in part because the MIRS sample is restricted to conventional loans only: the AHS
mean for conventional loans is 0.80.
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Figure 5.5: LTV (MIRS), price risk and price levels
It might be argued that these LTV patterns have a supply-side explanation, due to the
intricacies of American mortgage institutions. But, in Appendix A, we show that geograph-
ically non-varying conforming loan limits do not drive the observed cross-city variation in
LTV, and nor do di erences in local mortgage interest rates. It is unlikely then that any
potential geographic di erences in default propensities are causing the observed variation in
LTV via di erences in default risk-premia. So in the model, we abstract from default.
Also, there may be concern that the variation in LTV is merely arising from cross-city
di erences in shares of mortgage-holders. Indeed, almost a quarter of homeowners (in the
5 percent census extract of 2000) do not hold mortgages. However, it turns out that the
local mortgage share (among homeowners) is uncorrelated with the ownership rate itself,
so it is not likely to be driving our results. Lastly, we also show in Appendix A that the
LTV patterns are equally strong for first-time buyers as for repeat buyers, so our results are
unlikely to arise from existing homeowners trading up after periods of high price growth.
To summarize, expensive and price-volatile cities tend to be characterized by low own-
ership rates, but also low LTV ratios. Households in these cities are less likely to own, and
when they do buy a house, they take a bigger equity stake. But, we cannot make causal
statements based on this evidence, given the close association between local price volatility
and levels.
Association between house price volatility and levels
To understand the close link between volatilities and levels, it is necessary to view house
prices as the sum of two components: land values and structure costs. Price volatilities and
levels are correlated across cities because they share the same statistical source: variation
in local land shares, as demonstrated in Figure 5.6.18The intuition is simple: compared to
structure costs, the price of land tends to vary much more both across cities and within cities
18To ensure comparability, all data (including house prices) for this figure are taken from Davis and
Palumbo (2008) - for 42 MSAs.
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over time; as a result, due to a simple composition e ect, cities with large land shares tend
to have higher and more volatile prices. We elaborate on this in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.6: Price risk and levels and land share
Given the strong empirical connection between price volatility and levels, we have to
disentangle their e ects on household choices with a model. One approach would be to
simulate ownership and LTV decisions in cities with di erent land shares. These cities
are characterized by di erent local price volatilities and levels (this is what matters for
the simulation), and these can be estimated from the data (by reference to their empirical
relationship with land share).
The problem is that the correlation between land share and ownership or LTV cannot
be considered causal a priori. Omitted variation in local productivity or housing demand
should not be a concern, because we are controlling for household income in our estimates
of ownership and LTV. But, we are worried about reverse causation from ownership/LTV
to price levels/volatilities and land share.
There are two ways to address this issue. The first is to simulate a general equilibrium
model, where land share, price levels and volatilities are all determined endogenously. How-
ever, the determination of these housing market outcomes is not the focus of this chapter,
and the equilibrium conditions would significantly complicate computation.
The second approach, which we choose, is to find a suitable instrument for land share
that will only a ect ownership and LTV indirectly, i.e. via local price levels and volatilities.
We opt for a measure of local land scarcity, described in the data section above. It is based
on local geographical features, namely inclined land and water. Conditional on household
income, this instrument is unlikely to a ect tenure and LTV in a significant way directly;
the e ect should only come through local housing conditions (captured by price levels and
volatility). The first stage is su ciently powerful. Figure 5.7 shows a strong relationship
between land scarcity and land share: a 1 percentage point increase in land scarcity is
associated with a a 0.5 percentage point increase in land share. Unsurprisingly, Figure 5.8
shows there is a strong positive relationship between land scarcity and price volatilities/levels
as well, with correlations of 28 and 30 percent respectively. Finally, Figures 5.9 and 5.10
show the relationships between homeownership and LTV and land share/scarcity.
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As with land share, we confirm in Appendix C that the entire e ect of land scarcity on
price levels comes through the land value component (and not structure costs). And, the
e ect on price volatility is entirely a composition e ect: land scarce cities have larger land
shares, and local land values are more volatile than structure costs.
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Figure 5.7: Land share and land scarcity
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Figure 5.8: Price risk and levels and land scarcity
123
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Washington
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
H
om
eo
w
ne
rs
hi
p,
 2
00
0
.2 .4 .6 .8
Land share of house price, 2000
Coeff: −.499 (.089), R2: .438, N: 42
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Washington
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
H
om
eo
w
ne
rs
hi
p,
 2
00
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Land scarcity
Coeff: −.245 (.032), R2: .211, N: 221
Figure 5.9: Homeownership, land share and land scarcity
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Figure 5.10: LTV, land share and land scarcity
5.3 Household choice model
In this section, we build a life-cycle model of households that work and consume in a partic-
ular city for their entire lives. Several of the assumptions we make deserve extra attention.
We severely limit households’ access to insurance in a way that should bias the model
in favor of using homeownership as insurance: we do not allow for inter-city migration, so
households cannot use moving away from the city as a source of insurance against house
price changes19; and the only asset besides a house is a risk-free bond.
Though the model is “partial-equilibrium”, rental prices are tied to sale prices through
an implied equilibrium relationship that leads to counterfactually high rental volatility. In
the model, rents will be as volatile as house prices, while in the data they are clearly lower20.
19See Sinai and Souleles (2009) for a model where owning can hedge moving risk. There the risk is that a
household moves to a market whose house prices are highly correlated with the household’s previous market.
In our model, all moves will be within-city moves and so this risk is maximized.
20For instance, see Campbell et al. (2009) and Verbrugge (2008).
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Excess volatility in rents as compared to prices will again bias the model in favor of home-
ownership as insurance. Also, all house price changes are common to all houses within a
city; we abstract away from house-level idiosyncratic changes in prices and rents. This too
favors the homeownership as insurance hypothesis as idiosyncratic volatility would fall more
heavily on homeowners in the model (a renter could easily move to an alternative house if
she gets an idiosyncratic increase in rent).
Time is discrete, and each period in the economy corresponds to one year in the data.
Households are born at age a = 21 and live at most to age a = 75. A household is indexed
by i and lives in a city, indexed by j, for its entire life. The city has a time-invariant land
scarcity ⁄j.
Preferences
Households have recursive preferences of the Kreps and Porteus (1978) type21. The household
gets instantaneous utility from a non-durable consumption good c and a durable housing
good h according to:
u(ct, ht, at) = (c1≠‡t h‡t )/F (at)
The path for the family size adjustment factor, F : {21, 22, ..., 75} æ R++, is exogenous,
constant across households of the same age and known to the household at birth.22 The
household’s utility at time t, Vt, is then given by the composite of its instantaneous utility
and its future expected utility:
Vt = [(1≠ —)u(ct, ht, at)1≠„ + —(RtVt+1)1≠„]
1
(1≠„) ,
where future expected utility is given by RtVt+1 = (Et[V 1≠“t+1 ])
1
1≠“ . “ measures risk aversion
while „ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Additive utility is a
special case where „ = “.
Households get utility at death from bequeathing wealth, Vt+1(·, at = 75) = (bt+1 +
pjt+1ht)1≠‡.
Labor earnings
Households receive labor earnings, Y ijt until an exogenously set retirement age R, after which
they receive a pension. Y ijt contains two parts: idiosyncratic components and a city-specific
21These preferences nest time-separable preferences but allow for the separate consideration of inter-
temporal smoothing (savings) and smoothing across states within a given period (risk-aversion).
22Attanasio et al. (1999); Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Cagetti (2003); Li and Yao (2007) each let
family size a ect a household’s discount factor. In Gourinchas and Parker (2002); Li and Yao (2007),
the life cycle profile for family size is deterministic and homogeneous across households of the same age.
Attanasio et al. (1999); Cagetti (2003) let the profiles vary by education. Browning and Lusardi (1996)
have a stochastic process for family size (see their paper for more references). Gervais (2002); Campbell and
Cocco (2003); Li and Yao (2007); Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) all use Cobb-Douglas preferences over non-
durable consumption and housing that are consistent with evidence from Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
that housing expenditure shares are approximately constant across cities.
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component. The city-specific component W jt , which we call wages, follows a geometric
random walk. The idiosyncratic components are, Lit, a geometric random walk with deter-
ministic age-dependent drift, and a transitory shock, ﬂit, as in, for example, Storesletten et al.
(2004a):
Yt = LitW jt Íit
Lit = exp f(at)Lit≠1Âit
W jt = W jt≠1‹jt
where lnÂit ≥ N (≠0.5‡2Â,‡2Â), ln Íit ≥ N (≠0.5‡2Í,‡2Í) and ln ‹jt ≥ N (µ‹ ≠ 0.5‡2‹(⁄j),‡2‹(⁄j)).
The variance of innovations to wages, vjt , can di er across cities according to their land
scarcity; however all cities have common drifts. After retirement, the household gets a
proportion (adjusted for growth in the city) of its final salary, Yt = ’LiRW jt . All households’
income is taxed at a rate ty.
Housing market
At any time, homes may either be rented (· it = 0) or owned (· it = 1), but not both simulta-
neously. There is a housing ladder that forces households to choose rented housing from the
set Hr and owner-occupied housing from the set Ho.
Housing can be bought at a unit price pjt , which contains two components - one correlated
with labor earnings and one uncorrelated with labor earnings:
pjt = QjtW jt
where Qjt = Qjt≠1‘jt and ln ‘jt ≥ N (≠0.5‡2‘ (⁄j),‡2‘ (⁄j)). The variance of innovations to the
uncorrelated component, ‘jt , like those of the correlated component, di ers across cities;
city-specific drifts remain common23.
An owner pays proportions tp and ”j of the value of the house each period toward prop-
erty taxes and maintenance, respectively. The housing maintenance means houses do not
depreciate and the maintenance required may vary across cities. A household may not “build
on” to its house; to adjust the size of an owner-occupied house, it must sell its current one
and buy a new house. Each time a household buys a house, it pays a fraction ◊b of the value
of the house as a transaction cost.
A renter pays only the spot rental price per unit of housing sjt , which we set so that a
risk-neutral landlord would be indi erent between renting or selling the house, subject to
paying income tax on its rental income:
sjt =
tp + ”j + rb≠µ‹1+rb
1≠ ty p
j
t
23There is a long literature (e.g. Case and Shiller (1989)) that documents a small predictable component in
house prices and Han (2010) and Han (2013) use price processes with some predictability. For computational
reasons, we follow Flavin and Yamashita (2002); Campbell and Cocco (2003); Cocco (2005); Yao and Zhang
(2005); Li and Yao (2007); Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2008) and assume shocks to house prices are permanent.
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where rb is the risk-free interest rate at which households and landlords can borrow.
Households have three potential motives for owning: the cost of renting exceeds the user-
cost of owning due to the taxation of rental income, the housing ladder restricts the size of
rental housing, and the several insurance motives.
Assets
Besides housing, the only other financial asset for the household is a risk-free one period
bond, bit+1, which pays rl to savers but costs (net) rb > rl to borrow. Households may
borrow at this rate, subject to a borrowing constraint. Housing is the sole form of collateral.
We model this by giving households a home equity line of credit.24 The LTV at the time of
purchase is simply the ratio: ≠ bit+1
pjth
i
t
.
When purchasing a home, households can borrow up to (1 ≠ d) of the value of the
house, where d is the down payment constraint. Thereafter, as long as they continue to
be homeowners, agents may borrow up to (1 ≠ d) of the value of the house. They may
also choose to roll over their debt after making an interest payment. So at any time, the
borrowing constraint is:
bit+1 Ø min{≠(1≠ d)· itpjthit, (1≠ 1m)bit},
where 1m is an indicator variable which equals one if the household chooses to move in the
period.25
If the household chooses to sell its home, it must pay o  all existing debt, though another
loan can be taken out if another home is purchased. A household that does not have positive
total cash-in-hand (housing wealth plus financial wealth plus current income) will not be
able to pay o  the mortgage it has (the debt it owes) on its home and will not choose to
move in this period. We do not allow the household to choose to default (see Jeske and
Krueger (2005) for a model with mortgage default), but households can default implicitly
by dying. After retirement, we do not allow households to take out new loans, but they may
continue with their old loan26. This e ectively ensures in our calibrated economy that all
households reach age 75 debt-free.
Newborn households are “born” with no housing but they draw their initial wealth from
a distribution  b, which is a probability distribution on R+.
24We also call this a mortgage throughout. It is worth reiterating that there is only one asset in the model,
the risk-free bond; households are not allowed to simultaneously hold “savings” and a “mortgage.” Such an
alternative, if allowed, would generally be unattractive due to the higher interest rate on debt. However,
because of the borrowing constraints in the model, some households might find it slightly attractive. Modeling
both assets separately would require an extra state variable though.
25This borrowing constraint is di erent from the more typical one which restricts borrowing to be weakly
less than some percentage of the house value (bit+1 Ø ≠(1 ≠ d)· itpjthit). With risky house prices, for a
household near the typical borrowing constraint, a fall in the value of a house means the household must
reduce the amount borrowed. If house price volatility is large enough, the e ective down payment constraint
(the amount the household could borrow and still be able to repay in any state of the world next period)
may be much tighter than the actual (d).
26That is, a retired household’s borrowing constraint is bit+1 Ø min{0, (1≠ 1m)bit}.
127
Household’s problem
The problem of the household is to choose consumption, house size and ownership, and
savings, given its permanent and transitory earnings components, housing and assets at the
beginning of the period and prices, subject to budget, borrowing, and choice-set constraints
and the initial condition and laws of motion for Qjt , W jt (which we do not repeat below) for
all variables27:
V (at, Lt, Ít, bt, ·t≠1ht≠1;Qjt ,W jt ,⁄j) = max
ct,ht,bt+1,·t
[(1≠ —)u(ct, ht, at)1≠„
+—(RV (at+1, Lt+1, Ít+1, bt+1, ·tht;Qjt+1,W jt+1,⁄j))1≠„]
1
(1≠„)
s.t.
ct + bt+1 + ht((1≠ ·t)sjt + ·tpjt(”j + tp + 1 + 1m◊b)) Æ bt(1 + r) + Yt(1≠ ty) + ht≠1·t≠1pjt
bit+1 Ø
Y][min{≠(1≠ d)· itp
j
th
i
t, (1≠ 1m)bit} if at Æ 65
min{0, (1≠ 1m)bit} else
r =
Y][rl if bt Ø 0rb if bt < 0
c Ø 0 ·tht œ {0, Ho} (1≠ ·t)ht œ {0, Hr} ·t œ {0, 1}
5.4 Parametrization
In Section 5.5, we will compare how households that live in cities with di erent expected
prices and volatilities behave di erently in both the model and the data. Since our model
is partial equilibrium and we have argued that di erences in land scarcity are plausibly
exogenous to di erences in homeownership rates and LTV except through the cross-city
variation in price behavior, the cities that we simulate with our model will di er ex ante
only by their land scarcity. Parameters indexed by j vary ex ante across cities according to
their land scarcity, ⁄j. All other parameters remain constant across cities.
In this section, we discuss the calibration/estimation of some key parameters; the cali-
bration of the remainder are discussed in Appendix B (see Table 5.1 for their values). These
key parameters are all those that vary across cities and the housing ladder parameters in Hr
and Ho. These are estimated in three steps.
1. We initialize the model so that the cross-section of relative prices and wages in a partic-
ular year, 2000, is the same in the model as in the data. We assume ‡j‹ ,‡j‘ , pj2000,W j2000, ”j
vary across cities in the model with respect to land scarcity according to the same (lin-
27Variable superscripts dropped where obvious.
128
ear) relationship estimated in the data.
‡j‹ = –‹ + —‹⁄j (5.1)
‡j‘ = –‘ + —‘⁄j (5.2)
pj2000 = –p + —p⁄j (5.3)
W j2000 = –w + —w⁄j (5.4)
”j = (1≠ –” ≠ —”⁄j)”h (5.5)
We run OLS regressions on equations (5.1) to (5.4), with land scarcity as the indepen-
dent variable, and a range of dependent variables: local price volatility (the standard
deviation over annual growth rates, 1995-2000), wage volatility, price level and wage
level. We take local wage levels from the BEA data of 2000, and estimate price levels
(as discussed above) from the 5 percent census extract of 2000.28 The ”j are set using
the relationship between land share and maintenance described below. This entire step
can be done without computing the household’s problem.
2. We simulate a set of cities with di erent land scarcities, each with 200,000 households.
Each household is born at some date at most 54 years before 2000. For each city, we
draw realizations of the annual innovations to prices and wages so that they equal their
2000 relative value in 2000.
3. We choose the parameters in the housing ladder so that specific moments in the simu-
lated model data best match those in the data in 2000. The values of the housing ladder
parameters are found by repeatedly computing the household’s problem for di erent
values of the parameters (and repeating step 2) and choosing the pair that provides
the best match.29
Housing
We assume that a city’s housing supply is fixed and that homeowners pay a maintenance
cost to replace depreciated housing capital. So, the (growth-adjusted) relationship between
housing depreciation and housing investment is (abusing notation)
”h =
Ih ≠ (pH)
pH
For the aggregate value of housing, pH, we use non-farm owner-occupied housing from the
National Income and Product Accounts’ (NIPA’s) Historical-Cost Net Stock of Residual Fixed
Assets table. Investment in housing is computed using non-farm owner-occupied housing
28Further details about the estimates of the – and — coe cients as well as estimates using alternative
windows for measuring volatility can be found in Appendix C
29A simulated method-of-moments computed over a grid of potential parameter values.
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Table 5.1: Invariant parameters
Parameter Description Value
— Discount factor 0.95
‡ Housing’s share in utility 0.30
„ Inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IIES) 5
“ Risk aversion 3
ty Income tax 0.20
tp Property tax 0.01
‡Í Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic transitory shock 0.25
‡Â Std. dev. of the idiosyncratic permanent shock 0.098
rb Interest rate on loans 6%
rl Interest rate on savings 4%
d Down payment 0.1
◊b Home buyer’s transaction cost 0.08
’ Replacement rate for pensions 0.6
from NIPA’s Historical-cost Investment in Residential Fixed Assets. This gives ”h = 0.017.
These values from NIPA are the value of the structures and do not include the value of land.
For any city, j, 1 ≠ –” ≠ —”⁄j is the share of structure costs in house value. So for each
city, we set ”j = (1 ≠ –” ≠ —”⁄j)”h, where –” = 0.306 and —” = .470 are the intercept and
slope, respectively, of the linear relationship estimated between land share and land scarcity
(see Appendix C for further details). The rent-to-price ratio in the cities will therefore vary
slightly with land scarcity due to changes in ”j.
We allow households to choose any size rental up to a maximum: Hr = (0, hr]. We impose
a minimum owner-occupied house size but no other restriction: Ho = [ho,Œ). We use the
model to set ho and hr so that 1) cities with the mean land scarcity in the model have an
average homeownership rate that matches the fitted homeownership rate at the mean land
scarcity in the data and 2) so that the mean ratio of owner-occupied house sizes to rental
house sizes in the model matches the fitted ratio (in square feet) in the data. Matching
the two moments, the homeownership rate and the relative housing sizes, identifies the two
parameters uniquely. We do not have a formal proof but casual introspection (if ho increases,
then hr must decrease to keep the ownership rate constant, but hr must increase to keep the
relative house size ratio constant) and all computation thus far confirms it.
Prices
To estimate the parameters in the price processes, we match year/city panels of house prices
(from the FHFA) and average wages (from the BEA). These data are used to calculate, for
each city, a covariance matrix of annual growth rates of wages and house prices over 1995-
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Table 5.2: Matched parameters
Parameter Description Mean value Interquartile range
‡‹ Std. dev of shock to wages (corr with house prices) 0.012 0.010-0.013
‡‘ Std. dev of idiosyncratic shock to house prices 0.022 0.015-0.025
ho Min owner-occupied house size 4 4 - 4
hr Max rental house size 8.25 8.25 - 8.25
”j Housing maintenance 0.0112 0.012-0.010
p2000 Price level in 2000 1 0.81 - 1.09
W2000 Wage level in 2000 1 0.96 - 1.02
Price and wage levels are normalized so that prices and wages are equal to one for all cities with
the average level of land scarcity in the year 2000. The units on the house size parameters are median
household earnings for 21 year olds, and these parameters are not changed across cities. The "interquartile
range" is the di erence in the predicted value of the parameter (as predicted from an OLS regression on
land scarcity) between the city at the 25th and 75th percentile of the land scarcity distribution.
200030. We have assumed in the model that ‹jt a ects prices and wages equally. So we could
use either wage growth variance or price-wage growth covariance as alternative estimates for
‡2‹(⁄j). The mean (across cities) wage growth variance (0.00021) is almost twice as large as
the mean price-wage growth covariance (0.00011). However, if we restrict our attention to
the thirty largest cities in the sample, the two statistics do match (they are both 0.00015).
We choose to use the wage growth variances to estimate –‹ and —‹ .
Conditional on –‹ and —‹ , house prices are used to estimate –‘, —‘ and —p. Due to the
homogeneity in our model and since we only set the housing ladder parameters in a later step,
we are free to normalize –w and –p. Table 5.2 shows some moments for the key parameters.
The results from the instrumental variable regressions are available in Appendix C.
5.5 Results
Moments in models and data
Table 5.3 shows the results from the average city by land scarcity compared to the data.
Since the house size parameters were chosen so that the model matched the data on the
homeownership rate and relative house sizes, it is not surprising that we attain a very
good fit along these lines. The model also matches the data well if we consider only those
households 65 years old and younger. Given the model’s relatively simple characterization of
30Results are mostly robust to changes in sample dates with the exception that —Á would go up if the
post-2007 data are used and –‘would go up if the data included either the recent bust or the late 1980’s
bust.
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Table 5.3: Model fit
Data source City sample Data Model
Homeownership rate Census 221 0.62 0.63
Homeownership rate under 65 Census 221 0.61 0.61
Owned/rented home size ratio AHS 42 2.07 2.05
LTV AHS 42 0.84
0.71LTV (conventional loans only) AHS 42 0.80
LTV (conventional loans only) MIRS 25 0.77
This table compares key parameters in the data with the model. The third column
shows the number of cities on which the data estimates are based (see Appendix A for
further details). The fourth column gives the mean (weighted by census sample size)
for the relevant variable across those cities (NB restricting the larger samples to 25
cities has only a negligible e ect on the estimated means). The AHS LTV estimates
are conditional on household characteristics; see Appendix A for further details and the
estimation procedure. We also report the mean LTV across cities for the sample of
conventional loans in the AHS. This makes it more comparable with the LTV estimate
from the MIRS (the final row), whose sample excludes non-conventional loans.
Table 5.4: Homeownership profile: data and model
Age Data source City sample Data: mean Model: mean
21-35 Census 221 0.38 0.25
36-50 Census 221 0.67 0.72
51-65 Census 221 0.76 0.88
66-75 Census 221 0.78 0.68
See notes under Table 5.3. This table reports mean ownership rates by age
group.
post-retirement life, this is also not surprising. Table 5.4 shows that the model also matches
the profile of homeownership relatively well, though there are too few young and too many
middle-aged homeowners. We conjecture that additional heterogeneity, particularly in family
size (which here does not vary within-age), would cure the excess steepness.
Though no parameters were chosen to match the LTV rates (conditional on taking a loan),
the model is able to match the data from the AHS relatively well, however it is somewhat
lower. This is perhaps a result of only having one non-housing asset in the model. In the
data, we do not observe the mortgage net of other financial assets, which is the relevant
variable in the model.
Table 5.5 shows the slopes of linear regressions of city-level homeownership and LTV
on land scarcity in the data and in the model. The model is able to explain much of the
di erence in homeownership and LTV across cities. A ten percentage point increase in land
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Table 5.5: Slopes with respect to land scarcity
age Own: Data Own: Model LTV: Data (AHS) LTV: Data (MIRS) LTV: Model
all ages -0.25** -0.20† -0.07** -0.08** -0.06†
21-35 -0.23** -0.32 -0.09** N/A -0.16
36-50 -0.24** -0.22† -0.05** N/A 0.04
51-65 -0.18** -0.09 -0.08 N/A 0.22
66-75 -0.17** -0.13† 0.02 N/A 0.00†
This table compares cross-city slopes of ownership rates and LTV with respect to land scarcity, for both the
data and model. For the data, reported coe cients are taken from cross-city OLS regressions (weighted by
census sample size) of mean ownership or LTV (for the age group in question) on land scarcity. The local
ownership and AHS LTV estimates are conditional on observed household characteristics (see Appendix A for
estimation procedure), but not the MIRS. Also, there is no available disaggregation of the MIRS data by age
group. Cross-city OLS regressions on simulated data weight all cities equally and do not control for household
characteristics (since the sample of households in each city is the same). ** signifies that the estimate from
the data is significant at the 95 percent confidence level. † signifies that the model estimate falls within the
95 percent confidence interval of the data.
scarcity implies a decrease in homeownership of 2.5 and 2.0 percentage points in the data and
model, respectively. Likewise, the same increase in land scarcity implies a decrease in LTV
of 0.7 and 0.6 percentage points in the data and model, respectively. Generally speaking,
the di erence in homeownership rates across land scarcity declines with age, a pattern which
the model matches.31
As in the data, the relationship between LTV and land scarcity for the most part becomes
less negative with age, turning positive for the older ages (although the coe cients are not
significant for these ages). The shortcoming of not being able to observe net financial assets
in the data is likely to be more acute for older households that have accrued savings, and
perhaps explains why the increase in the coe cients is sharper in the model than in the data.
Fortunately, late-life LTV figures are relatively inconsequential for the cross-city dispersion:
in the data, 80 percent of new loans are taken by households under 50 and 97 percent by
households under 65. Thus the restriction that, in the model, households over 65 are not
allowed to take new loans is probably not important for the LTV results.
Counterfactuals
In the data and the model, cities with high price volatility have lower homeownership rates
and LTVs, but they also have high price levels, high wages, among other di erences. To
disentangle these di erent contributions, we simulate five variations to the baseline model
31This may explain why Sinai and Souleles (2005) find a positive e ect on ownership from the interaction
between mobility (which is negatively correlated with age) and rent volatility (which is positively correlated
with land scarcity).
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Table 5.6: Contribution from various elements: slopes with respect to land scarcity
Parameter Homeownership: slopes LTV: slopes
‡‹ -0.02 -0.01
‡‘ -0.03 -0.01
”j -0.01 0.01
p2000 -0.23 0.02
W2000 0.04 0.00
economy, each time allowing only one of the parameters to vary keeping the other parameters
at their mean land scarcity values. Since the parameters have di erent implicit units, for
comparability we again look at slopes with respect to land scarcity. In two of the counter-
factuals, we allow the variances to vary by land scarcity according to equations 5.1 and 5.2,
respectively. In a third and fourth, we simulate cities with di erent land scarcities so that
they have relative prices or wages in the year 2000 that vary according to equations 5.3 and
5.4, respectively. In the final counterfactual, we vary the maintenance in cities according to
equation 5.5. Table 5.6 shows the coe cient from regressing homeownership and LTV on
land scarcity from each of the counterfactual economies, so highlighting each parameter’s
contribution to the cross-city di erences generated by the model.
The largest contributor to the cross-city dispersion in homeownership is dispersion in the
level of house prices. Changes in risk do a ect homeownership slightly. But the results show
that higher risk reduces homeownership; households, on balance, do not use homeownership
to insure themselves against housing risk. Instead, the model suggests higher risk leads to
lower LTVs.
Di erences in price levels and homeownership
Di erences in prices create di erences in homeownership through the housing ladder. In
both the data and the model, households live in larger houses when they live in cheaper
cities, and the di erence in sizes is larger for owners than for renters32. So, households in
cheaper cities, living in larger houses, are more likely to choose to own due to a binding
maximum rental constraint, while households in the expensive cities are more likely to rent
due to a binding minimum owner-occupied house size constraint. Likewise, di erences in
wages work similarly, though the total e ect is smaller. Everything else equal, higher wages
in the land-scarce cities leads to higher housing consumption and, due to the housing ladder,
higher homeownership (consistent with findings from Coulson and Fisher, 2009).
32The square-footage di erence in the data (using the AHS, all reported di erences statistically significant)
between the 75th percentile and the 25th percentile city by land scarcity is 21 percent, while in the model the
size di erence is 19 percent of the average size house. For owners, the di erence in house size is 15 percent
and 17 percent in the data and model respectively. For renters the di erence is 13 percent and 9 percent,
respectively.
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In our simulations, households respond to lower prices by increasing housing consumption,
which leads to higher homeownership due to the housing ladder. Therefore, households that
adjust their tenure decision in response to local prices are likely doing so to adjust their
housing consumption. And so, holding housing consumption fixed, we should expect to
see no e ect of price on tenure decisions. In other words, prices a ect tenure choices only
through the price’s e ect on housing consumption.
In the data, a critical margin of adjustment in housing consumption is between apart-
ments and houses.33According to our census sample, almost all houses (85 percent) are owned
and almost all apartments (87 percent) are rented. Interestingly though, among owned prop-
erties, LTV ratios (predicted for 2000 from the AHS) are almost identical across dwelling
types: 0.84 for houses and 0.86 for apartments.34
In Figure 5.11, we plot the relationship between conditional homeownership rates and
prices across MSAs, by dwelling type: full sample, houses only and apartments only. The
estimated e ect of prices on ownership rates is more than three times as large for the full
sample as the houses-only sample. And, the relationship for apartments is actually slightly
positive. Clearly then, adjustments in housing consumption (in this case, between dwelling
types) play an important part in driving the overall price-ownership relationship. Also,
Figure 5.11 suggests that New York is an outlier in Figure 5.1 because it has more apartments
per unit of housing than the typical city with its land scarcity.
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Figure 5.11: Homeownership-price relationship by dwelling type
33Based on US census data, we have defined an “apartment” as a housing unit that shares its structure
with one or more other housing units; a “house” is a single-unit structure. Note that “houses” need not be
entirely detached from other structures: a housing unit attached to another unit by a full-height dividing
wall, that goes from ground to roof, is here defined as a “house”.
34These two statistics are means of local conditional LTVs across the 42 cities in our sample (for houses
and apartments respectively), where the conditional LTVs are estimated as described in Appendix A.
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Figure 5.12: LTV-price relationship by dwelling type
In contrast to the tenure choice, the LTV decision (conditional on ownership) is not
strongly related to housing consumption. This suggests the mechanism driving these LTV
results is independent of the housing ladder (instead, we argue below that insurance motives
are important). In Figure 5.12, we plot LTV-price relationships for the full sample, and
separately for houses and apartments. This time, the e ects of log prices are negative for
both dwelling types; they are also very similar in magnitude: -0.060 for houses and -0.064
for apartments. It is clear that composition e ects are not driving the relationship for LTV.
Homeownership and within-city di erences
In a general equilibrium model, the homeownership-as-insurance e ect may lead to higher
price-to-rent ratios (as in Nordvik (2001); Sinai and Souleles (2005); Han (2013)) rather
than higher homeownership rates in cities with high price volatility35. So Sinai and Souleles
(2005) looks at how di erences in rental volatility across cities tilts the homeownership-by-
age profile within cities. They find that riskier cities have steeper profiles, increasing faster
before age 60 and then decreasing faster afterward.36 This evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that households use homeownership as insurance: younger households (which are
more likely to move shortly) are more likely to rent when volatility is high, whereas older
households are more likely to own.
In our data and model, we too find a steeper profile in cities with high land scarcity and
thus high volatility.37 So we can use our counterfactuals to find the cause of the change in the
35Ortalo-Magne and Prat (2010) build a model where insurance e ects imply that homeownership and
price-to-rent ratios are positively correlated.
36More exactly, they impute a household’s expected duration in a home using the proportion of households
within the same age-occupation-education cell in an MSA that did not move the previous year. They find
that propensities to own are increasing in this proxy interacted with rental volatility (see Table II, columns
2 and 3 from their paper). Halket and Vasudev (2013) show that di erences in expected duration vary
substantially by age - in part due to endogenous di erences in tenure. Sinai and Souleles (2005) interaction
result implies a steeper age profile in riskier cities (see Figure I from their paper).
37From Table 5.5, homeownership rates decline with land scarcity faster earlier in the life cycle. Our data
does not show a significant steepening post age 65 however.
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Table 5.7: Ownership slopes with respect to land scarcity for select counterfactuals
age ‡‹ ‡‘ p2000
21-35 -0.035 -0.046 -0.23
36-50 -0.026 -0.049 -0.19
51-65 -0.005 -0.010 -0.14
66-75 0.003 -0.007 -0.39
steepness of the profiles. Table 5.7 shows that the age profiles of homeownership are steeper
in riskier cites and in more expensive cities. Higher risk leads to lower homeownership for all
age levels. However, the change in steepness due to changes in the volatilities is consistent
with the insurance hypothesis - both the ‡‹ and the ‡Á slopes increase by about .03 from
the age 21-35 cell to the age 51-65 cell. If, like Sinai and Souleles (2005), we used only the
change in the steepness of the profiles to identify the e ect of risk on homeownership, we
would find that more risk leads to more homeownership. Quantitatively though, the change
in steepness due to changes in price levels is almost three times as large as either change
from the volatility parameters, implying that a sizable proportion of the e ect that Sinai
and Souleles (2005) find may not be due to risk. Instead, our model finds that most of the
observed large change in age profiles is because the housing ladder is more relevant at earlier
ages.
Di erences in risk and LTV
Higher risk has a small e ect on homeownership, but accounts for all of land-scarce cities’
lower LTVs. This is for two reasons. Firstly, households save more in the high variance cities,
in part due to higher price volatility but also due to high wage volatility. Renting is a partial
hedge against falls in wages that are correlated with rents and prices. However, households
will not completely insure themselves against falls in wages through rental housing, since
doing so would distort their housing consumption greatly. So households also hold more
total wealth in the high co-variance economies. This extra total wealth leads to lower LTVs
when the households do decide to purchase a house.
Model households do view homeownership as a potential source of insurance; but it
is a highly imperfect variety of insurance. Housing comprises about 25 to 30 percent of
expenditures in the model, so households would like homeownership to comprise about the
same amount in their total wealth portfolio (including human capital) for insurance purposes.
However, most renters would have to leverage their financial wealth greatly to buy a home,
leaving them near the borrowing constraint and particularly exposed to large falls in house
prices, which are more likely in risky cities. Large falls in prices can leave their budget sets
particularly small. So households in riskier cities defer housing purchases until they can
a ord to buy the house with lower leverage.38 This is consistent with our finding that the
38These are two sides of similar coins: households worry about the risk that their house will be expensive
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share of homeowners that purchase their house without a mortgage is not correlated with
risk (or land scarcity) in the data: households with this much financial wealth in the model
are not troubled by the borrowing constraint.
There are also transaction costs: more risk leads to more mobility and lower expected
durations in any given house. Since adjusting owner-occupied housing is costly, this decreases
the value of owning and thus the ownership rate. For instance, in the ‡‘ counterfactual,
the homeownership rate for households under 35 in a typical low land scarcity city (25th
percentile) economy is 2 percentage points higher than its counterpart at the 75th percentile.
If we eliminate transactions costs, the (negative) slope of homeownership with respect to land
scarcity halves in both risk counterfactuals. In other words, households optimally prefer to
self-insure with a risk-free bond, which does not have transactions costs, does not distort
the intratemporal consumption bundle and does not compel asset-poor households (which
young would-be homeowners largely are) to over-leverage themselves, rather than insure with
housing even though housing is the only asset whose return is correlated with the some of
the risks the household faces.
Households do own slightly larger houses in the higher variance economies but there is
little evidence of a housing ladder e ect as discussed in Banks et al. (2010). Their theory is
that households that expect to consume more housing than a rental can provide later in life
anticipate owning later in life and therefore households in economies with high risk will seek
to insure themselves against the risk that prices may be high in the future, when they are
likely to own a large house, by purchasing (rather than renting) a small house earlier.
Theoretically, the overall strength of the “ladder e ect” is particularly dependent on the
nature of the housing ladder assumptions. A very rigid ladder (where, say, the minimum
owner-occupied size equaled the maximum rental available, such as in Banks et al. (2010))
can potentially have large average e ects early in the life cycle. However, a rigid ladder
with a low maximum rental size would not enable our model to match the relative housing
consumption of renting versus owning households seen in the data. More importantly, if the
ladder e ect were large, new homeowners should be willing to buy housing with lower down
payments in order to own sooner in riskier cities. From the price level counterfactual, we do
see that households would opt for higher leverage purchases in expensive cities in order to
climb the housing ladder. If more risk also led households to try and climb the ladder faster
via larger loans, the model would not be able to match the higher down payments (lower
LTVs) in land scarce cities in the data.
Finally, the e ect of di ering maintenance costs is small: maintenance after all is only
part of the cost of housing. Relatively high maintenance in low land scarcity economies
makes owner-occupancy relatively more attractive as it increases the tax wedge in the user-
cost formula, leading to very slightly higher homeownership rates and LTV ratios.
at the time of purchase and also the risk that their house falls in value after buying it.
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5.6 Regression-based inferences
We use a life-cycle model of homeownership to ask whether households are more likely to
own when housing market volatility is higher. Our approach has been to document stylised
facts based on a cross-section of cities, which we interpret using a calibrated model. Other
studies on this topic have exploited variation in price or rent volatility within cities over
time to empirically identify the e ect on ownership. Before concluding, we wish to use the
language of our model to caution against such an approach.
A household’s decision to become a homeowner is a durable decision. The durability of
this decision means that at the aggregate (city) level, homeownership rates are not only a
function of contemporaneous prices, but also of lagged prices. For instance, take a city in
the model that has high prices today but had low prices in previous years (with constant
wages) and compare it to another city with the same high prices today but that also had high
prices in the past. Let these two cities be otherwise identical in that households in the two
cities have the same expectations with regard to price levels and volatilities going forward
(i.e. these two cities have the same land scarcity value). In other words, households with the
same current state values today will make the same choices in each of the two cities today.
Note, however, that an econometrician using historical prices to measure current expected
housing volatility39will regard the first city as having higher expected volatility relative to
the second city.
In this case, the city that is measured by the econometrician as “riskier” today will also
have a higher homeownership rate today relative to the second city. This is because prices in
the first city were lower in the past, which led some households then to want to live in bigger
houses which meant they were more likely to own (due to the housing ladder constraints).
When prices rise to their current level, many households will not choose to immediately
downsize, so ownership rates remain high relative to the second city. Therefore there is error
in the measurement of expected price volatility which is correlated with variables that do
explain di erences in homeownership rates (historical price levels), and so estimates of the
e ect of expected volatility on homeownership may be biased.
Two particular attributes of this bias are worth mentioning. First, the direction of the bias
will generally depend on the direction of price movements: in the above example, the bias is
positive; if the first city instead had prices that fell to the same level as the second city, then
the bias would be negative. Second, the magnitudes of the bias are not generally symmetric:
positive shocks to prices lead to tighter borrowing constraints and so some households are
unable to own, whereas negative shocks relax borrowing constraints and so some households
are now able (but not required) to own.
39Sinai and Souleles, 2005 and Banks et al., 2010 measure volatility using a 9-year window and a 5-year
rolling window of realized volatilities, respectively, in their regressions. Han (2010) and Han (2013) use an
AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) process to model expectations.
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Conclusion
Our model is able to explain much of the cross-city variation in homeownership and LTV and
matches the variation in the data for younger households. We find that it is the relatively
higher prices in cities with scarce land which causes their lower homeownership rates, while
it is their relatively higher volatility that causes homeowners in these cities to borrow less.
So, we do not find that more risk leads households to own more. Instead, more risk leads
perhaps to a higher reliance on non-housing savings. This result highlights the importance
of including other means of imperfect insurance in asset allocation models with incomplete
markets. Land scarcity has a larger e ect on LTV in the data than in the model. So it is
probable that there are other channels through which risk may a ect LTV that are precluded
in our model. For instance, it is possible that households in risky cities hold the same amount
of wealth but take smaller mortgages due to, perhaps, higher propensities to move and the
presence of prepayment penalties that are proportional to the mortgage balance.
The main question explored in this chapter concerns homeownership and insurance. Sev-
eral of the facts developed in this chapter - the relationships between land values, land
scarcity and house prices, and between housing availability (the housing ladder) and home-
ownership - beg further examination and a full structural explanation. It would also be
worth using a general equilibrium version of the model to examine the di erent local e ects
of aggregate (country-wide) shocks. Finally, it would be useful to explore whether land
scarcity, via LTV, can help explain any recent geographical patterns in mortgage defaults.
If our model allowed for default, households may perhaps be more likely to own in volatile
cities (though this would then perhaps also imply that households would borrow more in
these cities). This of course depends on the particulars of the contracting problem between
lenders and households.40
A. Data construction and supplementary estimates
A.1 Construction of conditional ownership rates and LTVs
Here, we describe the construction of the conditional measures of local ownership rates
and mean LTV used in cross-city analysis. For homeownership, we first run a probit-level
regression (using the full national sample) of an ownership dummy on various characteristics
of the household head41, together with a full set of MSA e ects. Then, for each MSA, we use
the regression estimates to predict the ownership rate corresponding to a household with the
mean characteristics in each dimension.42 To estimate conditional local ownership rates for a
40See Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011); Corbae and Quintin (2011); Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009);
Guler (2010); Jeske et al. (2011) for various models of default and home ownership.
41Quadratic in age, education dummies (high school graduate, 1-3 years of college, 4 year + of college),
gender, marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 (1, 2, 3+), ethnicity dummies (black,
Hispanic) and log household income.
42Because the regression is non-linear, the mean of our “conditional” ownership rates will not equal the
mean unconditional rate. Therefore, we recenter all observations by a constant to correct for this.
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particular demographic group (e.g. an age category), we follow exactly the same procedure,
but from the beginning (i.e. even before the probit regression) restrict the sample to the
relevant demographic group.
As described above, we have two alternative sources of city-specific LTV data: the AHS
and MIRS. The AHS is a longitudinal survey, containing detailed information on housing-
related variables. The metropolitan survey covers 41 MSAs, and booster samples of a further
6 MSAs (the largest) are included in the national survey43. Of these 47 cities, we have land
scarcity data on 42; and, we base our AHS analysis on this set of 42. The AHS surveys
cover di erent MSAs in di erent waves, and we therefore rely on four di erent waves to put
together a complete sample for cross-city analysis: the metropolitan surveys of 1998, 2002 and
2004, and the national survey of 2001. We index observations by year of purchase (rather
than survey year), because we have information on the loan amount and home price (to
calculate LTV) at the purchase year. We restrict our sample to households with mortgages,
and we only study details of mortgages which were taken out when the home was purchased.
The last condition ensures that we measure the loan and price in the same year to calculate
LTV.
As with the ownership rates, all reported local LTVs from the AHS are conditional on
characteristics of the household head44. Also, since the AHS samples are not large, we
include all households that purchased their home up to five years prior to the survey year (so
the full dataset spans purchase years 1993-2004) to predict LTVs in 2000. The consequent
overlapping (in terms of purchase year) of the di erent waves allows us to identify MSA
e ects. Specifically, we run an OLS regression of LTV on household characteristics, purchase
year dummies and MSA dummies45. And, we predict LTV in each MSA for a household
with the mean characteristics in each dimension46, who purchased their home in 2000. To
43In the national survey, the samples for cities other than these 6 are insu cient to derive reliable city-
specific statistics.
44Quadratic in age (at purchase year), education dummies (high school graduate, 1-3 years of college, 4
year + of college), gender, marital status, dummies for number of children under 18 at purchase year (1, 2,
3+), ethnicity dummies (black, Hispanic) and log household income (deflated by CPI to 2000 dollars). To
predict number of children at purchase year, we count the number of children currently in the family who
would have been under 18 at the purchase year; of course, children born between the purchase and survey
years are not included.
45In this regression, we exclude a number of observations which have suspect LTV values. First, we
exclude observations with home purchase prices and loans below $5,000 and LTV ratios above 1.2. Second,
the AHS includes a number of imputed values for mortgage size; we exclude these observations, because
the imputations are not conditional on MSA. There is also a problem with top-coding, discussed in Davis
and Palumbo (2008). In the metropolitan surveys, the top code values for house price and loan amount are
calculated by city (as the mean value of the top-coded observations), which is ideal for our purposes. But,
this is not the case for the (relatively expensive) cities with booster samples in the national survey: there, a
national top code is used. In our sample, 10 percent of observations in New York are top-coded, 9 percent in
Los Angeles, and 5 percent in Chicago. Our approach is to exclude all top-coded observations in the national
survey from the regression. However, we take some assurance from the fact that we control in the regression
for household characteristics that are correlated with top codes (e.g. household income, education); see the
following footnote.
46When estimating the means of household characteristics, we include in our sample all excluded observa-
tions detailed in the previous footnote. This should partially address the problem of omitted top codes in
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estimate “conditional” LTV for a particular group (e.g. an age category or loan type), we
follow exactly the same procedure, but from the beginning (i.e. even before the predicting
regression) restrict the sample to the relevant group.
A.2 Conforming and non-conforming loans
Here, we consider the impact of conforming loan limits.47 The existence of this nationally
uniform loan limit may well be responsible for our LTV result. In more expensive cities, the
conforming loan limit is more likely to bind. As a result, households will be forced to make
a larger down payment (to qualify for the cheaper rates on conforming loans). And, this
will yield a negative correlation between price and LTV (and consequently, between price
risk and LTV too). If the conforming loan limit is driving our results, then the e ect should
be stronger the closer the loan size is to the conforming loan limit: increases in land value
would be less likely to lead to increases in loan value if that means the household will go
over the conforming loan size limit.
To test whether the loan limit is driving this e ect, we check the LTV-price level/volatility
correlation in samples delineated by the ratio of loan size to loan limit (restricting our atten-
tion to households with conventional mortgages). It turns out, though, that the correlation
is strongly negative (especially) for loans well below the limit and less so for loans close to
the limit. So, we conclude that the loan limit cannot be responsible for the correlation.
The results are reported in Table 5.8. In each case, observations are at household-level,
and the dependent variable is LTV. The regressor of interest is price volatility in Panel A
and log house price in Panel B. Also included are a range of household-level controls (see
the table notes) and a full set of purchase year fixed e ects (we only include households that
purchased their home between 1993 and 2004).
the national survey (we essentially predict the LTV of the top-coded observations, based on their observed
characteristics).
47Mortgages in the United States fall into di erent categories. Mortgage loans may either be conventional
or non-conventional. To qualify for a conventional loan, households must pass credit and income tests
(known as PITI tests: principal-interest-taxes-insurance). If they cannot a ord a threshold down payment
(often as high as 20 percent), they will also have to purchase PMI (private mortgage insurance) to qualify
for a conventional loan. Non-conventional loans are guaranteed by the government, through the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) or Department of Veteran A airs (VA). They tend to be more appropriate
for households that require a large LTV. Conventional loans may either be conforming or nonconforming.
Loans are conforming if they fall below a dollar threshold, which varies with time. Until 2008, this threshold
was nationally uniform (our sample excludes years after 2008). Conforming loans are subject to cheaper
rates, because they are more liquid: Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac will provide guarantees enabling a lender
to sell them to the secondary market. See, for example,Caplin et al. (1997) for further detail.
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Table 5.8: Regressions of LTV on price volatilities and levels, for samples delineated by the
loan-limit ratio
PANEL A: PRICE VOLATILITIES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: loan/limit 0-0.25 0.25-0.5 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 1-1.25 1.25-1.5 >1.5
House price volatility -4.882*** -1.593*** -0.587 -0.223 -0.552 -0.767 -0.474
(1.653) (0.586) (0.392) (0.483) (0.380) (0.455) (0.863)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,360 4,566 3,285 1,506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.051 0.020 0.007 0.008 0.055 0.099 0.169
PANEL B: PRICE LEVELS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample: loan/limit 0-0.25 0.25-0.5 0.5-0.75 0.75-1 1-1.25 1.25-1.5 >1.5
Log house price -0.388*** -0.116*** -0.042*** -0.005 -0.031* -0.042** -0.055
(0.051) (0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.033)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Purchase year e ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,360 4,566 3,285 1,506 550 275 304
MSAs 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.119 0.037 0.012 0.008 0.060 0.108 0.189
Regressions are run separately for samples delineated by loan-to-limit ratio (the ratio of loan size to
conforming loan limit, reported above each column). For each sample, we separately estimate the e ect
of price volatility (in Panel A) and log price level (in Panel B) on household-level LTV. All regressions
control for the household characteristics listed earlier in Appendix A (i.e. those used to condition the
local LTV estimates), as well as a full set of purchase year e ects. We use the composite sample described
earlier in Appendix A, though we exclude all household with non-conventional mortgages. There are 42
MSAs in the sample. SEs, clustered by city, in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Regressions are disaggregated into samples delineated by the loan-limit ratio. Also, the
sample is restricted to households with conventional mortgages (we are interested in the
impact of the conforming loan limit). The loan-limit ratio for each sample is reported at the
top of the columns (0-0.25, 0.25-0.5, 0.5-0.75, 0.75-1, 1-1.25, 1.25-1.5 and >1.5).
The e ect on LTV is negative in all samples for both price volatility and levels. For
volatility (Panel A), the e ect is very large and statistically significant for the 0-0.25 sample
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(-4.9) and the 0.25-0.5 sample (-1.6). But, the e ects for all the other samples fall below 0.8
and are statistically insignificant. The e ects around the conforming loan limit (0.75-1 and
1-1.25) actually tend to be smaller than elsewhere. This suggests that the negative e ect is
not being driven by some interaction with the conforming loan limit. The patterns are very
similar for price level in Panel B, though more of the samples are statistically significant.
A.3 Local variation in e ective interest rates
An alternative hypothesis is that banks subject households in riskier cities to higher mortgage
interest rates - and this could explain the lower ownership rate in these cities. Similarly, it
could explain why households in these cities choose to take out smaller loans (relative to
home value). Interest rates may also vary across cities because of di erences in state-level
regulation.
However, it turns out that e ective interest rates48 are actually lower in expensive/risky/land-
scarce cities. This is illustrated by Figure 5.13, using data from the MIRS on 25 major cities.
There is a strong negative correlation across cities between the interest rate and both price
risk and level (R squared is 40-50 percent in each case). The interest rate varies from 7
percent in the most expensive/risky/land-scarce cities to 8 percent in the least. And so, this
cannot explain why ownership rates and LTV ratios are also lower in expensive cities.
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Figure 5.13: E ective mortgage interest rate, price risk and price levels
A.4 Dynamic wealth explanations
The lower LTVs in land-scarce cities might also be explained by the contemporaneous emer-
gence of significant local wealth, allowing homebuyers to put down large deposits (with more
modest loan requirements). In particular, this wealth may originate from recent local house
price growth: as argued above, land-scarce cities tend to experience larger price booms (and
busts). In Figure 5.14, we plot local house price growth separately for recent decades (1980s,
1990s, 2000s) against land scarcity49. Prices grew significantly faster in land-scarce cities in
48“E ective” because it accounts for any up-front fees
49Local price growth is estimated from the IPUMS census extracts of 1980, 1990 and 2000 and the American
Community Survey of 2010. The sample size in these plots varies across periods because the sample of MSAs
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the 1980s and 2000s.
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Figure 5.14: House price growth and land scarcity, by decade
If wealth e ects from house price trends are responsible for the LTV results, we should
find that the patterns are driven by purchases by previous homeowners rather than first-time
buyers. Fortunately, the AHS data allow us to estimate conditional LTV separately for each
of these buyer types. In Figure 5.15, we plot conditional LTV (in 2000) on land scarcity,
separately for previous homeowners and first-time buyers. Reassuringly, the coe cient of
the OLS-estimated slope is identical in each case (0.09). This suggests that housing wealth
e ects are not driving the results.
It is true that the down payments of first time buyers may be funded by relatives,
who have benefited from growing local housing wealth. However, only a small fraction
of households (5 percent in our sample) report that the main source of their down payment
was an inheritance or gift. Re-estimating the results without these households makes only a
negligible di erence to these results.
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Washington
.
75
.
8
.
85
.
9
.
95
LT
V,
 2
00
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Land scarcity
Coeff: −.09 (.027), R2: .217, N: 42
First−time buyers
Boston
Chicago
Dallas
Detroit
Los Angeles
New York
Philadelphia
San Francisco
Washington
.
65
.
7
.
75
.
8
.
85
.
9
LT
V,
 2
00
0
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Land scarcity
Coeff: −.087 (.047), R2: .08, N: 42
Previous homeowners
Figure 5.15: LTV and land scarcity, by buyer type
An alternative source of expanding local wealth is contemporaneous wage growth. How-
ever, Figure 5.16 shows that the growth of average wages in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s is
is not identical in each census cross-section. Note that the geographical definitions of these MSAs has also
changed over time, as the cities have expanded.
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uncorrelated with the land scarcity instrument.50
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Figure 5.16: Wage growth and land scarcity, by decade
A.5 Land share, price levels and volatilities
In this section, we explain why land share is an important factor for both house price levels
and volatilities. Consider first the cross-city variation in price levels. The first panel of Figure
5.17 shows that there is substantial variation across cities in house price levels (the range
covers two log points). But, comparing the final two panels of Figure 5.17, the cross-city
variation in structure costs is negligible: it is land values that are driving the large variation
in house prices. Clearly then, cities with larger land shares will have higher house prices.
In further results in Appendix C, we confirm that the e ect on price levels comes entirely
through the land value component (structure costs are uncorrelated with land share).
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Figure 5.17: Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value levels
Next, consider the variation in house price volatilities, that is, the standard deviations
over annual growth rates. As with the price levels, the first panel of Figure 5.18 reveals
50Local wage growth is estimated from the IPUMS census extracts of 1980, 1990 and 2000 and the American
Community Survey of 2010.
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large variation in volatilities, ranging from 0.006 to 0.075. It turns out that the covariance
between the growth rates of land and structure costs within a city over time is, on average,
negligible. And so, the standard deviation of house price growth over time within a city can
be approximated as:
‡j(ghpjt ) ¥ lj,t‡j(glvjt) + (1≠ lj,t)‡j(gscjt ), (5.6)
where ljt is land share, and glvjt , gscjt and ghpjt are the annual growth rates of land values,
structure costs and house prices, respectively. In Appendix C, we show that the volatilities
of land values and structure costs are individually uncorrelated with land shares. And, as
can be seen in Figure 5.18, the volatility of land value is an order of magnitude larger than
the volatility of structure costs. Therefore, according to equation 5.6, house price volatility
will be strongly positively correlated with land share - through a composition e ect. And
indeed, Figure 5.6 confirms that both local house prices levels and volatilities are increasing
in land share51.
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Figure 5.18: Histograms of city price, structure cost and land value volatilities
B. Parametrization
B.1 Household life-cycle and preferences
We calibrate the discount factor, — = 0.95, and housing’s share in the utility function,
‡ = 0.3 following Favilukis et al. (2010) and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, „ = 5, following Piazzesi et al. (2007). Estimates of risk aversion vary widely,
particularly when the parameter is separately identified from the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. Some studies have point estimates with “ = 20 or higher but with equally
large confidence intervals (see Attanasio and Weber (1989); Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio
(2003), and, for values over 100, Yogo (2006)). Since such a large value of “ would imply
an outlandish level of precautionary savings in our model, we choose “ = 3, which is well
51Reported land share is the mean over the four quarters of 2000, based on estimates from Davis and
Palumbo (2008).
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within the more traditional range of two to five that most studies prefer (see Lustig and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2010); Hryshko et al. (2010); Li and Yao (2007)).
B.1.1 Family size equivalence
We collect data from the period 1970-1993 in the Current Population Survey (CPS). We
control for year e ects by using year dummies. The family size profile is generated by the
regression:
Fiat =
81ÿ
k=21
—k1k +
1993ÿ
tÕ=1970
—tÕ1tÕ + ‘iat
where 1k is a year dummy which takes on value 1 when a = k, and 1tÕ is the year dummy
that takes on value 1 when tÕ = t.
Figure 5.19 shows the profiles of family size from the CPS. Family size increases sharply
when the household is young, peaking at age 39.
In order to adjust the household’s housing and consumption stream, we use a household
equivalence scale. The objective of an equivalence scale is to measure the change in consump-
tion needed to keep the welfare of the family constant as the family size varies. Note that
using per capita consumption assumes that the family converts consumption expenditure
into utility flow following constant returns to scale. Lazear and Michael (1980) point to the
existence of family goods, economies of scale and complementarities, which are all factors
that they show to be significant. We therefore use a household equivalence scale that is not
constant returns to scale. Table 5.6 lists some equivalence scales. L-M stands for Lazear
and Michael (1980), US Dept of Commerce refers to US Department of Commerce (1991)
and F-V&K stands for Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007). Lazear and Michael’s scale
takes greater account of common or public goods, so that the impact of family size is less
than other equivalence scales (compare, for instance, Orshansky (1965)). We use the housing
equivalence scale used by Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007).
All households in the model economy have the same life-cycle profile of family size, which
is set to the average family size at each age in the CPS. To account for non-integer family
sizes, we assume that the adjustment factor is linear within the family sizes specified in Table
5.6. Figure 5.19 shows the equivalent, normalized family size over the life cycle.
Table 5.9: Family size equivalence scale
Family Size L-M Orshansky (1965) US Dept of Commerce F-V&K
1 100 100 100 100
2 106 126 128 134
3 128 151 157 165
4 147 189 201 197
5 169 223 237 227
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Figure 5.19: L-M adjusted family size profile (yearly bins)
B.2 Assets
We set the down payment requirement, d = .1. We set the transaction cost of buying,
◊b = .08, within the range typically chosen by the literature (Martin (2003); Fisher and
Gervais (2011)). We set the interest rates rl = .04. The average di erence between a 30 year
fixed rate mortgage and the 30 year U.S. Treasury bond is between 1 percent and 2 percent
for 1977-2010 so we set rb = .06.
B.2.1 Initial wealth distribution
We calibrate the wealth distribution of newborns using the distribution of wealth among
21-25 year olds in the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) waves from 1989-2001. We drop
top-coded observations, households with negative wealth, and students from the sample and
use the sample weights provided by the SCF. We parametrize the initial wealth distribution
as an exponential distribution. That gives us one parameter that we have to match.
f(b0) = ⁄we≠⁄wb0
where b0 is the initial wealth, and ⁄w is the parameter to estimate in the exponential distri-
bution. We estimate ⁄w by matching the mean of the initial wealth distribution.
⁄w =
1
b0
This gives us ⁄w = 0.00589. We convert the initial wealth distribution in the data to model
terms by scaling by the ratio of average labor earnings at age 21 in the model to average
labor earnings at age 21 in the data.
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B.3 Taxes
There are two forms of taxes in the model economy - income tax, ty, and property tax, tp.
Piketty and Saez (2007) use public use micro-files of tax return data from the Internal Rev-
enue Service, which have the advantage of being aggregated to the household level already.
The income tax rate we choose, ty = 0.2, is in the same range that they compute for the US
economy52.
We use data from the IPUMS 1990 5 percent sample. The variables used are the amount
of property tax paid and the estimated value of the house. We remove top-coded variables
from the sample, and consider only owner-occupiers. Sample observations are weighted
using the household weights given in the data set. The weighted average of the ratio of the
amount of property tax paid to the estimated value of the house is 0.012. In the model we
set tp = 0.01.
B.4 Earnings process
We parametrize the idiosyncratic and age-profile portion of the household’s earnings following
Halket and Vasudev (2013), who estimate a process similar to Storesletten et al. (2004a) but
also control for regional variability (in their case, at the U.S. state level) in earnings rather
than just national variability. We set the standard deviation of idiosyncratic innovations,
‡Â = .098 and let the initial (fixed e ect) distribution have a standard deviation of 0.5 (since
the persistent component of earning follows a random walk, a fixed e ect is equivalent to
households entering at age 21 with a value Âi21 drawn from normal distribution with standard
deviation 0.5). As is well known, the variance of the transitory shock is not separately easily
identified from the variance of measurement error in these approaches to estimation. We set
‡Í = .25, which is within bounds found by Storesletten et al. (2004b); Blundell et al. (2008)
We discretize the innovations with a 3-point distribution following Tauchen (1986).
We set the pension at 60 percent of final earnings, ’ = 0.6.
C. Further robustness exercises (online appendix of the
published paper)
C.1 Robustness checks for homeownership and LTV e ects
Here, we check for robustness in the impact of price levels and volatilities on ownership
(Table 5.10) and LTV (Table 5.11). We report results for both OLS and IV (with land
scarcity as the instrument), for volatilities measured using di erent windows (5 years, as in
the main text, and 10 years also), for di erent year cross-sections (2000, as in the main text,
and 1990 also), and for di erent datasets for LTV (AHS and MIRS).
52See Table 1, page 6 in their paper
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Table 5.10: E ects on homeownership of price, volatility and land scarcity
Year sample 2000 1990
OLS IV Observations OLS IV Obs
Log house price -0.235*** -0.254*** 221 -0.214*** -0.233*** 191
(0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.022)
Volatility (5yr window) -4.952*** -6.755*** 221 -2.815*** -8.162*** 153
(0.402) (0.795) (0.228) (2.132)
Volatility (10yr window) -4.378*** -5.689*** 215 -2.630*** -13.390** 98
(0.323) (0.642) (0.519) (5.552)
Land scarcity -0.245*** - 221 -0.263*** - 191
(0.032) - (0.036) -
This table reports coe cients from linear cross-city regressions of the local homeownership rate for
both 2000 and 1990 on a range of variables: log house price, two measures of volatility (5yr and
10yr windows) and land scarcity. For the IV results, we use land scarcity as an instrument for prices
and volatility. Note that 1990 has fewer observations because the set of MSAs in the census changed
between 1990 and 2000. Local homeownership rates are conditional on household characteristics, and
are constructed as described in Section 2.1 in the main text, using the IPUMS 5 percent census extracts
of 1990 and 2000. We include volatility measures (constructed as described in Section 2.1) for both
a 5 year window (i.e 1995-2000 for 2000; 1985-1990 for 1990) and a 10 year window (1990-2000 for
2000; 1980-1990 for 1990). The 1990 samples are smaller beause the set of MSAs has changed between
years. And, the samples for some volatility windows are smaller because the FHFA time series for
prices are longer for some cities than others. All regressions are weighted by census sample counts. SEs
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.11: E ects on LTV of price, volatility and land scarcity
Dataset, year AHS, 2000 MIRS, 2000 MIRS, 1990
OLS IV Observations OLS IV Obs OLS IV Obs
Log house price -0.064*** -0.076*** 42 -0.055*** -0.071*** 25 -0.014 -0.021 25
(0.011) (0.020) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018)
Volatility (5yr window) -0.995*** -1.830*** 42 -1.153*** -1.695*** 25 -0.241 -0.645 25
(0.329) (0.612) (0.242) (0.406) (0.156) (0.629)
Volatility (10yr window) -0.703*** -1.543*** 42 -0.783*** -1.579*** 25 -0.347 -0.908 25
(0.262) (0.547) (0.215) (0.485) (0.268) (0.864)
Land scarcity -0.072*** - 42 -0.078*** - 25 -0.028 - 25
(0.023) - (0.019) - (0.026) -
This table reports coe cients from linear cross-city regressions of local mean LTV ratio on a range of variables: log house price,
two measures of volatility (5yr and 10yr windows) and land scarcity. For the IV results, we use land scarcity as an instrument
for prices and volatility. The first set of columns corresponds to the AHS in 2000; here, LTV ratios are conditional on household
characteristics, and are constructed as described in Section 2.1 in the main text. For the MIRS, we report estimates for both 2000
and 1990. We include volatility measures (constructed as described in Section 2.1) for both a 5 year window (i.e 1995-2000 for 2000;
1985-1990 for 1990) and a 10 year window (1990-2000 for 2000). The FHFA data does not extend back su ciently to calculate 10yr
volatilities for 1990. All regressions are weighted by census sample counts. SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
For homeownership, the observed patterns are robust to choice of cross-section, volatility
window and year. In each case, we see the strong negative relationships described in the
main text. Looking at the OLS specification, the e ect of price is very similar across years:
a doubling of house prices is associated with a fall in the ownership rate of between 21 and
24 percentage points. The IV results are very similar. With regard to volatility, changing
the window of measurement has little e ect on the coe cients for each cross-section. But,
the results do vary across years: the OLS e ects are larger in 2000, and the IV e ects larger
in 1990. Still, the reduced form e ect of the land scarcity instrument (in the final row) is
very similar across years.
In Table 5.11, the estimated e ects are remarkably similar in magnitude across the AHS
and MIRS datasets for the 2000 cross-section, for all variables. In each case, there is a
strongly significant negative e ect, consistent with the main text. The results are not very
sensitive to the chosen volatility window either. However, the e ects on LTV in the 1990
cross-section (as measured by MIRS), while negative, are all statistically insignificant. This
is a result of smaller coe cients, rather than larger standard errors. In Figure 5.20, we
explore this further: we plot the estimated coe cients from reduced form regressions of LTV
(from the MIRS data) on land scarcity, separately by year (over 1978-2008). The dashed
lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. The e ect has always been negative, though it was
small and insignificant until the mid-1990s (averaging about -0.5). It has grown steadily
since though, reaching almost -2 in 2008.
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Figure 5.20: Changing e ect of land scarcity on LTV
The blue line gives estimated coe cients from OLS regressions of LTV (from the MIRS data) on land scarcity,
separately by year (over 1978-2008). The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
C.2 Disaggregation of price and volatility e ects
Table 5.12 provides the detail for a discussion in Appendix A in the main text. The idea
is to show that the strong positive relationship between local land share and price lev-
els/volatilities is entirely a composition e ect: the land value component (as opposed to
structure cost) is larger and more volatile. The same is true when we instrument land share
with land scarcity: the e ect appears to be causal.
In Panel A, we regress price levels and volatilities - and their individual components -
on land share, for the 2000 cross-section. This is based on the 42 MSA sample, for which
we have the Davis-Palumbo land share data; in this sample, land share varies from 0.15 to
0.85. A 0.1 increase (a 10 percentage point increase) in the land share is associated with
a 21 percent increase in local house prices. This e ect is entirely due to variation in land
value, rather than structure cost. Also, a 0.1 increase in the land share is associated with a
0.0081 increase in price volatility. The e ect of land share on the volatilities of land value
and structure costs are statistically insignificant. Evidently then, the positive relationship
between overall price risk and land share is entirely due to a composition e ect (land values
are much more volatile than structure costs).
Panels B and C give the reduced form and 2SLS e ects of land share on the disaggregated
price levels and volatilities, where land scarcity is the instrument for land share. The IV
e ects in Panel C are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the OLS e ects in Panel A.
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Table 5.12: Explaining cross-city variation in local price levels and volatilities
PANEL A: OLS (2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log HP Log LV Log SC Vol HP Vol LV Vol SC
Land share 2.110*** 4.594*** 0.128 0.081*** -0.044 0.004
(0.151) (0.168) (0.155) (0.012) (0.035) (0.004)
Constant 11.239*** 9.224*** 11.505*** -0.006 0.100*** 0.008***
(0.072) (0.080) (0.074) (0.006) (0.017) (0.002)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.830 0.949 0.017 0.519 0.037 0.022
PANEL B: Reduced Form (2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log HP Log LV Log SC Vol HP Vol LV Vol SC
Land scarcity 0.975*** 2.076*** -0.008 0.052*** 0.016 0.004
(0.241) (0.482) (0.122) (0.011) (0.028) (0.003)
Constant 11.888*** 10.653*** 11.565*** 0.014*** 0.075*** 0.009***
(0.088) (0.175) (0.044) (0.004) (0.010) (0.001)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.290 0.317 0.000 0.350 0.008 0.033
PANEL C: IV (2000)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log HP Log LV Log SC Vol HP Vol LV Vol SC
Land share 2.075*** 4.419*** -0.018 0.110*** 0.034 0.008
(0.246) (0.276) (0.255) (0.021) (0.060) (0.007)
Constant 11.254*** 9.302*** 11.571*** -0.019** 0.065** 0.006**
(0.112) (0.126) (0.117) (0.010) (0.028) (0.003)
Observations 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.829 0.948 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000
HP is house price, LV is land value, SC is structure cost. Price levels (Log **) are means
over the four quarters of 2000. Volatility ("Vol") is standard deviation over annual growth
rates in prices (measured at first quarter of each year), between 1995 and 2000. Instrument
in IV columns is land scarcity. Observations are weighted by city size. SEs in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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C.3 Land scarcity slopes for parametrization
In Section 4 of the main text, we described the parametrization of the model. Our method
is to compare cities with di erent scarcity of land, which we take as an exogenous variable.
These cities di er in a number of dimensions that are important for the model: specifically,
levels and volatilities of local house prices and wages, and local land share. In Table 5.13, we
report the OLS reduced form estimates of these variables on land scarcity, our instrument. In
the main text, we use these estimates to characterize cities with high and low land scarcity;
see Section 4 in the chapter for further details.
Table 5.13: Land scarcity slopes for key parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Log house price Log wage House price volatility Wage volatility Land share
Land scarcity 0.966*** 0.193*** 0.036*** 0.012*** 0.470***
(0.100) (0.062) (0.004) (0.003) (0.099)
Constant 11.760*** 10.431*** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.306***
(0.034) (0.021) (0.001) (0.001) (0.036)
Observations 221 221 221 221 42
R-squared 0.299 0.042 0.276 0.087 0.361
Log house price is estimated for 2000 using data from the 5 percent census extract. Log wage is taken from
metropolitan-level data of 2000 from the BEA. House price volatility is the standard deviation over annual growth
rates in prices (measured at first quarter of each year), between 1995 and 2000, taken from the FHFA. Wage
volatility is constructed in the same way using data from annual BEA data. Land share is taken from Davis and
Palumbo (2008). In each case, the regressor is land scarcity (taken from Saiz, 2010). Observations are weighted
by census sample size. SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
As a robustness exercise, Tables 5.14 and 5.15 report the land scarcity slopes for house
price volatility and wage volatility respectively, varying the time window used to calculate
volatility in each column. In each table, the first column (volatility window 1995-2000) gives
the estimates used in the parametrization in the chapter. The mean house price volatility
grows significantly as the window is extended: the constant in the regression is more than
double for the 1985-2009 window as compared to 1995-2000. The land scarcity slope also
grows with the volatility window, largely due to recent cyclicality: the slope approximately
doubles when the boom and bust of the 2000s is included. For reference, if we changed our
calibration sample to 1985-2000, the mean city by land scarcity would have as much house
price volatility as the 75th percentile city does in the 1995-2000 calibration. We already
know from the counterfactual section in the main text that that would have only a small
e ect on the model output, particularly with regard to homeownership.
The coe cients on wage volatility are more robust to changes in the volatility window.
The coe cient on land scarcity hardly changes at all across the columns of Table 5.15. But,
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the constant does grow somewhat as the window is extended: it is almost twice as large for
the 1985-2009 window, as compared to 1995-2000.
Table 5.14: Robustness of land scarcity slope for house price volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volatility window 1995-2000 1990-2000 1985-2000 1985-2009 1990-2009
Land scarcity 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.049*** 0.084*** 0.094***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 221 215 163 163 215
R-squared 0.276 0.269 0.156 0.308 0.322
This table estimates cross-city OLS regressions of local house price volatility on land
scarcity, where volatility is calculated using a di erent time window in each column.
House price volatility is the standard deviation over annual growth rates in prices
(measured at first quarter of each year), over the reported time interval, taken from
the FHFA. The results in the main text use the 1995-2000 interval in the first column,
and this result matches column 3 of Table 4 above. The sample size is smaller for
intervals including earlier years, because the FHFA metropolitan sample has grown
over time. Observations are weighted by census sample size. SEs in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5.15: Robustness of land scarcity slope for wage volatility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volatility window 1995-2000 1990-2000 1985-2000 1985-2009 1990-2009
Land scarcity 0.012*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 221 221 221 221 221
R-squared 0.087 0.122 0.104 0.092 0.092
This table estimates cross-city OLS regressions of local wage volatility on land scarcity,
where volatility is calculated using a di erent time window in each column. Wage volat-
ility is the standard deviation over annual growth rates in prices, over the reported time
interval, taken from the BEA. The results in the main text use the 1995-2000 interval
in the first column, and this result matches column 4 of Table 4 above. Observations
are weighted by census sample size. SEs in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
The aim of this thesis is to bring new insights to old questions about urban labour and
housing markets. Here, I briefly summarise the key contributions from each chapter and
extensions which are worth pursuing.
The focus of Chapter 2 is the impact of immigration on native wages. The traditional
approach to analysing this question is by studying the e ects on marginal products of dif-
ferent labour types in a competitive framework. But, I show how, in a frictional model,
immigration can a ect native wages even if marginal products do not change: specifically,
firms can exploit the relatively low reservation wages of migrants by cutting wages for all
workers. I have presented indirect evidence for this phenomenon from cross-city variation in
wages, employment and skill composition.
My strategy in this chapter was to demonstrate why alternative explanations for the
reported empirical patterns are inconsistent with the evidence. Most importantly, I show that
the displacement of low skilled natives from popular migrant destination cities was su cient
to ensure there was no significant local deviation in skill composition (contrary to the findings
of Card, 2001; 2009a); this suggests the observed changes in skill wage di erentials for natives
cannot be explained by an influx of low skilled migrant labour driving down the marginal
product of low skilled natives. In the future, it would also be useful to test whether the
magnitude of the estimated e ects on wages and employment rates are consistent with a
reservation wage explanation; this is likely to require further development of the model.
In Chapter 3, I study the question of why higher skilled workers tend to migrate more
between cities and states. One view is that they face relatively low costs to moving, whether
because of weaker credit constraints, information constraints or psychic costs. I document
new empirical evidence on this subject from direct responses to the CPS on reasons for
moving. I show that better educated workers, and workers in higher skilled jobs within edu-
cation groups, are more likely to move in any given year for the sake of a specific job match.
But, they are less likely to move for reasons driven by the characteristics of the locations
themselves - whether related to family, housing, amenities or job availability. Mechanically,
higher skilled workers move more because the skill gradient is steeper in “match-specific”
than “non-match” migration.
Using a multi-city matching model with directed search, I show how both these empirical
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patterns can be explained by higher skilled workers facing larger average productivity and
larger variance in job match productivity. Because of the larger potential gains from a job
match, more jobs are created and both workers and firms spend more resources on search; and
this explains why higher skilled workers make more match-specific moves. Geographically
better integrated markets also facilitate swifter migratory responses to local declines in labour
demand. The negative skill gradient in non-match moves can be explained by the resilience
of large skilled job surpluses to external shocks.
As in Chapter 2, my strategy was to present evidence against alternative interpretations
of the data; in particular, simple theories on skill di erentiated migration costs do not
sit comfortably with the evidence on non-match moves. However, it would also be useful
to test whether di erences in the variance of match productivity is su cient to explain the
magnitude of the skill gap in job and non-match migration rates; again, this would necessitate
further work on the model.
Moving to Chapter 4, I document a range of new facts on local joblessness in the UK
and US. In the UK since the 1980s, I show that more productive cities (as proxied by the
average wage) have seen significantly higher rates of unemployment and inactivity, with the
important exception of London (which is characterised by high wages and high joblessness).
In contrast, in the US, there is no persistent relationship between wages and joblessness;
unlike the UK, higher wages are instead strongly manifested in city size. This suggests that
US cities adjust much more quickly to local demand shocks.
I cast doubt on the popular theory that Americans are somehow more intrinsically foot-
loose than the British. I instead speculate that the patterns are driven by the UK’s relatively
generous out-of-work welfare support. This allows workers to survive long periods of job-
lessness in less productive cities, but it cannot explain the persistence of these shocks for so
many decades. I suggest the missing ingredient is housing market adjustment: it turns out
that local housing costs are so low in these cities that real wages are actually higher than in
more productive areas. Historically, this may have materialised through the destruction of
industry-specific human capital, while housing capital was largely preserved - causing hous-
ing costs to fall relative to wages. I also discuss the predicament of London, and suggests its
distinctiveness may be driven by prolonged shocks to labour supply, perhaps due to persis-
tently high rates of immigration or foreign investment in local property. Of course, all these
hypotheses are speculative, and the next step for this work is to construct a model to test
their internal and external consistency.
In Chapter 5, co-authored with Jonathan Halket, we challenge the popular theory that
homeownership is an e ective form of insurance (under incomplete markets) against rent
or house price fluctuations (e.g. Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Ortalo-Magne and Rady, 2006;
Banks et al., 2010). We make the novel argument that for most households, ownership is too
blunt an instrument, and the accumulation of liquid savings is often a preferable means of
insurance. One key contribution is to document some interesting cross-city correlations in the
US. We show that, conditional on observable characteristics including income, households in
cities facing higher house price risk are less likely to own and tend to opt for lower LTVs at
purchase. But, this variation is di cult to interpret because of the strong positive correlation
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between price levels and volatilities. To disentangle the e ect of levels and volatilities, we
use a calibrated life-cycle model to simulate ownership and LTV in cities with di erent price
and earnings processes. We allow households to insure themselves through homeownership
and through buying a risk-free bond. Our model suggests the lower ownership rates in
riskier cities are a response to the high cost of housing (assuming a housing ladder where
larger houses are unavailable for rent); but the low LTVs are driven by the risk itself: since
households accumulate more liquid savings in riskier cities, they put down relatively larger
deposits when they do eventually purchase. In this chapter, we use a partial equilibrium
model, taking price and earnings processes as given; an important task for future work
should be to provide structural explanations for the origin of these processes, as well as our
assumptions on the housing ladder.
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